Stephen Kotkin is a pre-eminent historian of Russia and the author of an acclaimed three-volume biography of Joseph Stalin (volume three forthcoming). Editor-in-Chief Justin Vogt spoke to him today about the dramatic events that have taken place in Russia over the past 24 hours. This interview has been edited for clarity and length.
Yesterday, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary organization, launched an uprising against the Russian military and a direct challenge to the rule of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since this afternoon it seems as if he has stopped the apparent march towards Moscow, at least temporarily. It remains extremely difficult to say where events in Russia are going. The situation is fluid, it’s early days and we don’t want to jump to conclusions. Nonetheless, how could this have happened?
Prigozhin improvised. Maybe he stopped the advance towards Moscow, but now what? Back to the base camps, he says. Okay, but he’s still in charge. You say Putsch, I say Putsch. You say tomato, I say tomahto: Let’s call this whole thing off – but just for the moment.
But he has already managed to break into the southern military headquarters of Russia, located in downtown Rostov, in the very heart of the city. Wagner took over the headquarters – and they didn’t take it with guns, but essentially with smartphones. Technology has made this a different ball game. A television production company rules Ukraine – and with enormous success, in times of war. Prigozhin’s tool is Telegram. As is well known, Putin is not on the Internet; Apparently he doesn’t understand social media. Big mistake.
The dynamic here may resemble a bank run. Think of the Silicon Valley bank collapse: that was a Twitter-backed bank run. If the Russian army on the ground begins to disintegrate, it would be tantamount to a Telegram attack on a political-military bank.
Stephen Kotkin
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford
If that happens — an immense “if” — Prigozhin could be the gift Ukraine deserves: the crucial alternative to Putin, testing the loyalty of everyone in Russia, shows that those who support him on the Russian side are not cause there is little or no actual support for the war. and even clears things up in Moscow. In the first ten days of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, it was all about sounding out weaknesses – unfortunately, also sounding out Ukraine’s own weaknesses and finding them almost everywhere. But the ride could suddenly look more like cutting through butter as Russians lay down their guns in confusion — or just go home demoralized. Long and difficult opportunities awaited Ukraine’s counteroffensive; An internal threat from Putin was the only scenario that really benefited Ukrainians. And well, here we are – or could be.
I have long called the Putin regime “hollow, yet strong.” It remained and will remain viable as long as there is no political alternative. Now we could see how hollow the regime is. Putin has inadvertently initiated a stress test for his own regime. With the blunder of aggression against Ukraine, he had already lost his mysticism. Once lost, Mystique is nearly impossible to regain. The old cliché of the emperor and the clothes. He still wields tremendous power, based on structures he built around himself, such as his Praetorian Guard, and on those he rebuilt – his destruction of the landscape of political opportunity outside himself and his harsh repression to demobilize the population.
Almost every coup fails. The chances are good. But now there is at least a chance.
There is one thing all dictators rightly fear: an alternative. And Putin, shockingly, has allowed alternatives to take shape after years of relentlessly suppressing alternatives and shoving insignificant ones into his inner circle to ensure no one can threaten him. pinch me
Authoritarian regimes build up massive military and security services, but these are deliberately divided against themselves by the leader in order to control and make them dependent on him. The leader deliberately assigns them overlapping responsibilities, exacerbating their inherent rivalries at every turn, and sits back and watches, mostly with glee. But in this case, Putin has conjured up his own nemesis.
I’ve been saying for some time that the way to get Putin’s attention and destabilize his regime is to identify and recruit an internal defector, a Russian nationalist, a person who reaches out to Putin’s rank and file, but the separate recognizes existence of a Ukrainian nation and state. Preferably a defector in uniform. And Putin gave us a candidate.
It’s early. We must be careful not to indulge in wishful thinking. Attempted coups in Russia have had a terrible record. Almost every coup around the world fails. The chances are good. But at least there is a chance now.
But what are the alternatives to Putin?
It’s easy to dismiss Prigozhin as a minor, a commander of a few death squads – militiamen jailed for murder or rape, whom he personally recruited in penal colonies. He himself was serving a lengthy sentence, reportedly nine years. But in a way he also presents an alternative that might be attractive: an authoritarian Russian nationalist who recognizes that the war is a mistake and who, whether intentionally or unconsciously, is fighting the war, or at least the currently active phase of it effectively ended. That’s the only type of person who could threaten Putin – and Putin didn’t take any action as it played out in real time, on video for the whole world to see.
