Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced Friday that he would withdraw about 900 U.S.-led coalition troops from his country, saying that “the justifications for their existence” – the threat posed by the Islamic State, or ISIS – ” “finished”.
As Portal reported on Friday, Al-Sudani announced that he would put together a “bilateral committee” that would include members of coalition forces tasked with ending their presence in the country. However, it is not clear whether al-Sudani and the Iran-aligned political blocs crucial to his appointment as prime minister will actually be able to oust coalition forces from office, even if they do so could limit their ability to operate in the country and the wider region.
The announcement came just a day after the US killed Mushtaq Jawad Kazim al-Jawari, also known as Abu Taqwa. According to the Defense Department, he was a leader of Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN), a Shiite militant group linked to Iran and responsible for attacking U.S. facilities in Iraq and Syria. Other reports identified Abu Taqwa as Mushtaq Taleb al-Saeedi. The Pentagon confirmed Abu Taqwa's identity as al-Jawari, but did not confirm the identity of a second person killed in the attack, aside from his affiliation with Abu Taqwa and HaN.
Such attacks have been taking place at varying paces and intensities for years, and are on the rise again following Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza following the October 7 attacks. Pentagon leadership claimed that Abu Taqwa was “actively involved in planning and executing attacks on American personnel.” Given that Harakat al-Nujaba and similar groups are technically part of the Iraqi military, al-Sudani's office called Thursday's attack an “unjustified attack on an Iraqi security force operating within the authority authorized by the commander-in-chief.” the armed forces.”
In both Iraq and the Red Sea, U.S. coalition forces are at a loss as to how to respond to attacks like those by Harakat al-Nujaba and the Houthis. The lack of response has not deterred the attacks, but even limited attacks – such as targeted attacks on ammunition depots in Syria – have not been possible. But more aggressive attacks, like the one on Thursday that killed Abu Taqwa, could have undesirable consequences, such as increased attacks on U.S. facilities or on commercial containers in the Red Sea – and risk further escalation in the region as a whole.
What else is the anti-ISIS coalition doing in Iraq?
The US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS was formed in 2014 to drive ISIS out of areas it controls in parts of Iraq and Syria. The group enforced an extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam in its so-called caliphate, forcing conversions, executing those who opposed them, committing genocide, kidnapping and killing journalists, and carrying out terrorist attacks on Western targets.
In March 2019, five grueling years later, the coalition managed to largely dismantle ISIS infrastructure and drive the group from the territory it once controlled. In October of the same year, IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died during a raid by US special forces in Idlib, Syria.
Although by this point the coalition had ostensibly achieved its goals—dissolving the caliphate and killing the group's leader and many commanders—ISIS itself did not die. That's partly because partner groups still operate around the world, including in the Philippines, parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Gulf states and parts of Africa. And it is also because thousands of people linked to ISIS – former fighters and their wives and children – have been held in prisons and displaced persons camps and have not yet been repatriated.
Furthermore, as U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) claimed in a 2022 report, ISIS still operated in the region, albeit with much less impact than at the height of its power. The CENTCOM mission, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, “now advises, supports and enables partner forces” – such as the Iraqi military and the Syrian Democratic Forces – “to ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS and enable the establishment of one.” Framework for Security Cooperation.”
Complicating this mission are the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs) – mostly Shiite militias that are linked to varying degrees with Iran but are technically part of the Iraqi military. These groups grew significantly and gained power in Iraq in 2014. They played a critical role in the fight against ISIS, particularly early in the conflict, according to a recent RAND Corporation report.
“There is a core network of Iranian-controlled groups in Iraq that run these front groups” that carry out rocket attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, according to Phillip Smyth, an independent analyst who focuses on Hezbollah and jihadist groups in the Iraq region .
These groups have been launching missile attacks since around 2020, following the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a revered leader of the Iranian military, but some occurred as early as 2019. Some of the groups have been around for much longer – since 2005 at least – and they are trusted allies of the Iranian regime. They are unlikely to deviate from Iran's strategy and interests in the region. But other smaller front groups are not necessarily as closely connected, Smyth said, and can sometimes erroneously veer off course or completely disregard Iran's orders.
What are the possible consequences?
Until late last year, al-Sudani had “publicly defended US troops by saying they were in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government,” wrote Sarhang Hamasaeed, director of Middle East programs at the US Institute for Peace, in early November. As recently as August, the USA and Iraq were on the way to deepening their military cooperation.
Al-Sudani has tried over the past year to balance competing interests – those of a coalition called the Coordination Framework, which former Iraqi ambassador to the US Rend al-Rahim described in an article for the Arab Center as “a diverse group of Shiites.” political parties dominated by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the PMFs, allied with Iran and Kurdish and Sunni interests and those of the US.
Before the October 7 attacks, this might have been easier; Attacks on U.S. facilities by PMFs and Iran-aligned groups in Syria had stopped for months before Israel's war against Hamas, part of a de-escalation trend between Iran and the United States and its partners in the region.
While Iraq has always sided with the Palestinians and refused to recognize Israel, the war — and particularly the U.S. strike on Abu Taqwa on Thursday — has changed the domestic political balance for al-Sudani, says Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow at the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment International Peace, said Vox. “For Sudani, this move creates additional domestic political pressure to act against U.S. forces,” she said. “I think the strike continues [Abu Taqwa] will at least spark a broader, more lively and public debate about whether U.S. forces should stay or leave. This may not result in US forces being kicked out, but it will likely restrict their freedom of movement and force the US to withdraw.”
Indeed, in late October, powerful Shiite Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr called for the US embassy in Baghdad to be closed due to US “unreserved support” for Israel; This has not yet happened, even as tensions between the US and Iraq rise due to the war.
For the United States, Iraq's harsh response – and al-Sudani's about-face, which appears to be due to domestic political pressure – is a result of crossing a border, Kavanagh said. “In this already tense context, the US attack was a risky and escalating step. I believe that this will not reduce the threat to U.S. forces in Iraq, but rather increase it.” And while it is not yet clear whether al-Sudani's threat will come true, “I believe that the effort to Forces to expel forces could have enough momentum to succeed in the event of further US attacks.”
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