Today, September 26th, marks the day a landing was so hard it resulted in a plane crash as the plane was badly damaged although everyone on board was unharmed.
It was September 26, 2011 when the aircraft Douglas DC950, registered under registration YV136T, operated by the Venezuelan company Aeropostal, operated flight VH342 from Caracas to Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, carrying 125 passengers and 7 crew members performed.
Upon arrival at the destination, a hard landing on Puerto Ordaz runway 07 occurred at almost 4.2 G (4.2 times gravity), which ruptured the pylons of both aircraft.JT8D engines.
Despite the accident, the plane safely decelerated and stopped on the runway, where the passengers disembarked. The DC9 was later towed from the runway but never returned to service, having accumulated 71,817.6 flight hours since its manufacture in 1976.
Research and Conclusions
According to the investigation report of the General Directorate for the Prevention and Investigation of Aviation Accidents of Venezuela (DGPIAAE), three crew members were on the flight deck:
a commanderintraining, 55 years old and a total of 14,000 flight hours;
a senior officer in training to be verified as a senior officer, aged 42 years and cumulative hours of 275; and
an official safety pilot (no dates mentioned) who played no role and was limited to just one observer in the extra seat.
The DGPIAAE analyzed that even during takeoff, the aircraft exceeded the maximum allowable noseup angle of 10.5 degrees and reached 13.2 degrees, leading to the possibility that the tail had made contact with the runway surface.
Subsequently, during the approach to Puerto Ordaz, the airspeed was reduced to 123.8 knots (229 km/h), resulting in a significant loss of lift that contributed to the aircraft hitting the runway with force and a vertical acceleration of +4.155 G caused and the detachment of both engines.
The report describes the need to keep the cockpit sterile (free of conversation and distractions) during the final stages of the approach for landing, but this requirement was not met, resulting in the first officer’s control of the aircraft being neglected.
In his interview, the commander stated that he was fulfilling his duty of monitoring the copilot and monitoring the approach speed. However, the cockpit dictaphone, as well as the commander’s psychological examinations, indicate that he was preoccupied with difficulties in his work environment and several company allegations against him.
The investigators felt that additional assessments were needed to determine what factors influenced the first officer’s spatial orientation decisions (lack of experience, age, or mental health issues) that compromised flight safety by not acting quickly enough to to avoid the hard landing.
In their interviews, the crew members expressed that there were no squalls, updrafts or downdrafts, which was confirmed by the weather report stating that the winds were calm.
Based on the characteristics of the event as well as the evidence gathered, the investigators believe human factors to be the primary cause of the accident, and the following causes have been conclusively determined as likely:
violations of the provisions of chapter 4 number 6 regarding the sterile cabin of the Operator’s Operations Manual, due to activities not related to the conduct of the flight;
Lack of situational awareness of the trainee commander, first officer and observer pilot; and
Other activities of the commander in addition to his work as training commander.
With information from the DGPIAE