Prigozhin seems an unlikely candidate. But in some ways his background fits the present better than Putin’s. Both are from St. Petersburg, but Prigozhin, despite his sentence, comes from the intelligentsia. His mother is an artist; She runs a gallery in London. He speaks Russian better than Putin. In terms of social class, he is actually a notch above Putin. And Prigozhin’s artistic side is evident in his videos. He can’t count (his math is terrible, another revelation of his videos). But look at his succinct and pointed vocabulary, his cadences, his ability to take on the role of the tough guy, the genuine Russian patriot, the fortune teller denouncing the opportunists, idiots and thieves put in place by Putin.
There is one thing all dictators rightly fear: an alternative.
To a certain extent, Prigozhin seems to have learned from this [Russian dissident] Alexej Navalny’s superlative video appearances. Navalny is still alive. He is in prison and faces re-conviction on fabricated charges. As long as he lives, he too represents an alternative. Another Russian nationalist, of a very different hue, but one who also says out loud that the war was a terrible idea and hurts Russia.
Furthermore, Navalny is the invaluable sanctions-lifting card for any potential replacement for Putin, even if Navalny himself is not that replacement.
What can Putin do to turn things around?
Putin could use his powerful air force, which is still intact, to attack the Wagner forces. It appears that the Russian Air Force bombed Wagner forces en route to Moscow. It would be a radical act to attack Prigozhin, holed up in Rostov, Russia’s main military hub for Putin’s war in Ukraine. Imagine the symbolism of that. However, an airstrike or missile attack could quickly end this potential insurgency. And if he doesn’t use the air force decisively soon, Putin could lose control of the situation.
Prigozhin does not have the heavy weapons to take Moscow militarily. It has no air force – unless parts of the Russian Air Force defect to it. He could take, or at least enter, Moscow for talks or negotiations, but only if he doesn’t meet resistance. That would require the Russian military – soldiers and officers – to choose not to fire on his men and him. That would mean that the FSB (Federal Security Service) or some of its elements decided not to carry out orders to shoot. To be honest this seems unlikely. However, the fact that we’re discussing this at all means it’s not a zero probability issue.
We should worry that Putin might do something radical.
Should Putin actually use the air force against Prigozhin, this could also make things worse for Putin. He would bomb his own forces. Rostov is Russia, not Ukraine. There are Russian children. The military headquarters is right in the middle of downtown in a populous city, and at the headquarters there are Russian soldiers and officers, not just Wagner mercenaries – who also have mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers. Putin would not be able to censor such an act, as it would only be a matter of showing that he is in charge.
We should also be concerned that Putin might do something radical to divert attention and regain the upper hand. He blew up the Kachowka Dam. What about the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant? Putin could blow it up and have Ukraine irradiated. Much of Ukraine would potentially become uninhabitable for an extended period of time: radiation is far worse than contaminated water or the mines Russia has planted in much of the Ukraine it occupies. Ukrainian special forces have repeatedly tried in vain to cross the Dnieper and take control of the nuclear power plant.
Those are some dire scenarios.
Armageddon not averted but delayed? Armageddon postponed? I can’t believe I’m saying those words. Putin recently reiterated that the government’s policy on the use of nuclear weapons is in a scenario that threatens the very existence of the Russian state. He equates his personal rule with that of the Russian state.
Of course, we don’t want to cause panic or cause panic. I don’t know if the Putin regime’s claim that it has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus is genuine. He must have used only one. Is there reason for retaliation against Russia if a tactical nuclear bomb is launched from Belarus?
Remember, when Putin tried to assassinate traitors in the UK, he didn’t let his hit squads shoot them with pistols or put arsenic in their tea. He made them use polonium, novichok. That, too, was a message – not just the fact that he would kill traitors wherever they were, but also the “how”.
No matter how Putin reacts, it seems he is in danger of losing control.
This could pass quickly. Putin is a survivor. The sense that the Russian state is in danger could rally the various rival factions.
In his video response to Prigozhin, Putin alluded to a moment of danger like that of 1917 – when Lavr Kornilov, the supreme commander of the Russian armed forces in World War I, sent troops to the capital, St. Petersburg, to restore order. However, they only succeeded in further dissolving the political home front.
Or consider Alexander Kerensky’s attempt shortly thereafter to forestall an attempted coup by sending troops to eliminate and arrest the Bolsheviks, setting in motion the very coup that Kerensky and his Provisional Government wanted to prevent. The Russian Empire dissolved. If the tough men agree and recognize a moment of similar peril, not just for Putin but for Russia, they might save him to save the country.
What or who should we look out for to know where the journey is going?
