Between 2019 and 2021, the European Union negotiated a comprehensive agreementCivil Aviation with Qatar which ended with the formalization of the agreement on October 18, 2021. An Open Skies Agreement comparable to those the EU has formalized with the United States, Canada, Morocco, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova, Israel and Ukraine has been applied to the Gulf Emirate. According to the agreement, according to the website of the European Commission, “all EU airlines should be able to operate direct flights from any EU airport to Qatar and vice versa for Qatari airlines”.
The Making of the Agreement
In words, it could be read as a major turning point for the revival of aviation after the Covid-19 halt. Outside the bureaucracy, however, we speak of an unbalanced understanding. As the Greek City Times pointed out in a newly signed agreement, the Middle Eastern country’s companies will essentially be reduced to a single carrier: Qatar Airways.
The deal was discussed at a time when the emirate of al-Thani was actually under siege due to the embargo imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain, which had closed land borders and prevented air overflights by Qatar Airways airlines, who at the time were considered one of them best companies in the world for service quality. At a time when the Middle East was becoming the key hub of world air traffic with the launch of Asia, the flag carrier of the Middle East country entered into negotiations to break the siege and build a bridge to Europe.
A capillary service
However, we note that upon reading the content of the agreement, Qatar Airways has a strong advantage: aiming to meet and exceed 6.3 million passengers annual flights on the Europe-Middle East axis and increase in commercial flights The EU has planned broad growth in connections with five key countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.
According to the Commission’s website, 261 connections are affected: 24 weekly connections between the emirate and Belgium; 27 weekly connections between the Gulf State and Paris, 14 weekly connections between Qatar and Nice, as many for both flights to Lyon and separately for all other French airports; 21 weekly connections between Qatar and Frankfurt, as many to Monaco Monaco and 14 weekly connections between Qatar and any other point in Germany; 84 weekly flights Qatar-Italy; 14 flights Qatar-Amsterdam and 14 between Doha and all other hubs in the Netherlands. There are also 135 commercial flights. A total of 396 flights on the Europe-Gulf axis, where on the one hand Qatar Airways has free access to European Union airports and on the other hand EU companies, formally guaranteed in compliance with competition, can compete with each other for a single hub, the international hub Doha .
The role of Qatar Airways
The deal was completed last year criticized by major airlines and by Europe’s unions, but defended by the European Commission, which said it would guarantee “opportunities for both sides”. Since then, the national airline has established a base in Dusserdolf, Germany, restarted the Italian route to Venice and reorganized strategies to connect “Europe with the world” according to its priorities. Data between mid-2021 and mid-2022 shows that the national carrier is clearly behind the crisis: revenue rose 210% last year thanks to growth in Qatar Airways’ network and a record profit of 1.54 billion in the company’s 25-year history US dollars, expected 2022-2023.
The deal, which leaves Doha failing to comply with EU aviation legislation, returned to the eye of the storm after the Qatargate blast. The national carrier is not under investigation, but Politico.eu stressed that the emirate’s lobbying in Europe may have had, among other aims, in addition to a soft-power operation, to favor oneapproval sent the agreement. For which a direct involvement of Qatar Airways would not be necessary: The emirate of al-Thani runs its business like a large corporation: the company’s latest hire is a pilot and the stars of Paris Saint Germain alike are considered “employees” of Doha, whose government is responsible for political leadership.
Corriere della Sera’s Francesca Basso announced that “Left-Left MEP Leïla Chaibi has tabled an amendment adding the suspension of the agreement to point 14 of the resolution being voted on by Parliament today, which calls for the suspension “everyone on the legislative dossiers related to the Gulf country, in particular with regard to visa liberalization and planned visits, until the suspicion is confirmed or disproved.” From our perspective in Qatargate, we stick to what we know so far, namely that the deal is off the Panzeri’s radar – Kaili scandal. However, as analysts we have to make some hypotheses and reflections on the political consequences of this fact.
Three questions to focus on
The first point to consider is the fact that the exclusion of Qatar Airways The Qatargate scandal does not rule out political pressure from Doha to restart the company. The emirate’s understandable fear of international isolation, Europe’s balanced stance in the Gulf dispute and, above all, the desire to speed up the EU’s connection to the major international hubs all play a role. Elements that, together with the undisputed excellence of the Middle East airline, may have played a role in the signing of an agreement deemed appropriate to penalize companies but speed up the internal market.
Secondly, one has to wonder who might turn out”winners” of this agreement on the European front. And to consider that the great flight game mobilizes complex industrial contexts that fall under the direct competence of governments rather than bodies like the European Parliament, which is at the heart of the scandal. Simple Flying brought up a few weeks ago the suspicious correspondence between Qatar Airways’ purchase of 80 Airbus A380s in 2010 and pressure from France, the European avionics giant’s central nation, to give the Middle Eastern country the 2022 World Cup. Well, in the years that the flight deal was being negotiated, Airbus, which owns 6.65% of the Franco-German traction company, saw the start of orders from Qatar for the new Airbus A350. The deal recently fell through after disputes over the safety and future of the order following delivery of the first A350s, and Qatar has turned to Boeing despite having a stake in the group Qatar Airways is at odds with. So certainly France and secondly Germany they have every political interest in strengthening the aviation axis with Doha, which would have meant booming deals and multi-billion dollar orders between 2019 and 2021.
Third, opening Pandora’s box with the al-Thani company would require an ex-post review of all civil aviation trade deals signed by the EU. The special feature of the European “single sky” makes the EU internal market extremely attractive. And that, in turn, puts Brussels at a “disadvantage” in many agreements involving individual countries.
Therefore, to date, there is no evidence that Qatar Airways is involved in Qatargate. However, there is a possibility that political pressure from both the emirate and the EU, for reasons of opportunity and hope for successful contracts, favored the acceleration of the deal. And for now there is only one winner of this challenge: Doha. Which has secured a privilege without having to adapt to European standards and has “invaded” the EU with its five-star company. But that can actually show the stupidity of the Brussels bureaucrats. Pay more attention to the logic of free trade than to market equilibria. And if that were the case, it would be less surprising: it would be ordinary European administration.