Bombs, massacres, negotiations, sanctions, threats and propaganda. The war not only devastates Ukraine, but also changes world politics. And this at a time when it seemed that “traditional” warfare, at least in Europe, would give way to other types of weapons and theaters of confrontation.
War, on the other hand, has returned overwhelmingly as the protagonist with all that it entails and causes. And to understand the dynamics of not just this conflict, but the current conflicts in the world, we spoke to Giorgio Cuzzelli, a retired army general and now a professor at L’Orientale, Lumsa and Unint Universities. During his career he has commanded units at all levels, national and multinational, and has been deployed to operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Together with Matteo Bressan he is the author and editor of the book From Clausewitz to Putin: the war in the 21st century.
General Carl von Clausewitz (one of the greatest military theorists in history) spoke of a triad that characterizes “traditional” warfare. Are these elements still present today? Do you also see them in the recent conflicts?
According to Clausewitz, any war is fought by three interdependent components, namely the people, the military instrument, and political power, which contribute to the conflict with different abilities. The interdependence of these three forces is actually a product. If only one of the factors is zero, the result is zero and the war is lost. It is the logic of the great conflicts of the 20th century, the Cold War clashes, the postCold War uprisings, and also the current dispute in Ukraine. On both sides we see these powerful forces in action. And none of them seem ready to give up, no matter what they say. In this sense, contemporary war like all war is more than ever a clash of opposing wills, and it is not yet decided who will prevail.
What is this war in Ukraine?
The current conflict in Ukraine is a modern war, involving practically all dimensions of contemporary conflicts, from conventional operations to cyber warfare and economic confrontation, without forgetting the psychological dimension the narrative which on the Ukrainian side proves to be fundamental proves to compensate for the material inferiority of the nation.
Vladimir Putin speaks of a “special military operation”: a simple narrative or a precise definition, including a strategic one?
In my opinion, the term “special military operation” arises from a number of considerations of a political, domestic and international nature. A war has a precise legal connotation. To call it that is a flagrant violation of the UN Charter. It is no coincidence that Putin cites selfdefense as justification for his actions. However, I am increasingly convinced that the Russians had absolutely no idea what was happening, but rather a ride between two wings of a Vienna 1938style cheering crowd facing the beheading of the Zelenskyi government. That means it had to be a reunion between separated brothers, not a massacre. A number of obvious errors in the assessment and probably in the planning and preparation of the military tool led to absolutely unexpected results.
Many argue that Putin is not a strategist but a tactician. Someone speaks of madness, irrationality … What idea did you have after a month of conflict?
Putin is an absolutely rational actor, and the state policy of the Russian Federation is absolutely rational. The fact that we Europeans have rejected war as a means of settling disputes since the end of World War II and for a number of very good reasons does not mean that in other parts of the World War war is not seen as useful or legitimate in its own interests pursue. Then it makes little sense to pull your hair out. Coming to Russia we obviously find ourselves in the presence of a different value system, not based on individual rights and common rules like ours, but on the supposed interests of a national community and the power logic that governs them, ie violence and subterfuge. . Moreover, this system has ruled the world for at least the last ten thousand years and continues to do so on every continent. We are the exception, unfortunately not Putin.
In the book we talk about revolutions (or nonrevolutions) in war. We were used to the idea of hybrid wars, of almost elusive battlefields, at least between great powers, and instead we find tanks and missiles at the gates of Europe. Does this mean that war (and man) never change?
With the end of the Cold War, there was a growing belief in the West that wars alone can win their weapons and relegate man to a subordinate role. This is due to extraordinary advances in technology. Still, you have to be very careful. On the one hand, the use of more sophisticated materials or deployment techniques does not change the basic parameters of the maneuver towards the opponent, ie the combination of mass, speed and surprise to hit him. Basically, I’ll be able to hit harder, faster, further, faster, but I always have to combine those three things to win. Second, it is not entirely correct to believe that human progress—all progress, mind you—is the result of a revolution. Rather evolution, but not revolution. In fact, change has its roots in a chain of successive steps, all of which are necessary and can last for centuries. Columbus’ caravel is the result of a development in naval technology that began at least three centuries earlier. The French Revolution has its roots in the liberal ideas of the 17th century on the one hand and in the wars and famines of the first half of the 18th century on the other. After all, war is not waged by guns, but by people. The best weapons in the world are useless if the soldier who must use them throws them in the trenches. In that sense, the war in Ukraine seems to me to be an example for us.
What strategic lessons can we learn from this conflict?
From the point of view of politics and international relations, as I have already mentioned, we are in the presence of a conflict between two different value systems. There’s no point in going back to that. From a military point of view, we are witnessing the revival of conventional operations that many socalled experts had abandoned, conjuring up new wars, fourth generations and the like. In reality, war has never changed its face. If anything, we’re fighting on multiple levels, from conventional to irregular to economic to cybernetic. It is the circumstances and the nature of the actors that determine their nature. Basically, in the case of Ukraine we have two contenders, both of whom have an exSoviet mentality, whatever they say, and as such they face each other. They pay attention to the point and give them a good reason.