After four years of uninterrupted campaigning and five election cycles, an election finally ended in a KO. While coalition talks have yet to officially start and more surprises could theoretically lie ahead, it is now very likely that Netanyahu will get his wish and be able to form a right-wing coalition.
Much has been written about the election and its implications at home and abroad. This column does not attempt to contribute to that debate.
Instead, as we’ve done throughout the campaign, we’ll focus on the data and answer two key questions: What happened to turn a very close election into a relative smash? And what does that mean for the further development of the elections in Israel?
During the four-month campaign, the polls were neck and neck, with both the Netanyahu and anti-Netanyahu blocs hovering around the 60-seat mark. In our last column before the election, we noted that two things could change this and lead to a significantly different outcome: the turnout differential and the threshold.
That’s exactly how it happened. Simply put, the turnout differential ensured Netanyahu’s bloc victory, and the threshold secured the relatively large margin.
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Let’s look at them individually.
Turn out
This would never be a choice based on conviction. With so much water under the bridge, the likelihood of a large number of voters changing sides always seemed unlikely. And so much of the campaign was about creating differential turnout, mobilizing the convinced rather than convincing the undecided: getting more supporters to the polls than the other side could.
The first thing to note is that overall voter turnout has indeed increased, from 67% in 2021 to 71%. Quite apart from anything else, it is remarkable that the Israeli public’s response to election after election is to actually turn out to vote in larger numbers.
More important, however, is who voted in large numbers and who didn’t. Centre- and left-leaning cities in the center of the country – such as Tel Aviv, Herzliya, Kfar Saba, Hod Hasharon and Raanana – saw turnout numbers virtually unchanged from 2021. In contrast, right-wing cities such as Beersheba, Jerusalem, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Tiberias, Kiryat Gat and Afula all saw turnout increases of between three and seven percentage points.
Far-right Otzma Yehudit Itamar Ben Gvir party gestures early November 2, 2022 after the end of voting for the national elections at the campaign headquarters in Jerusalem. Left is Rabbi Dov Lior. (Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
The four percentage point increase in voter turnout therefore came largely from right-leaning sectors.
A look at the raw vote counts further clarifies this point. In 2021, 2.22 million Israelis cast their ballots for anti-Netanyahu parties, as opposed to 2.13 million for pro-Netanyahu parties. While the non-Bibi bloc increased its votes this time by 5 percent to 2.33 million, the Netanyahu bloc grew by 11 percent to 2.36 million. All told, Netanyahu added 230,000 votes to his block from the previous round, while the other side added half as many votes.
Percent change in votes won, 2021 vs. 2022
What happened becomes even clearer if we break down the blocks into their component parts:
On the right, the biggest shift was an unprecedented turnout among Haredi party supporters, who managed to increase their electoral base by 19 percent. The increase in the non-Haredi right (Likud, Religious Zionism and Jewish Home) was more modest but still significant, 8 percent.
In contrast, despite the enlarged electorate, the Zionist center and left (Yesh Atid, National Unity, Labor and Meretz) saw their electoral base fall by 1 percent, showing how their attempts to motivate and mobilize their constituents have failed.
After weeks of talk about Arab turnout, Arab citizens finally turned out in large numbers, with votes for Arab parties increasing by 35 percent. Ultimately, however, this could not compensate for the relegation of the centre-left party.
Overall, Netanyahu’s bloc “won” the “plebiscite” by a very narrow margin for the first time since April 2019 (a highly controversial and questionable concept in this context, but interesting nonetheless).
The referendum in the last five elections
The border area
While Netanyahu’s narrow “victory” by 30,000 votes explains how his bloc would have reached 61 or 62 seats, it does not explain his sizable majority. For that we need to look at the threshold.
As noted throughout the campaign, Netanyahu built his bloc optimally: four parties, each with a majority vote-sharing agreement, with another smaller party he mercilessly attacked to ensure it barely got enough votes to matter to play. Overall, his bloc “wasted” around 56,000 votes, or 1.5 seats.
