by Guido Olimpio
The man who works for two masters, useful for misleading, is known in technical jargon as “caviar”: Hamas has made him one of its best weapons and manages to deceive the enemy and hide its intentions
In spy jargon I call it “caviar.” the double agent, the man who works for two masters, useful for misleading. Hamas has made it one of its best weapons and persuaded Israeli collaborators to also act for the movement.
It is likely that these ambiguous figures were involved in a well-thought-out plan at the tactical level. Palestinian sources revealed to Portal how the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades managed to deceive the enemy by concealing their intentions. Even if something leaked. Egypt, which has “eyes” in Gaza, had warned Jerusalem of “something big.” We’ll see if this really happened in a continuing story highlighting the faction’s capabilities, the missteps of Mossad, Shin Bet and Aman, Jerusalem’s military intelligence agency.
Israel – Hamas: news about the war, live
Hamas’s first step was to send a reassuring message: We are not interested in a new conflict, we are dedicated to managing the Gaza Strip, we are negotiating to increase the number of Palestinian workers working in the Jewish state. A note said and repeated it on multiple levels, both in and out of the strip. Nevertheless, there were contacts with the Iranian Pasdaran in Lebanon in April, but these were interpreted as preparation for smaller actions, attacks that Israel learned to contain and tolerate. If the Wall Street Journal’s revelations are true, they instead represented the final step that triggered the October offensive, including last Monday’s alleged order to act.
However, at an official level, the Jerusalem government was more cautious about direct involvement of the ayatollahs. It’s time for concrete accusations. The chain of attacks in the West Bank also weighed on the overall assessment: violence – coupled with the government’s ideological decision in favor of the settlers’ demands – pushed for an increase in units in the West Bank and weakened the southern sector.
The second card was more obvious. The brigades conducted exercises, evidence was documented through videos posted online: here are the combat swimmers on the beaches, the fighters on hang gliders, the fire maneuvers. Everything clearly visible. Their workers built a training ground that replicated the houses of the kibbutzim that had been stormed at the time, a theater in which the mission could be rehearsed. It’s impossible that the Shin Bet didn’t notice. The analysis office will have had routine propaganda activities in mind. And what did their local sources say? Have you confirmed? Possible. However, a candid assessment was mixed with misleading advice, in keeping with a tradition that Hamas maintained when it was still “in its infancy.”
Immediately after the movement’s birth, he founded al Majd, the first cell of his counterintelligence agency, and in the 1980s the current leader Yahya Sinwar was also a member of it. The apparatus was replaced by Internal Security in 2007 and has become a key component. He hunted down traitors, studied his opponents and, with Iranian help, equipped himself with technical means. When she found out about this, in several cases, instead of brutally punishing her, a mole persuaded her to work together to “intoxicate” the Shin Bet. a subtle game because you have to secure the turnaround.
The double agent, used to pass accurate data and misinformation, makes it possible to sacrifice something or someone in order not to arouse suspicion among the Israelis. In one episode, Internal Security used the informant’s cell phone to listen in on dialogues with the Israeli 007s; in another, they used the farmer to learn details about “safe houses,” procedures, and Shin Bet connections. But there was an episode in which the spy killed his intelligence contact, a gesture to fully atone for his guilt.
An endless dance of duelists. With losses, twists and turns, infiltrations. In September, the arrest of a member of the brigades in Lebanon who had previously served in Turkey was announced. As a member of the technical department, he spied on comrades in Gaza and abroad, providing the Mossad with details that were later used to kill explosives expert Hamza Shahin in the Gaza Strip in 2021. Economic difficulties forced him to betray one of the Israelis’ favorite hooks for recruiting accomplices.
October 9, 2023 (modified October 9, 2023 | 4:57 p.m.)
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