It’s likely that Henry Kissinger, at the age of a hundred, will see his visit to Beijing as the “last mission,” in a highly regarded career that made him the best-known and most influential diplomat of his day (but also controversial and highly controversial), for example because of his responsibility in the Vietnam War, the bombing of Cambodia and Laos, the Chilean coup against Salvador Allende).
For those who know his medical condition – excellent intellectual clarity, physically more precarious with walking problems after hip surgery – it is a just sacrifice that he endures the 15-hour flight from the east coast of the United States, where he lived, to Beijing had to leave due to an emergency. Doctor Kissinger (a title he loves because it evokes memories of his Harvard doctorate and the beginning of his career as an academic and Metternich scholar) is convinced that humanity faces great dangers. One of them is artificial intelligence, to which he recently dedicated a book. The other is an escalation of misunderstandings between the two great superpowers that could lead to a world war. The final mission, therefore, is to resume dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Is it likely that this is a “mission impossible”? Certainly, recent attempts by the American side have had very modest results.
Recent visits to Beijing by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Climate Commissioner John Kerry have all been evidence of a thaw, with disappointing results. Kissinger assumes a different level of credibility and prestige. He is obviously not a member of the Biden administration. His recent stints as a private consultant to various governments around the world have not diminished his authority as a geopolitical analyst. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party recognize him as a genuine friend, even a benefactor, alongside the “Confucian” attitude of respect for the elder statesmen. As the architect of the Nixon-Mao dialogue in 1971-72, when he was chairman of the National Security Council and then Secretary of State, he remains the most respected and revered Westerner for generations of Chinese leaders. Including Xi Jinping. The Beijing Communists really trust him. Even more than the Americans. Joe Biden doesn’t have a particularly close relationship with Kissinger, not just because one is a Democrat and the other is a Republican. That Biden also sees himself as a veteran of foreign policy, a connoisseur of geopolitics, plays a role, and in the past he has been somewhat annoyed at the “arrogance” with which Kissinger drops his advice from above.
Furthermore, Kissinger is light years away from the vision of an “ethical” foreign policy (based on the defense of certain value models) supported by the left wing of the Democratic Party with which Biden has dealings. However, Kissinger has also earned the respect of this administration for the flexibility he has shown in Ukraine. He started from a position that favored Kiev’s neutrality as the price of pacifying Russia. He then gradually adjusted his analysis to advocate a close relationship between NATO and Ukraine in the interests of peace in Europe. In short: Kissinger gives both sides in this “last mission” so much credibility that perhaps even exaggerated expectations are aroused. Is he really capable of changing the situation on his own and allowing a reconciliation of the US-Chinese climate, up to the possible positive impact on Ukraine? The analysis and balance of this visit will be dealt with in further parts.
It is possible that Kissinger himself will one day circulate his version for use and consumption by the world public in addition to the top secret content reserved for Xi Jinping and Joe Biden. In the meantime, one can study the message that China’s top foreign policy chief Wang Yi publicly conveyed to Kissinger. Aside from the well-known and repeated positions on Taiwan and other issues, I would like to draw your attention to a very succinct passage in which Wang Yi sets out the “two impossibilities”. Here it is: “It is impossible to try to transform China, and it is even more impossible to try to contain China.” Here we have the two main fears of communist nomenclature. First, behind the hardening of American foreign policy (in perfect continuity from Donald Trump to Biden) is the old goal of “regime change”, i.e. the overthrow of the communist system. This betrays an uncertainty we do not take for granted: Xi appears to be the most powerful and solid of all world leaders, yet authoritarian regimes are always afraid of collapse. Kissinger should be able to assure him that “regime change” in the case of China is now a distant dream for the American ruling groups.
The second fear is more problematic. Containing China is a US goal, and how. This is economically and technologically what explains the embargo on the supply of the most advanced semiconductors. This is happening at the diplomatic and military level, as evidenced by the different geometries of new alliances in the Indo-Pacific. From the Aukus with Great Britain and Australia to the Quad with India, Japan and Australia to the new military agreements with South Korea and the Philippines, America actually wants to strengthen the strategic cordon around the People’s Republic. The limitation of the Chinese leadership is that it does not understand how much its very aggressive stance in the Far East has worried and frightened many neighboring countries, driving it even more than before into the arms of the United States. Kissinger’s ability to teach is put to the test to explain China’s shared responsibility in the current situation to Xi. Then he will have to explain to “us” what we must and can do.