On the other side of the map, the situation was very different. With four parties hovering just over the threshold and one more just below, there was always a big chance of wasted votes that would prove costly. In the end, Meretz, the veteran left party, missed the threshold by around 4,000 votes while Labor just crossed it. The result meant that although the two left-wing parties received enough votes for around eight seats, they ended up with just four.
votes for left parties
This has sparked a wave of mutual recriminations on the left and centre.
Without falling into the blame game, we want to emphasize a point that’s been made frequently throughout these pages throughout the election campaign: when elections develop head-to-head dynamics, with two major parties vying to become the largest, voters tend to be attracted to smaller parties than last minute. While Meretz has surpassed the threshold (albeit narrowly) in every survey over the past two months, this momentum means its undershoot shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Meretz Party leader Zehava Galon casts her ballot at a polling station in Bnei Brak during the Knesset elections November 1, 2022. (Roy Alima/Flash90)
The other party that failed to cross the threshold was the Arab Balad Party, which ended up missing by 2.9 percent, or about 15,000 votes. This means that while the Arab parties won a total of 511,000 votes, practically the same number as religious Zionism, they ended up with only ten seats. Ultimately, the 130,000 increase in Arab votes since the last election and the successful attempt to increase their turnout has been largely meaningless.
votes for Arab parties
Overall, the anti-Bibi bloc squandered 289,000 votes, worth around seven seats – the difference between a very close election and a resounding defeat.
What about the poll?
As always, when election results don’t match the polls, questions are raised about the quality — and even usefulness — of the opinion poll. This has become a well-known argument around the world, and as those who have noted the accuracy of Israeli polls over the past few cycles, this is an important issue that we need to address.
The biggest challenge for pollsters in Israel concerns the threshold. Meretz fell about 0.1 percent below the threshold, well beyond the accuracy of a survey. This, in turn, bolstered the other parties, as the Meretz vote is awarded elsewhere, all of which contribute to the perception of a “mistake” in voting.
If we’re being critical, we can point out that Meretz averaged 4.6 seats in our final cut and never fell short in any poll, but still the polls showed that it was consistently in danger – always within margin of error – and that they were therefore below shouldn’t come as a big surprise.
Shas Party leader Aryeh Deri with supporters announcing the results of Israel’s elections in Jerusalem. November 1, 2022. (Yossi Zamir/Flash90)
Had Meretz won that additional 4,000 votes, the Netanyahu bloc would have won 61 or more likely 62 seats, not far off the poll average of 60.3. Subsequent analysis will be able to deepen this further, but it is likely that the late surge in turnout among the right, and particularly among the Haredim, was responsible for this discrepancy.
However, there is much room for improvement on the issue of Haredi parties. Despite polls consistently reaching 15 seats throughout the campaign, the Haredi parties ultimately won 19 seats, beating poll numbers for the fifth straight year. Twice – in April 2019 and this time – this was by a very large margin.
Haredi Parties: Seats vs Final Poll Average
Given the particular nature of the Haredi community, Israeli polling institutes must continue to invest in new ways to more accurately reach this community to ensure this does not happen again.
On the whole, however, the survey was fairly accurate. With the exception of Meretz and the Haredi parties, every other party within a seat finished below their average, with several being right on the nose. In an extremely fluid multi-party field, that is not to be scoffed at.
Shift from final survey average to results
Even if Meretz just missed the threshold, the average “miss” per party in this election was 1.2 seats, which is well in line with the average of the last four rounds.
Average seat change by party from last poll average to actual results
In the end, the survey served its purpose of giving us an accurate picture of the state of the race. It showed us the election would go to the end, a seat or two either side of 60-60 unless a left-wing party falls below the threshold. It also showed us that four parties were very close to that threshold. She couldn’t see exactly which party would eventually go under, but she did her job.
Which brings us back to where we started this column four long months ago with our borrowed and misappropriated Winston Churchill quote: After five campaigns in quick succession, the reality is that polls remain the worst way to measure the measure public sentiment, apart from all others that have been attempted.
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Simon Davies and Joshua Hantman are partners at Number 10 Strategies, an international strategy, research and communications consultancy that has conducted polls and campaigns for presidents, prime ministers, political parties and large corporations in dozens of countries on four continents.