A Russian tank destroyed by the Ukrainian army near Luhansk, February 26, 2022. ANATOLII STEPANOV / AFP
A week after launching their attack, Russian forces took Kherson, a major city in southern Ukraine, Ukrainian officials confirmed on the night of Wednesday, March 2 to Thursday, March 3. It is the largest city taken by Russian forces. Further east, in Mariupol, Ukraine’s main port on the Sea of Azov, fighting is still raging. If it took control, the Russian army could ensure territorial continuity between its forces from Crimea and those arriving from separatist territories, located further northeast.
Russia’s military advance comes just hours before ceasefire talks to which it has agreed. Russian and Ukrainian negotiators are due to meet on Thursday morning in Belarus, not far from the Polish border. Initial talks on Monday, also in Belarus, yielded no tangible results.
During a chat, Michel Goya, historian and former colonel of the naval troops, answered questions from readers of Le Monde about Russian military strategy.
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Re4Be: How to explain the interruption of the advance of the long line of armored vehicles of the Russian army positioned north of Kiev?
Michel Goya : This is a reinforcement of the Russian XXXVI Army west of Kiev. The braking is due to Ukrainian counter-attacks and organizational problems. The Russians are also taking the time to reorganize.
JB: Are Russian military operations in Ukraine representative of the capabilities of the Russian apparatus? What kind of doctrine are they inspired by?
As a matter of principle, they are representative, given the scale of the resources committed. The doctrine is essentially the same as since the 1970s with the idea of high-speed attacks, armored columns coming from all sides aiming to go as far as possible in the depth. This plan failed. Of the seven Russian armies engaged, only two managed to advance in depth, especially in the South. The control of the sky is incomplete and there is poor air-ground coordination.
Vincent: What possible explanations for the underperformance of the Russian army? Has it been overestimated?
Yes, I was the first, because the judgment was based on the experiences of the annexation of Crimea, the offensives of August 2014 and January 2015 in Donbass and Syria, which were rather successful. This time the commitment is on a very large scale and no longer limited to elite or selected units, and it is clear that they have poorly organized the thing. The Russian general staffs are visibly lacking in experience, and many of the motorized troops are quite mediocre.
In addition, the use of firepower (artillery, air strikes) was initially limited to avoid devastation, but the Russian army – which is mainly a large artillery – has difficulty fighting without it. The Russian army is also visibly in trouble in urban fighting, where precisely their superiority of fire and armored equipment can play much less. And then there is a much tougher Ukrainian resistance than expected.
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Paxwax: Given the imbalance of power between the Ukrainian army and the Russian army, is it conceivable that the Ukrainians could stop the invasion of their country?
It is likely that Russian forces will eventually prevail at least in eastern Ukraine, as far as the Dnieper. For Kiev, it will probably be long but inevitable from the moment the city is surrounded. Western aid is very important especially for the consolidation of a guerrilla war that can hold urban strongholds for a very long time and harass Russian forces over the long term. All the small equipment (helmets, vests, etc.) is very useful and especially small arms, from assault rifles to anti-tank missiles. It is simply unfortunate that this is coming now and was not organized before the war.
Heixi: How do you explain the lack of air superiority of the Russian forces after a week of conflict?
Several reasons are put forward: the initial phase of destruction of the Ukrainian air defense structure is incomplete due to the lack of precision ammunition, the poor coordination of the Russian air force with the Russian air defenses on the ground – and the fear of fratricidal fire – and the restraint in the use of the air force to limit the damage. This left space for the Ukrainian Air Force. Currently, there are no more Ukrainian planes in the sky, but armed (effective) drones. The Ukrainians keep batteries of S-300 missiles that scare the Russians.
Luc: Why doesn’t Ukraine destroy – with surface-to-surface and/or air-to-ground missiles – the road and the trucks that make up this long column?
Because it does not have the possibility, except with the use of Turkish TB2 drones, very effective, as always.
Laurent: Is it conceivable that in the event of major Russian strikes on civilian areas, NATO will impose a no-fly zone [a perimeter where flights are prohibited] on Ukraine?
No, it is impossible. This would involve fighting the Russian air force, which is excluded.
Lea: Isn’t it a bit early to say that the Russian military is not achieving its goals or has been overestimated? The conflict is only in its first week… Moreover, what level of certainty do we have about Russian military and strategic objectives?
It is obviously not known precisely what the Russian strategic objectives are, except most likely a change of regime in Kiev and probably also the conquest of eastern Ukraine, followed probably by a partition.
