- Hamas gave the impression that the economy was the focus, says a source
- Even in full view of everyone, Hamas was training for an attack, says a source
- A source adds that Israel misinterpreted training as posturing
- “This is our September 11th,” says an army spokesman, “they got us.”
Oct 9 (Portal) – A careful campaign of deception ensured Israel was unprepared when the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas launched its devastating attack, allowing a force with bulldozers, hang gliders and motorcycles to take on the Middle East’s strongest army .
Saturday’s attack, the worst breakthrough in Israel’s defenses since the Arab armies’ war in 1973, followed two years of Hamas’ subterfuge to keep its military plans secret and convince Israel that it was didn’t want a fight.
While Israel was led to believe that it would contain war-weary Hamas through economic incentives for Gaza workers, the group’s fighters were often trained and trained in full view of the public, a source close to Hamas said.
This source provided many details for the report compiled by Portal on the attack and its setup. Three sources within the Israeli security establishment, who, like others, asked not to be named, also contributed to this report.
“Hamas gave Israel the impression that it was not ready to fight,” a source close to Hamas said, describing plans for the most high-profile attack since the Yom Kippur War 50 years ago, when Egypt and Syria surprised Israel and fought for it let survive.
“Hamas has used unprecedented intelligence tactics in recent months to mislead Israel by publicly creating the impression that it is unwilling to engage in combat or confrontation with Israel as it prepares for this massive operation prepared,” the source said.
Israel admits it was caught off guard by an attack that coincided with the Jewish Sabbath and a religious holiday. Hamas militants stormed Israeli cities, killing 700 Israelis and kidnapping dozens. Since then, Israel has killed more than 400 Palestinians in its retaliatory strike against Gaza.
“This is our 9/11,” said Major Nir Dinar, spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces. “They got us.”
“They surprised us and came quickly from many places – both from the air, from the ground and from the sea.”
Osama Hamdan, Hamas’ representative in Lebanon, told Portal the attack showed the Palestinians had the will to achieve their goals “regardless of Israel’s military power and capabilities.”
“They revolted”
One of the most striking elements of their preparations was the construction of a mock Israeli settlement in Gaza, where they practiced a military landing and trained to storm it, the source close to Hamas said, adding that they even took videos of the maneuvers.
“Israel certainly saw them, but they were convinced that Hamas was not interested in engaging in a confrontation,” the source said.
Meanwhile, Hamas tried to convince Israel that it was more important to ensure that workers in Gaza, a narrow strip of land with more than two million residents, had access to jobs across the border and had no interest in starting a new war .
“Hamas was able to give the impression that it was not ready for a military adventure against Israel,” the source said.
Since a war with Hamas in 2021, Israel has sought to create a basic level of economic stability in Gaza by offering incentives, including thousands of permits, to allow Gazans to work in Israel or the West Bank, where salaries in construction, in in agriculture or the service sector can be 10 times higher than the wage level in Gaza.
“We believed that the fact that they came to work and brought money to Gaza would create a certain level of calm. We were wrong,” said another Israeli army spokesman.
An Israeli security source admitted that the Israeli security services were deceived by Hamas. “They led us to believe they wanted money,” the source said. “And the whole time they were engaged in drills/exercises until they got out of control.”
As part of its deception over the past two years, Hamas refrained from military operations against Israel, even as another Gaza-based Islamist armed group called Islamic Jihad launched a series of attacks or rocket attacks of its own.
No idea
Hamas’ reluctance sparked public criticism from some supporters, which in turn was aimed at creating the impression that Hamas had economic concerns rather than a new war in mind, the source said.
In the West Bank, controlled by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah group, there were some who mocked Hamas’ silence. In a Fatah statement released in June 2022, the group accused Hamas leaders of fleeing to Arab capitals to live in “luxurious hotels and villas” and abandoning their people in Gaza to poverty.
A second Israeli security source said there was a time when Israel believed the movement’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Al-Sinwar, was busy administering the Gaza Strip “and not killing Jews.” At the same time, Israel shifted its focus away from Hamas and pushed for an agreement to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, he added.
Israel has long prided itself on its ability to infiltrate and monitor Islamist groups. Therefore, avoiding leaks was a crucial part of the plan, the source close to Hamas said.
Many Hamas leaders were unaware of the plans and the 1,000 fighters used in the attack had no idea of the exact purpose of the exercises during training, the source added.
When the day came, the operation was divided into four parts, the Hamas source said, describing the different elements.
The first step was a barrage of 3,000 rockets fired from Gaza, coinciding with incursions by militants flying hang gliders across the border, the source said. Israel had previously said 2,500 rockets had been fired initially.
Once on the ground, the hang gliders secured the area so that an elite commando unit could storm the fortified electronic and concrete wall separating Gaza from the settlements, which was built by Israel to prevent infiltration.
The militants broke through the barriers with explosives and then raced across on motorcycles. Bulldozers widened the gaps and more fighters advanced in four-wheel drive, scenes described by witnesses.
“BIG FAILURE”
A commando unit attacked the Israeli army headquarters in the southern Gaza Strip and disrupted its communications, preventing personnel from calling commanders or each other, the source said.
The final part was getting the hostages to Gaza, much of which was done early in the attack, a source close to Hamas said.
In a highly publicized hostage crisis, militants kidnapped partygoers fleeing a rave near Kibbutz Re’im, near Gaza. Social media footage showed dozens of people running through fields and on a road as gunshots were heard.
“How could this party take place so close (to the Gaza Strip)?” said the Israeli security source.
The Israeli security source said Israeli troops in the south near Gaza were no longer at full strength because some had been moved to the West Bank to protect Israeli settlers following a rise in violence between them and Palestinian militants.
“They (Hamas) took advantage of that,” the source said.
Retired Gen. Yaakov Amidror, a former national security adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, told reporters on Sunday that the attack was “a major failure of the intelligence system and military apparatus in the south.”
Amidror, chairman of the National Security Council from April 2011 to November 2013 and now a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, said some of Israel’s allies had said that Hamas had taken on “more responsibility.”
“We foolishly began to believe it was true,” he said. “So we made a mistake. We will not make this mistake again and we will slowly but surely destroy Hamas.”
Reporting by Samia Nakhoul in Dubai and Jonathan Saul in London; Writing by William Maclean; Edited by Edmund Blair
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