Fernando Cepeda Ulloa in a café in northern Bogotá Camilo Rozo (EL PAÍS)
Former minister, diplomat and academic Fernando Cepeda Ulloa (Bogotá, 84 years old) keeps a close eye on Colombian history and politics. In addition to many other positions, the doctor of law and political scientist was ambassador to Great Britain, France, Canada and the United Nations Organization as well as Vice Rector of the Universidad de Los Andes, where he taught for many years. Of late, he has multiplied his talks about an unprecedented situation that is raising concerns across sectors. Gustavo Petro is leading the polls ahead of the first round of presidential elections on May 29, followed by Federico Gutiérrez and Rodolfo Hernández. Since Colombia had neither a left nor a populist government, this has increased insecurity, Cepeda Ulloa emphasizes in this interview.
Questions. How do you see the moment when the country goes through?
Answer. Colombia is experiencing a negative moment, not now, but for at least three, four or five years. Everything is negative. Nothing is recognized. There is a pessimistic view of our history, what is happening and what could happen to us. It’s a very strange thing, but you look at the polls for the last four years and everything is negative. For once, there is something that gets more than 50% approval. Every question on any subject – personalities, institutions, public policies – scores below 50%, some even very low. There is a negative moment that contaminates everything, including the presidential campaign, of course.
P You warned of the collapse of the political consensus in Colombia. How do you mean?
R What gives a political society its basis, its foundation, its solidity, is the political consensus that defines it. And it revolves around fundamental questions. In Colombia, the peace agreement was a fundamental thing, we hadn’t touched on a fundamental issue in our political life for decades. The agreement with the FARC included whether or not you sanction crimes against humanity, whether you involve those primarily responsible for these subversive activities – or guerrillas or terrorists, you name it – in political life. And around it there was a breakdown of the political consensus that was supposed to support that agreement.
P What happened?
R The mistake was made, which was also committed in England with regard to the European Union, to submit to a public consultation an agreement of more than 300 pages that had been negotiated for more than six years. It is impossible for the public to assimilate that. That’s the starting point.
P We are in the middle of the presidential campaign. Is the political consensus still broken?
R I think it’s still broken, but it’s very interesting to note that the issue of peace hasn’t entered the President’s debate so far, it hasn’t returned to the debate on the content of the agreement. There are very casual allusions. As if the page had turned.
P The presidency of Colombia has historically been, at least from the National Front, in the hands of relatively moderate governments that have caused no major disruptions…
R Forever.
P Could that change in the next elections?
R What has caused these elections to increase the problem of uncertainty – which is typical of every election campaign but is amplified – are two very simple reasons. Colombia has never had a left-wing government. Chile had it, Argentina had it, Brazil had it, Peru had it; Colombian. It has had governments that are more progressive than others but usually moderate. Also, it has never had a populist government. The closest thing to a populist government in Colombia would be that of conservative Belisario Betancur.
P The erosion of the political system and social unrest appear to be common elements in different countries in the region. Is the panorama in Colombia part of a shift to the left in Latin America?
R Historically, Colombia is taking action against this. If there are left-wing governments in Latin America – Lula, the Kirchners, Rafael Correa, etc. – Colombia, for example, has a government like that of Álvaro Uribe. At this moment the red wave is returning and I wouldn’t be surprised if we’re on the wrong track again. The election data, which is widely considered to be very favorable for Petro, is not so clear cut. I see weaknesses in all candidates. Of all these weaknesses, Petro is the strongest, that has to be acknowledged. But they are weak.
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P Petro is clearly the rival to beat. We’ve seen a process in which he tries to portray himself as a more presidential figure.
R moderate. He did it as early as the second round, in 2018, when he managed to grow more than Duque between the first and second rounds. It’s impressive because historically the Colombian tradition of electoral support for the left has been very poor. The explanation we’ve always given academically was that as long as there was a guerrilla, the left had no choice. Once the peace agreement was signed – although it is an incomplete peace, although there are differences of opinion – the problem naturally eased and the left has more leeway, more options. You can see that, that’s clear, that can’t be denied. It is good that there is a left alternative in Colombia. The question is whether this left alternative is radical, is it anti-system, is it Chavez in Venezuela, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Ortega in Nicaragua, or is it an alternative to Ricardo Lagos, to Michelle Bachelet, these examples? progressive governments in Latin America that function with some moderation.
P Iván Duque’s government is nearing the end of its four-year term. What is your balance?
R Duque won with a very large electorate, but this was not reflected in popular support. That seems inappropriate, but it was. The media sort of “didn’t do anything” to him, at least during his first year and a half in government. But the pandemic came and things changed. Because the pandemic has given extraordinary powers to the President of the Republic due to a health emergency provided for in the Constitution. So they no longer said that he had become a dictator. And then, as the pandemic began to subside, they reverted to the thesis that it was irrelevant, inappropriate, or useless. This whole process seemed unfair to him, and I’m trying to identify at least three or four good deeds by the President.
P What are these transactions?
R The first, dealing with the pandemic. Second, the issue of migrants. It is recognized that the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan migrants, nearly two million in a poor country, is a policy that has been praised by many governments and multilateral organizations. Third, it is internationally recognized that post-pandemic economic reactivation was really very important and well managed. And it is recognized that their environmental policies have also been very important, although there have been criticisms for not promoting approval of the Escazú Accords. I could continue the list. They had very difficult situations.
P These achievements could not quell the social unrest.
R No, because the pandemic has exposed the inequality that is extremely notorious in Colombia, it is the most unequal country in Latin America next to Haiti. It made it worse, it sharpened it. Then comes a whole theory that he didn’t make any decisions to help the poor during the pandemic. That is not true. Let’s assume that the management of communications in this government was very precarious, so it was left in the hands of all sorts of very unfair situations.
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