Watch Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev. Beijing has not yet commented; Now may be the moment for Xi Jinping to decide that he really has no alternative to a quasi-puppet regime in Moscow. If Putin goes under, Xi may wish to anticipate less desirable options, such as a pro-Western one. Possibly profound consequences for China.
Watch Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, like Prigozhin, lead a large private militia. He claims his absolute loyalty to Putin, but could help start a problem in the North Caucasus. Let’s see if Kadyrov, who has serious health problems, stays in or near Grozny, or if he shows up elsewhere to play a role. His men are apparently involved in the suppression of Wagner. Incredibly, Kadyrov’s ambitions lay in Moscow. But triggering the North Caucasus could have far-reaching implications — for the South Caucasus, for the Levant, for Russia.
Also check out Belarus. The unpredictable President Alexander Lukashenko could decide that the signs of the times are against the wall and suddenly decide to flee, with further repercussions. Putin might even try to remove and replace him. And who knows? Lukashenko could even switch sides and turn west.
Has what happened in the last 24 hours changed your view of Putin?
The bottom line is: Even if it is now being erased, an alternative was allowed to emerge. All of this happened in real time, on video, over months. Putin did not intervene earlier and allow it to come to this. breathtaking. Either he is completely incompetent or he has less operational control than his media machinery allows. Or both. I expected him to be more knowledgeable about Authoritarianism 101. I expected him to understand in real time that this is the only threat. I expected him to stop the games, to stop the clash of rivals to control them because it had become dangerous for him personally. I overestimated him. However, I don’t want to make the opposite mistake and underestimate him.
What is the correct historical parallel here?
I mentioned 1917 earlier because it was Putin himself who evoked it, and not the Soviet implosion of 1991, which he witnessed and often reflected on. But what’s remarkable to me isn’t just the eerie sense of the distant past that seems so close once again, but the technology and media revolution. I look at the Ukrainian television production company running this war, I look at the production of the January 6th hearings here in the United States — Liz Cheney’s hearings were directed by a television producer, to great effect — and I’m like, ‘So They’re doing national security most effectively now: with smartphones, videos, memes.” All those policy briefs written and emailed, all those meetings of directors and deputies of the sprawling national security bureaucracies, all that espionage and stealth and dagger – and boom: Telegram and a pair of thumbs.
Can Ukraine benefit from this?
I was not one of those who believed that Ukraine would train a group of people working in equivalents between 7 and 11 for a few months to use the most advanced weapons in the world and send them in frontal attacks against some of them would The most fortified positions you will ever see. That is, launch an offensive where the enemy knows exactly where you are going to strike and has more than enough time to prepare and has persistently prepared for it.
On the Ukrainian side, there are not very many well-trained troops skilled in combined arms operations, which is one of the most difficult tasks for any military, but mostly civilians who, despite their courage and will, did it through no fault of their own, well, me was given a very difficult task. Not all of Ukraine’s newly trained brigades were deployed. Still, it hasn’t been impressive so far. Yes, Ukraine does not have F-16s yet; they should come. But how aviators with them could successfully fly combat missions into the teeth of the Russian S-300 and S-400 firing from Russian soil is beyond me.
We could see how hollow Putin’s regime is.
We have observed the Russian Defense Forces learning and adapting, using attack helicopters very effectively. That shouldn’t have happened but seems to have surprised some analysts. Russian mines were plentiful and deadly, used with some sophistication and in immense numbers.
But what if Prigozhin manages to disband the Russian army? What if he manages to destabilize the regime in Moscow? What if even if he were crushed, at least some form and degree of destabilization and disintegration would occur? This could be the gift that Ukraine deserves, the gift that its bravery and sacrifice more than deserves. This scenario – the Russian nationalist renouncing war – is Ukraine’s quickest route to some kind of victory. Then, of course, the question of Crimea would come to the fore.
What options do Washington and its NATO allies have? Just wait and see?
If it appears that Washington, NATO and Ukraine are supporting Prigozhin and in cahoots with Prigozhin, all of his chances of bringing about an end to aggression could be undermined. So the reaction was right, to just let it happen, with a little tongue-in-cheek commentary from Kiev, but otherwise scathing reticence in DC and Brussels.
Behind the scenes, of course, there is 24/7 very close monitoring of everything and everyone and intensive consultation. Twelve hours, 24 hours, 36 hours of nail biting. But after all this Sturm und Drang, we could be back where we started: Putin, in power in Moscow and Ukraine, is facing a counter-offensive that will be very difficult to carry out.
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