Javier Milei told a radio station that he would not allow himself to be blackmailed by unions or social movements in general. More specifically, he said that he would not allow himself to be blackmailed by the violent people on the streets for them it was “the law” for which he had the support of the security forces.
It would be a truism of no greater significance if it were not for the country’s situation, the upcoming “adjustment plan” and the long and still strong Argentine tradition of social movements on the streets.
The latest information on the future of the government indicates that Milei has appointed his own people to the few (apparently eight) remaining ministries and intends to do so. He has already done this, among other things, for three ministerial positions and the post of head of cabinet (for some of which he appointed people with no experience). The staff of ally and former President Mauricio Macri (20152019) would provide technical support as “subs”. Emilio Ocampo, Milei’s dollarization guru, goes to the central bank.
Members of the victorious Libertad Avanza coalition leak to Argentine journalists that there will be no coalition government, even though Milei’s group only has 38 of the 257 representatives in the House of Representatives. Even among Macri’s people and the normal right there is no majority.
Argentina’s elected president has also stated that the adjustment will not be paid for by ordinary people. The privileged caste in politics would pay for this.
It’s an old demagogic fiction that also applies in Brazil: without the privileges of the “politicians”, the supernumerary ministries and such sad nonsense, there would be money for everything. It is surprising, but it is the general opinion of so many people who have never looked at journalistic summaries about the national budget, whether Argentine or Brazilian.
Milei also said the first six months of his administration would be “tough,” a sort of optimistic truism if not because he has already stated that he wants to bring inflation under control within a year and a half to two years. Another year of recession is predicted for 2024.
Whatever your plan, there will be great social suffering, which is more or less inevitable depending on the intelligence and political feasibility of what you do.
But it is inevitable that the bill will be footed by workers as inflation still has a long way to go; by those who receive subsidies on tariffs for public services (e.g. energy); of those who will suffer the most from the upcoming sharp devaluation of the peso, which will have a direct impact on the prices of food (including meat) and fuel.
It is paid by those who do not have dollars or physical assets with which to protect the money from inflation.
Having secured almost 56% of the vote, Milei appears to have some social base to pursue his plans, without a coalition government and without threats to social movements and the most ardent Peronists. At first it could be like that. However, 46% of Milei’s secondround voters did not vote in the first round of the presidential election. They voted against the Peronist catastrophe.
It is not known who will be the Minister of Economy, which is the reason for the guesswork and speculation before the government that we know so well. But perhaps one can speculate how long this unknown economic minister will last in a country that will go through a harsh adjustment (or chaos without adjustment), and how long Milei will be able to govern “without a coalition.” Few.
At least in public and even in analyzes by Argentine journalists and economic consultants, there is no sign of any greater political agreement on the part of Milei, who has not given up on the core of his program, at least in lip service.
Milei will fight as is for now. It led to comparisons with Jair Bolsonaro. There is a risk that it is a variant of Fernando Collor.