Soldiers from the Seventh Armored Brigade were attacked in the strip by a Hamas anti-tank team, one of the small formations tasked with moving between houses to fire shots. The military responded by “aiming” at the target and then calling on the air force to intervene, which delivered a double strike. The guerrillas had tried to escape via a tunnel that was connected to an ammunition depot.
Underground traps
The summary version, accompanied by a video, was released by the army to describe one of the moments of the battle in Gaza. Stories that repeatedly refer to hidden positions and tunnels: A press release mentions 130 “exits” from tunnels.
The official reconstructions are balanced by those of more discreet sources speaking to the local media who provide two aspects: progress has been faster than expected, but no one has a definite idea of the size and characteristics of the underground world built over the years by Palestinian resistance . They know it’s impressive, fear it’s even more sophisticated, and to find out they’d have to go inside, but for now they prefer to destroy the entrance to the bunkers. Exploring them is risky due to bombs, possible firefights and rudimentary but effective traps.
The list
Details about the disused tunnels mix with online messages about Hamas, Jihad and Fatah officials killed during the invasion. Yesterday, speakers added the name of Mashan Abu Zina, who was introduced as one of the heads of the research sector, the department that develops military equipment in the Gaza Strip, to the list of almost 60 killed. In the days immediately preceding, they had reported the deaths of Mustafa Dalul, the battalion chief, and Jamal Musa, the “security officer.”
Jerusalem wants to convey the message of success on difficult terrain and the ability to cut down the enemy’s ranks. No one is excluded, the retribution also affects family members and houses that are razed to the ground. They searched for political leaders, commanders and individual elements accused of participating in or directing the October 7 massacres. The mission was entrusted to the defense, the intelligence services and, in particular, the Nili Special Forces: units that must advance together given the conditions in the operational area. As the weeks went by, they claimed responsibility for the elimination of Executive Council members, including Jamila Al Shanti, Widow Rantisi and Jawad al Shamala. The department’s diver leaders were then trained in how to use hang gliders or rocket launchers.
propaganda
However, the campaign must be evaluated taking four aspects into account. First, there is no independent confirmation of the “ending” of all characters (just a few). Secondly: The propaganda of the two competitors is just as fierce as the arguments. Third, the most important targets are still active and apparently well protected: Mohammed Deif, number one of the Al-Qassam Brigades, his deputy Marwan Issa and the leader Yahya Sinwar, who is apparently in a shelter in Gaza City that has been cut off from them everything. Unverifiable story, perhaps part of psychological warfare.
Fourth: Numerous figures in the hierarchy live scattered between Qatar, Lebanon, Turkey and Syria. They are the ones who speak, who often give contradictory interviews, who dictate (general) conditions. Are they at risk? In Israel, someone answered “yes,” even though they are protected by their hosts and can be used for confidential negotiations, especially about hostages. A targeted killing abroad could trigger retaliation against Israeli figures – possibly by jihadist groups not affiliated with Hamas – and have serious diplomatic consequences.
The decision goes through mechanisms that are not always linear. What is valid today may be considered outdated tomorrow. It depends on possibilities, on inner dynamics, on the desire to make dramatic decisions. The crisis, with its horrifying death toll, has shown that the two enemies are not afraid to cross the red lines.