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When NATO leaders meet in Lithuania this week, President Biden and his closest allies will try to convey a powerful message to Russia: that the West is united against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.
But Their show of cohesion is jeopardized by several of the same leaders joining Biden at the Vilnius summit, whose refusal to admit Sweden as the newest member of the 31-nation bloc underscores divisions over NATO’s deterrent power amid a dangerous standoff with Moscow could undermine.
While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban have expressed differing objections to the accession of Sweden, whose advanced military will bolster NATO’s combat capability, underscores their shared status as holdouts the ability of each member state to disrupt widely supported alliance priorities.
The strongmen are troubled if key NATO allies: Erdogan, fresh from an election victory that has cemented more than two decades in power, and Orban, who has friendly relations with Putin and opposes some European aid to Ukraine, have been criticized , because of their anti-democratic practices, but also recognition for their military and other contributions to the Alliance.
The dispute over Sweden’s accession, which requires the approval of Turkish and Hungarian lawmakers for a final resolution, not only poses a threat to Biden’s goal of flaunting his responsibility for a strong NATO, but is also a reminder of other differences that strains on the alliance, including divisions The level of military spending, Kiev’s path to membership and most recently the White House’s decision to supply cluster munitions to Ukraine.
Alexander Vershbow, a veteran US diplomat and NATO deputy secretary-general, said that managing internal differences is “the cost of doing business” for a consensus-based body like NATO, whose allies must, above all else, commit to getting their troops there protect each other when necessary.
“Ultimately, NATO has never been paralyzed when something of absolutely vital importance was at stake,” said Vershbow, who is now a member of the Atlantic Council. “That’s the most important.”
The July 11-12 summit comes at a time when Ukrainian leaders are urging additional weapons from the West, including, they say, fighter jets had to prevail in a hard-fought operation to retake Russian-held territory. They are also pushing for a clearer path to NATO entry.
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has taken a toll on NATO in 1949, as Cold War battle lines were being drawn, with renewed urgency as Allies tightened their defenses against what most saw as a renewed threat from Russia. Although NATO itself has not supplied arms to Ukraine, it has served as a forum to coordinate the massive surge in Western support to Kiev.
Like Finland, which completed its accession process in April, Sweden gave up decades of military non-alignment in response to Putin’s invasion. Although Erdogan decided in March to drop his government’s objections to Finland’s membership, he refused to agree to Sweden’s accession, citing further complaints.
Diplomats are now in turmoil – after months of expressing confidence that the summit will happen Vilnius would provide an opportunity to celebrate Sweden’s accession – to persuade Hungary, and Turkey in particular, to send a signal will allow Stockholm’s accession to proceed.
Turkey’s reasons for rejecting Sweden’s membership, according to Ankara, include a refusal to extradite people it sees as terrorists, including members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and a movement accused of trying to shut down the Turkish government in 2016 to fall. Turkey has also complained about anti-Erdogan protests in Sweden and demonstrations in which Korans were burned.
These complaints are consistent with the populist rhetoric Erdogan used at home, including during the In the May presidential election, he portrayed his opponents as sympathizers with Kurdish militants and enemies of traditional Muslim family values - issues that resonated with nationalist voters and Erdogan’s supporters.
Erdogan reiterated those themes earlier this week, calling the Koran burning in Stockholm during last month’s Muslim Eid al-Adha holiday “an abominable act” that was not a “single incident.”
While senior US and NATO officials insist that Stockholm has met the conditions formulated last year to address Ankara’s security concerns – including amending its constitution and passing tougher anti-terrorist laws – Erdogan has refused to accept Sweden’s accession protocol to send turkish legislators.
Sinan Ulgen, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, said that while Turkey’s stance towards Sweden had a “domestic aspect” that Erdogan used to gain political support, his opposition had “never been just an electoral tool”. Ulgen said it’s more like a brokerage chip to extract an important concession from the United States.
Officials and analysts say the cost of Turkey’s toleration appears to be a $20 billion deal for American F-16 fighter jets, a deal the Biden administration has backed on the grounds that it would strengthen eastern defenses strengthen NATO, but which has long faced resistance on Capitol Hill.
