“The situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than at any time since early June 1950. It may seem overly dramatic, but we believe that Kim Jong Un, like his grandfather in 1950, made the strategic decision to enter the war. “. This is what former CIA agent Robert L. Carlin and nuclear expert Siegfried S. Hecker, both at Stanford University and both protagonists of missions in North Korea, write in an article published in the analytical journal “North Korea North '38 North”. Title “Is Kim Jong Un preparing for war?”.
“We don’t know when or how Kim plans to pull the trigger, but the danger,” the two wrote in a Jan. 11 article, “already goes well beyond the level of routine warnings in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo about Pyongyang’s “provocations.” out. . In other words, we do not see war preparation topics appearing as typical North Korean bluster in the North Korean media since the beginning of last year.”
“It is difficult to conjure up the specter of Pyongyang's decision to pursue a military solution – effectively warning of war – in the absence of 'concrete' evidence. Typically, one will encounter the now routine argument that Kim Jong Un would not dare take such a step because he “knows” that Washington and Seoul would destroy his regime if he did. If this is what politicians think, it is the result of a fundamental misinterpretation of Kim and Kim's vision of history. “a serious failure of imagination that could lead to catastrophe (on both Kim’s and Washington’s part).”
Per Carlin, former head of the Northeast Asia division in the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he participated in negotiations between the US and North Korea, and Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and professor emeritus of Stanford University: “This Failure to understand the history of North Korean politics over the past 33 years is not just an academic problem. Misunderstanding history has dangerous implications for understanding the meaning of what lies ahead.”
They note that Washington and Seoul “cling to the belief that their alliance, supported by 'iron-clad' deterrence, will keep Kim on the path to the status quo, perhaps with a little provocation.” There is a completely understandable belief that this is becoming more and more common.” Symbols of our retaliatory intent will keep the North at bay, as will our oft-stated belief that if the North attacks, a counterattack will completely destroy the North Korean regime. However, in the current situation, clinging to these beliefs can be fatal.”
North Korea, they point out, “according to our estimates, has a large nuclear arsenal of 50 or 60 missile-launched warheads capable of reaching all of South Korea, virtually all of Japan (including Okinawa) and Guam. If, as we suspect, “Having come to the conclusion after decades of trying that there is no way to engage the United States, Kim's recent words and actions point to the prospect of a military solution using this arsenal.”