We need to talk about the Buffalo Bills’ 12-man-of-the-field penalty – the one that lost them the game on Monday when the Denver Broncos had to replay their original missed game-winning field goal attempt. This penalty was not the inevitable result of fast-paced football. This was not human error beyond the control of a head coach or special teams coach. This penalty should not be imposed on players who did not make the substitution properly.
The Athletic spoke with two recently retired special teams coordinators and three other current NFL employees who work closely with coaching decisions, and all five agreed that an NFL team cannot replace its existing defense with field goal block defense should replace if they find themselves in a “mayday” field goal situation. There is not enough time to ensure a clean transition (for less than two minutes the referees do not stand over the ball to allow a man-to-man transition) and the chances of blocking a field goal are vanishingly small.
“Defensively, we would never replace an opponent’s mayday situation for the exact reason that happened the other night,” said Mike Priefer, longtime special teams coordinator for four NFL teams, most recently the Cleveland Browns.
Over the past five seasons, only 2.2 percent of all field goal attempts in the NFL have been blocked (86 of 3,925), and even fewer times have the game been on the line. During the same period, only 1.8 percent of all potential game-winning/go-ahead field goal attempts were blocked in the fourth quarter or overtime (7 of 392).
Buffalo actually overperformed in this game. The Bills have blocked 2.7 percent of all opposing field goal attempts under head coach Sean McDermott, the seventh-highest rate in the NFL since his first season in 2017. That includes 7.1 percent of potential game-winning/go-ahead attempts in his fourth season contain quarters or OT by their opponents (1 of 14).
But that’s still not enough reward to risk a more likely and unnecessary outcome: having too many men on the field.
“You don’t want to give them a second chance,” Priefer said. “Whatever 11 is on the field, in a crisis situation, whether it’s nickel or dime, keep them out and make sure you don’t have more than six on the line of scrimmage on one side of the middle or the other, and make sure you get out of it.”
That’s the opposite of what Buffalo tried to do. They switched from their dime defense with six defensive backs to their field goal blocking unit. Five players left the field. Six went on.
“We practiced switching from dime to field goal block two or three times this week,” McDermott said. “And at the end of the day we didn’t implement it, so it’s inexcusable.”
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Before we go any further, we need to define what a mayday field goal actually is. Broncos coach Sean Payton said he calls it a “hurricane” now and other teams might call it a “lightning,” but whatever you call it, the teams have similar parameters.
1. Running watch
2. The offense has no more timeouts at halftime
3. Third down, in or near field goal range
4. Within 40 seconds up to 17 seconds on the clock
In the mayday scenario, the head coach alerts the offense and the special teams coordinator, who relays the message to the kicking unit to be ready. The kicking unit is likely already prepared on the sidelines, as their job is to stay two or three steps ahead of the offense. The attacker is instructed to get down as quickly as possible to save time and leave the field immediately. The snapper then takes over the lead for the kicking unit, always keeping an eye on the clock.
It may seem like absolute chaos, but teams practice these situations several times during training camp and then with the entire team a few times a year. Kicker, Snapper and Holder go through this scenario several times a week. “We drill it, we measure it, we drill it, we measure it,” Payton told reporters. There’s even a coordinated way for the offense to leave the field (straight, horizontal) and for the kicking unit (at an angle from the bench) so no one crashes into each other and wastes time.
In Denver’s case, quarterback Russell Wilson knelt three times to set up the mayday field goal, so it was a planned mayday. This is slightly different from other forms where the offense actually runs a play on third down, which means more uncertainty since the field goal depends on the third down play. In this case, there was no third-down play, no second-down play, or even first-down play. Denver found itself within comfortable field goal range after drawing a 28-yard defensive pass interference penalty, so all three plays were kneedowns.