As of this writing, Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s NATO entry “has more to do with what the US will eventually do and not do than what Sweden has done,” Ulgen said.
While Senator Robert Menendez (DN.J.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has long objected to the F-16 sale over Turkey’s rights and its hostile attitude towards NATO member Greece, the Opponents of the deal multiplied The delay in Sweden’s accession has been lengthened. Lawmakers, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), now say they will not support the sale of fighter jets until Turkey backs down.
The basis of Erdogan’s dance against Sweden is his country’s complex relationship with Russia, with which Turkey has strong economic ties and a history of deals and rivalries. While both Erdogan and Putin see themselves as counterbalances to US power, their countries have found themselves on opposite sides of conflicts, including in Libya and Syria.
After Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet in 2015, Russia halted a lucrative flow of tourists to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast the import of Turkish agricultural products.
Turkey’s relations with Russia have been a frequent point of contention with Washington. When Ankara acquired an advanced Russian air defense system, Washington responded with sanctions and removed Turkey from its F-35 fighter jet program, giving Putin a double victory: the incident created a wedge within NATO and prevented advanced aircraft from being deployed near Russian troops in Syria.
In other cases, these links have benefited the West, such as when Turkey helped broker a deal between Moscow and Kiev to resume Ukrainian grain exports across the Black Sea or arranged an exchange of high-ranking prisoners of war.
“It’s a complicated, nuanced relationship,” said David Satterfield, who served as US ambassador to Turkey and is now director of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, of Turkey’s relationship with Russia. “But ultimately it’s something that we, as a NATO member, think is valuable to the Alliance.”
Diplomats point out that Ankara commands NATO’s second largest ground force and has sent troops to participate in the alliance Missions, including Afghanistan, remain a valuable contributor. Turkey was also a reliable supporter of Ukraine and sold arms Drones to Kiev even before Putin’s invasion in 2022.
Officials in Hungary, meanwhile, have cited a range of reasons for their country’s refusal to ratify Sweden’s accession, from Stockholm’s drive to “beat up Hungary,” as a government spokesman said, to the Nordic country’s “crumbling throne of moral superiority.” .
But Hungary’s blockade is less about Sweden and more about Orban’s strong affinity with Erdogan, said Peter Kreko, director of Budapest-based think tank Political Capital. “On the one hand, Turkey is a role model,” he said. “Secondly, it is an ideological source of inspiration. Third, [Turkey is] a very important trading partner, not only at the national level, but also in business circles close to the Erdogan family and the Orban family.”
Hungary is a NATO outlier due to the good relations between Orban and Putin, the country’s skepticism about Ukraine’s war aims and its refusal to allow arms shipments to Ukraine through its territory. Orban has been criticized for his government practices and has repeatedly come into conflict with the European Union over his approach to migration and the rule of law. And like Turkey, Hungary has relied on Russia to keep its economy afloat.
Hungary’s Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said Budapest would not stand alone in obstructing Sweden’s bid. Should Turkey’s stance change, “of course we will honor the promise that Hungary will not hold any country back in terms of membership,” he told reporters last week.
Senator James E. Risch (Idaho), the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Turkey’s efforts to secure concessions unrelated to Sweden’s NATO entry prompted him to ask the question whether countries that pose obstacles to the Alliance’s larger mission should still be members.
“You see, when you have an alliance like this with … 31 countries, it’s important that each country solves problems in the best interest of the alliance and not in their own interest, especially when it’s irrelevant to the foundation.” Purpose of the Alliance” , he told reporters.
Such internal challenges were apparent ahead of the Vilnius summit, when regional and factional disagreements over who would best replace Jens Stoltenberg as the next NATO Secretary General ahead of his expected departure this summer led to his extension for another year.
But diplomats say that NATO has faced serious internal challenges for decades, pointing out that France, one of the alliance’s most influential members, resigned from NATO’s military command in protest in the 1960s. It was only in 2009 that Paris returned to military command.
“NATO has weathered that in the past,” Satterfield said. “And it will survive this one.”
Ryan and Hauslohner reported from Washington. Rauhala reported from Brussels; Fahim reported from Istanbul; Morris reported from Berlin.
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