Economic interests and international relations make it impossible for Muslim countries to take a joint step in support of the Palestinian people. In the hours in which Hamas is launching calls to the Arab world for mass mobilization in favor of its cause, it is said Michela Mercuri, professor of culture, history and society of Muslim countries at the University of Padua, it is unlikely that Middle Eastern governments will act with conviction and coordination. On the one hand, there is the so-called Shiite Crescent, consisting of Iran, Syria and the Lebanese party Hezbollah, which fully supports the attack by Islamist militiamen from the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, there are a number of Muslim states that, to varying degrees, are hoping for a de-escalation that will free them from the embarrassment of having to choose between proximity to the Palestinian people and economic interests with Tel Aviv.
Hamas asked the Muslim world for support. Do you think it is possible for these states to adopt a unified position?
I believe that there will be no joint action by these countries, other than a stronger call for moderation in the event that Israel’s actions against the population prove to be particularly bloody. The days of the Arab League, which was also so united in an anti-Israel perspective, are over, and it is clear that each of these actors is also thinking about the economic interests they have with Israel.
In its appeal, Hamas is particularly addressing Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. Why she?
Firstly, because they are neighboring countries. And as neighboring countries, particularly with regard to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, they have welcomed an important Palestinian diaspora since 1948. Therefore, Hamas intends to rely on the Palestinian population living in these states to increase their support and move public opinion, of course not only in these states. It is possible that the population will accept this invitation. In Jordan, for example, a section mobilized to call on King Abdullah to abandon the peace treaty with Israel. It is clear that we must then take into account the position of the different governments, and most of them have taken a rather cautious approach to the events and, in most cases, have not explicitly condemned the attack, but have called on the parties to be more moderate.
Türkiye’s positioning is interesting. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared himself a defender of the Palestinians years ago, but also initiated a process of normalizing relations with Tel Aviv. Now he is offering himself as a mediator: Do you think he will avoid openly taking sides?
Erdoğan is one of the actors who has called for moderation more than others; he has not taken sides. He has taken on this role of mediator in various contexts, sometimes he succeeds well, sometimes less so, but he believes that he has what it takes to carry out this role. Years ago he declared himself a defender of the Palestinian cause and part of the Turkish population agrees with him, but on the other hand he also has important business with the Israelis. I am referring to the Leviathan pipeline off the coast of Israel, which is intended to bring gas directly to Turkey. This is a very important deal for Turkey, and by putting support for the Palestinians and the economy on the balance, Erdoğan certainly believes that it is better to mediate than to take a clear position.
The other possible mediator is Egypt, which in recent days has called for respect for Palestinian rights. How will it behave in the event of an invasion? If people gathered at the Rafah border crossing at Israel’s suggestion, could Cairo decide to open it?
Egypt also occupies a very special position. On the one hand, in 1979 he signed the historic Camp David Accords, which he had brokered, with Begin, Sadat and Jimmy Carter, thereby moving very close to Israel and thus receiving important donations from the Americans. On the other hand, there is a section of the Egyptian population that is closest to the Muslim Brotherhood and linked to the Palestinian cause. However, it must be said that Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has ruled Egypt since 2013 and has become very close to the State of Israel. How will it behave in the event of an invasion? I believe that he will take as impartial a position as possible. Egypt recently closed the Rafah crossing, the only crossing that would have allowed Gazans to escape during a possible Israeli ground offensive. It is clear that Egypt fears that two million people living in Gaza will flee to Egyptian territory. It is also true that in the event of a massive exodus from the Gaza Strip, Egypt may be forced to open it under pressure from various Western public opinions.
Those who will openly side with Hamas are Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Qatar. Do you think that in the event of an invasion of Gaza they could launch an offensive in northern Israel?
It is difficult to say whether Hezbollah, the actor most to watch, will actually open a front in northern Israel. Hezbollah is ready, but it also has to deal with a population that has been really war-weary since 2006, since the last war between Israel and Lebanon. And therefore he will have to navigate between these two positions. However, we can hypothesize that Hezbollah could continue to fire some rockets, opening a second front and thus fragmenting the Israeli military forces. As for Qatar, I think it plays a rather unclear role at the moment: although it continues to finance Hamas and hosts its headquarters there, I see it as difficult for it to openly side with Hamas. Qatar’s position seems to me to be a wait-and-see approach. Furthermore, although I have some doubts about the sincerity of their position, it appears that they are brokering a prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel. In conclusion, I believe that Iran will continue to provide support and weapons, but will not use its men.
There are also doubts about the position of those countries that began normalization with Israel through the Abraham Accords, which also includes Saudi Arabia. Will they expose themselves?
I have some personal doubts about the authenticity of the Saudis’ attempt to move closer to Israel, including in light of the China-brokered deal between them and Iran. Until the situation becomes clearer, Saudi Arabia will stay and watch. It is not impossible that he will then take the file into his own hands again. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco will certainly not expose themselves, but are extremely concerned about this war.
It remains to be seen how the UN, EU and US can maintain their position of support for Israel in the event of a “disproportionate” response. If the number of casualties were to rise rapidly, would they send messages to Israel asking them to slow the advance, or would they remain in the alliance regardless of the outcome of the invasion?
In this context, we need to understand what is meant by Israel’s “disproportionate response.” What is proportionate when a thousand civilians, including children, are killed? With this act of war, Hamas caused an unprecedented massacre of the civilian population in these areas. And it goes on. It is clear that Israel’s response will be a strong response, with missile launches, attacks on strategic targets and perhaps even a ground offensive. If Israel starts striking in unusual ways and killing civilians, if the situation in Gaza becomes dire and it is not possible to evacuate people from the Gaza Strip, there is clearly a good chance that the United States and the European Union and the UN could demand de-escalation.