Although the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the propaganda of the opposing sides manages to hide many truths, some operational lessons can already be learned. In particular, the combat performance of the various branches of arms is intended to influence the tactical criteria and the commands of the earthly instrument.
First, the importance of battlefield surveillance and the target acquisition process was emphasized. Competition from NATO and US electronic systems aircraft platforms such as Global Hawk (opening photo), E8 Joint Stars and others has changed the confrontation between Russians and Ukrainians since the first day of the war.
Clearly inferior in terms of airborne radar, satellites and reconnaissance drones, the Russian Armed Forces have suffered a series of setbacks, largely due to the inability of their forces’ offensive maneuvers to produce surprise and the security of defensive machinery. The Ukrainian command, informed Real time movements of the Russian units and their exact position on the ground, was able to counterattack and hit the enemy at their weakest points, massing according to the gaps in the Russian deployment.
The use of drones was crucial both strategically and tactically in identifying the attacking columns and Russian logistics ganglia to the most distant rear lines, as well as directing and controlling the firing of missile systems and artillery pieces. The full use of the skies not only by the air and helicopter components, but also by the drones and orbital munitions used at all order levels down to those of platoon/squad, has revolutionized land combat and made the role of cavalry in missions strong reduces reconnaissance and exploration. These can be performed with much greater effectiveness and safety than the armored vehicles of drones, which are also economical and easy-to-use systems that have found widespread use in all weapons and combat specialties.
Another lesson was the high lethality of missile systems designed to counter aircraft, helicopters and armored vehicles. The Russian air force was almost paralyzed and the freedom of movement of the armored complexes was severely restricted. In practice, only aircraft and tanks equipped with adequate and updated electronic or active self-protection systems can operate profitably on the modern battlefield.
Even artillery, thanks to the prolific use of surface-to-surface missiles and guided shells, has rediscovered its importance and proved that it can replace airborne close-support and defense missions in various contexts. Those that made the most effort to increase the effectiveness of artillery fire were the fixed paying targets such as command posts, logistic centers, ammunition and fuel depots.
From these observations, you derive some general tactical directions. In order to avoid observation from above and avoid the identification of their forces by enemy reconnaissance, all combat units will have to make greater use of their mobility to move continuously around the battlefield and take on missions that are as thin and thin as possible. This applies also, and above all, to the logistical structures, which must be predominantly wheeled for the purpose of greater survivability and maneuverability of the armed forces.
Each infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineering division must have its own surveillance drones to ensure the security and defense of its unit, as well as drone identification and kill systems, and electronic warfare using munitions to disrupt drone travel links.
The artillery and transmission detachments, framed at the maneuver brigade or support brigade level, must have long-range drones to direct fire and control the battlefield over a large area.
The ingenuity in favor of mobility must also be strengthened in order to allow rapid restoration of road traffic through the construction of bridges and footbridges.
FC
Photo: US Air Force / Twitter