It is likely that russian forces will manage to seize Kharkiv and thus manage to unblock the maneuver in the east, in coordination with an attack from the south (Zaporozhia) but everything is slower, more expensive and more difficult than imagined.
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Timeout: Which side is the time taking advantage of? The Russian army that can reorganize itself or the Ukrainians receiving weapons in reinforcement of the Westerners?
It depends. The regular Ukrainian army is wearing out almost as fast as the Russian army, which is itself reorganizing. It is difficult to reinforce the regular army, except through logistics, but armament and light equipment can be transported more easily and strengthen territorial forces.
Importantly, the Russians still have the option of attacking western Ukraine from Belarus, which would greatly hamper Western aid.
Toto: Given the stalemate that seems to be beginning, is it possible to find a way out of the conflict that allows Russia to save face and therefore accept a cessation of hostilities?
It is very difficult to say. We are rather, for the moment, in a rush forward and an escalation. To negotiate, you need cards and Russia does not have any at the moment. It will have more with the capture of Kiev or eastern Ukraine. Perhaps a withdrawal could then be considered in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.
Art: Russia has deployed only 200,000 soldiers out of the 900,000 it has. Does this correspond to the limit of their financial capabilities, projection capabilities or logistical capabilities, or can they bring back more troops in the short term?
Troops are brought in to reinforce from almost everywhere, but the maneuvering capacity of an army is always more limited than its overall strength. I think the Russian military has committed – or is in the process of committing – in Ukraine about two-thirds of its capacity, which also needs to be supplied logistically. We will quickly reach the limits of what they can deploy. I would remind you that, for France, it is fifteen thousand men.
Escarcelle: In your opinion, does Russia plan to occupy Ukraine militarily in the medium term and does it have the means to do so?
It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. It is possible that they will consider cutting off Ukraine but, even so, it will be necessary to maintain significant forces in the eastern part of the country. In any case, the main threat to them is the existence of permanent guerrilla warfare.
Romain: Is the nuclear threat real?
It is not credible at the moment. The use of nuclear weapons is a taboo. Its tactical use (weapon of “low” power) in Ukraine would be disastrous for the image of Russia, which would be permanently banished. Its strategic (thermonuclear) use against Western countries is inconceivable because of the possibility of immediate retaliation. The nuclear threat is, in fact, somewhat the last possibility of Russian maneuver, but it is necessarily futile in the face of other nuclear powers.
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Claire: If the Ukrainians have Turkish TB2 drones that are very effective, why don’t they use them to destroy the column of Russian trucks north of Kiev?
The Ukrainians have only a few TB2 drones, used primarily against targets not protected by the Russian air defense (Pantsir). They may have been used against this column, I do not have the information.
Victor: We are talking about Chechen militias that would have a strong psychological impact. Do they have a real impact on the morale of Ukrainian troops? Or is it just com’?
The Chechens are there to complete an infantry that lacks men – and often motivation – and probably also to scare. I am not at all sure that this has a real psychological effect.
Leffiathan: To what extent has the Russian army been modernized? Everything seems to indicate that the 900,000 soldiers are not all at the same level of equipment.
The Russian army is in fact very heterogeneous and the reform process initiated in recent years has not yet borne all its fruits. There are excellent light infantry units (air assault brigades, naval infantry, spetsnaz [special forces], paratroopers) and others much more mediocre (motorized infantry). The ongoing professionalization is incomplete. The equipment is also very heterogeneous between what is very old and very modernized. Small-scale operations (Ukraine, Donbass 2014-2015, Syria) have been successful, while large-scale operations, where it is necessary to involve everyone, visibly pose many problems.
Francis: How many of these famous Turkish drones does Ukraine have? Are fast deliveries possible?
I am not sure. Sources range from two to six TB2s that are still operational. They are being implemented in Ukraine, from a command post that the Russians have not yet found.
Paranoid delirium: Could one imagine that Putin considers that supplying weapons is indeed an act of war and react accordingly?
Perhaps, but react in what way? Its army is now fixed in Ukraine and the nuclear threat is in vain. Russia can act in some other fields – cyber – but this is already the case anyway.
Clemclem: Can the weapons being delivered by Ukraine’s allies currently reach their destination, where they are needed?
This necessarily requires time between the decision, the meeting, the routing, etc. The encircled cities will obviously be impossible to help, but a Russian operation in western Ukraine via Belarus would also pose a lot of problems.
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Pierre: Videos of tanks abandoned in the open countryside – for lack of fuel but perhaps also motivation of the teams – circulate on the Internet. A tank certainly costing several million euros, are there any precedents for such a situation? How to explain it?