Buffalo even called two timeouts in the middle of Kneedown 1 and 2 and Kneedown 2 and 3. They knew what was coming, and those timeouts should have given them enough time to organize field goal block substitutions if they did had insisted on subbing. In this scenario, a planned Mayday where everything is announced, would it be appropriate to replace field goal blocking with defense? For Buffalo, that meant replacing five players.
Priefer said no, but allowed for a little flexibility. He said he switched to base defense during one of the timeouts Buffalo took between Denver’s squats. In Cleveland, Priefer said the 4-3 base defense consisted of the same personnel as the field goal blocking personnel, but that wasn’t the case on every team. That way they would be ready on this defense before Denver made the quick switch to the field goal unit on fourth down.
Many coaches refuse to make substitutions on defense in this situation because, with time running out, there is no reason to overcomplicate it. Don’t hit yourself; Let your opponent screw it up.
Denver’s Wil Lutz capitalized on his second field goal. (Bryan Bennett/Getty Images)
And the Broncos had already beaten themselves in this game. The reason they were down by a point is because kicker Wil Lutz missed an extra point in the second quarter, and then again in the fourth quarter when Broncos owner/punter Riley Dixon mishandled the snap on an extra point attempt that Lutz couldn’t do it anymore. I didn’t even kick the ball (Dixon ran with the ball, then fumbled and recovered it). One more reason not to risk replacing defensive players during Mayday.
The two former special teams coordinators The Athletic spoke with said they made a plan for this scenario with their head coach well in advance. And the plan didn’t change during the game.
Many NFL teams have a blocking team within the on-field defense, regardless of sub-package or base package. Every defensive player should know where to line up and execute a field goal block. Some teams even practice this for every field goal scenario during preseason games to help players get used to the situation.
At the end of that questionable sequence in Denver, Lutz’s 40-yard miss left reporters wondering whether the Broncos actually had enough time to make the field goal attempt with 24 seconds on the clock.
“Was there a second guess about whether the field goal unit would come out a little early?” a local Denver reporter asked Tuesday.
“No,” Payton said. “Here’s the thing, 17 seconds is the cutoff. So I knew we had enough time to send out our rush unit in the time we had.”
Whether there was enough time was the wrong question. The right question is: Did they spend enough time to play this as well as possible?
Priefer said the general rule of thumb is for the snapper to hit the ball with less than five seconds on the play clock, leaving no time for another play after the kick. Denver was so quick on their Hurricane field goal that they snapped the ball with seven seconds left, an eternity. And all that extra hustle may have led to Lutz missing, but it may also have contributed to the sloppiness of Buffalo’s substitutions. There were four seconds left on the clock after the miss. In the first half, Denver executed the Hurricane perfectly, grabbing the ball with three seconds left.
On Tuesday after the game, McDermott also discussed the end-of-game debacle in more detail. He talked about the two different ways a team could play: stay or sub, both of which the Bills did in this game. In the first half, Denver scored the truest version of the Mayday field goal in a shorter span, with 20 seconds on the clock to start third-and-six, a full pass to Jerry Jeudy and, in this scenario, Buffalo kept the same defensive personnel for the field goal attempt. The shot was good and there was no defensive penalty.
“Usually you stay out there with your defensive team, we call it defensive stay,” McDermott said. “And you do that so you don’t end up with a situation like a fire drill where you’re trying to bring in so many and get so many out. At the end of the game there are two schools of thought. Either you do the same thing and rush with your defensive unit, or you try to get your block, the maximum rush unit out there, that’s what coach (special teams coordinator Matt Smiley) has tried to do, and unfortunately a certain amount is went in and nothing equivalent came out.”
“Since it doesn’t happen very often, I would try to keep it simple and not change anything,” Priefer said. “Because for me it would be exactly the same situation at the end of half and at the end of the game.”
McDermott had the right answer. And he knew it well enough to say it out loud. He gave responsibility to his special teams coordinator, but this mistake negatively impacts the team’s process overall. Why wasn’t there a unified plan?
(Top photo by Sean McDermott: Timothy T Ludwig / Getty Images)
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