There is indeed a very high rate of vehicle loss per abandonment, on both sides, but especially on the Russian side. This means very dispersed fighting, where isolated units can no longer be supplied with fuel and where there are very local advances and retreats where vehicles are abandoned on the spot. On both sides, there are logistical problems, but the Russian operation was obviously poorly organized from this point of view.
Shidenkai: Do we have an estimate of the losses of the Russian army? Ukrainians speak of more than 6,000 Russian deaths.
The spokesman for the Russian army spoke of 498 Russian dead and about 1,500 wounded, a toll probably underestimated, but much more credible than that announced by the Ukrainians. This is already huge. Russian wear and tear is very important. For my part, I estimate the Ukrainian material losses at about half, perhaps a little more, of those of the Russians. For the Ukrainian casualties, I have no idea.
Hubert Bonisseur de la Bath: Has the Russian army committed its best tanks so far? We see in the photos of destroyed equipment a lot of light armored vehicles. This gives the impression that the bulk of the Russian forces (tanks, helicopters and planes, but also artillery) are still largely in reserve.
This is mainly because the Russians are leading their best units, such as air assault divisions and brigades, which are equipped with light armored vehicles.
Louis: In the limitation of effective deployment, you mention 15,000 men for the French army. We wouldn’t be able to supply more than 15,000 men into hostile territory? Sounds ridiculously weak to me, right?
The contract is to be able to deploy a division with two French brigades and a foreign brigade, this represents about fifteen thousand French soldiers as well as forty-five combat aircraft. This corresponds above all to what we are able to equip completely. Thanks to twenty-five years of budget cuts, from 1990 to 2015 (and 2017).
Pierre-Olivier: Some of the Russian soldiers seem young. What is the composition of the Russian armies deployed? Isn’t this a “tender” first wave that could be quickly reinforced by more seasoned troops?
The Russian army is mixed, mixing conscripts to a year of service and contract professionals, young people as well, as everywhere else. The best troops are in the light infantry, the paratroopers, and they are actually very committed, even over-engaged, to compensate for the weakness of others.
Question: What do you think of the hypothesis that Vladimir Putin is actually seeking to take possession of the southern part of Ukraine (in order to encircle the Sea of Azov), with no real intention of taking Kiev in the long term or installing a government there?
Possible. Still, three Russian armies, a third of the total effort, are concentrated around Kiev. The seizure of Kiev seems a prerequisite for everything from regime change to withdrawal negotiations.
Clem: Last night, four Russian planes briefly violated Swedish airspace. Error or deliberate action to send a message? Is this kind of incident likely to happen again? And if so, what are the risks and consequences?
This is why President Macron has called for caution and restraint for the French forces, which we will remind in passing that they are engaged in Mali, like Russian forces. There can be incidents and skirmishes conducive to a dangerous escalation, although I don’t think it can actually climb very high. That would add stress to the tension and this is not the time.
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Bayov: Information is circulating – without the possibility of verifying their sources – about what could be the manipulation of Russian soldiers by the Kremlin: namely that they are sent to the front without being informed of the basis of their mobilization. Do you have similar echoes?
The non-information of soldiers is an old Russian habit, out of obsessive preservation of secrecy and a little out of contempt, the soldier must and will obey, but the psychological damage can be, and already is, considerable. We must not get carried away at the idea of a mutiny or a coup, but it is always possible, as the attempts after the fall of the USSR showed. Generally speaking, military defeats often lead to political upheavals in Russia.
Mathieu: What conclusion will China draw, seeing the second army in the world get bogged down in the face of its enemy, which is not even considered a regional power, on its own ability to carry out an operation to recover the territory of Taiwan?
I don’t know. I am not sure that they like the current destabilization of the world very much. The Chinese are generally much more cautious and the current events should indeed encourage them to wait.
Marc: We read everywhere that the Ukrainian army massively arms civilians, that Zelensky invites civilians to prepare Molotov cocktails in preparation for an urban guerrilla war… Isn’t the flip side of this approach to make military and civilian victims inseparable, and therefore the identification of possible war crimes?
Yes, this is true, and military incompetence, despite the extreme motivation, is also a source of losses. Unfortunately, a great deal of sacrifice and civilian casualties are to be expected.
Iryna: Is it still possible for Ukraine to win this war?
In the short term, it is difficult to see how the Ukrainian army could resist. In the long term, it is difficult to see how the Russian army could get out of the trap of widespread guerrilla warfare.
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