THE NEW YORK TIMES Very few people were surprised by the presumed death Yevgeny Prigozhin, even if the means a plane crash were undeniably dramatic. Such a possibility has been widely discussed in Russian and Western circles since the 19th century brief mutiny of the mercenary leader in June. It doesn’t matter that Prigozhin later met with the Kremlin and seemed to come and go as he pleased. For many, it was only a matter of time before he received his sentence.
The events of Wednesday remain a mystery. Was Prigozhin’s jet shot down or did an explosion occur on board? To what extent the Russian authorities, and in particular the President himself Wladimir Putin were involved in the incident? If Prigozhin was assassinated, was it a hasty decision or a wellthoughtout postuprising plan? The Kremlin, for its part, denies any involvement in the accident.. Whatever the truth, it is clear that Putin had many reasons for wanting Prigozhin dead reasons that go beyond trying to restore his reputation.
Putin firmly believes in a powerful state. Western audiences often downplay this core belief, instead emphasizing Putin’s personal interests and individual priorities. It is true, of course, that there is a great deal of selfinterest in the President’s behavior. But one of Putin’s greatest nightmares is the danger that the state will become vulnerable, unable to meet internal challenges and teetering on the brink of collapse. This is exactly what Prigozhin threatened. And he may have paid for that transgression with his life.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a cabinet ministerial meeting in Moscow. Photo: Mikhail Klimentyev/AP
It is currently understood that the Wagner group’s efforts were all directed by the Kremlin, but in fact Prigozhin was the driving force. He proactively identified areas where Russia it was faltering or ineffective and offered its services as an interim solution, always in a way that could be interpreted as beneficial to the national interest. Although Prigozhin worked closely with the Kremlin, he had his own priorities. But while Putin no doubt sanctioned and funded these efforts, he has always prioritized the primacy of the state. Nothing could harm him. Prigozhin could have his adventures as long as he remained subservient to the state apparatus.
This deal worked for years. But war in Ukraine upset the balance. Prigozhin saw the opportunity to advance his career, began to challenge the military leadership. When the conflict between the two parties became untenable, Putin’s preference was clear: he clearly chose the side of the army.. In January he stressed that the war should be conducted in accordance with the strategy of the General Staff, a clear sign that the Wagner group should submit. All Wagner fighters who wished to remain in Ukraine were expected to sign contracts with the Defense Ministry and assume command of their generals by June. It was the last drop that broke the camel’s back. The uprising came soon after.
It was a humiliating blow to the Putin regime. The pain stemmed less from the betrayal of the everunpredictable Prigozhin than from Putin’s personal responsibility for the disaster. At state expense, the President had promoted a company that he did not control. The mutiny that followed Putin’s inability to manage escalating tensions between the Defense Department and the Wagner Group was a direct result of this fundamental failure.
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The political price was considerable. Putin was forced to yield to Prigozhin, affecting his position and causing public outrage. Now he faced a thorny dilemma: how to disband a private army without provoking political backlash or violence? After the uprising, the Kremlin’s main concern was to neutralize Wagner politically and militarily in order to restore the stability of the state.
The first step was buying time. Under the terms of the agreement that suppressed the uprising, Prigozhin guaranteed his freedom and the Wagner members were not charged a fee for their participation, surprisingly allowing them to travel as if nothing had happened. In hindsight, it seems a logical approach: Putin wanted to appease Prigozhin by making him feel irreplaceable and protected by the state.
This was instrumental in allowing Prigozhin to leave Russia. And it allowed for the confiscation of some of his Russian assets, as well as depriving him of access to lucrative contracts (although his business didn’t collapse entirely). Above all, Prigozhin’s departure was the prelude to the dissolution of the Wagner group. The most committed Wagner troops, a contingent of around 5,000 fighters, were forced to withdraw Belarus under a new leader, the loyal and obedient Andrei Troshev; the group’s heavy artillery was returned to the Ministry of Defense; and those who hesitated were forced to join the army or go home. In Africa and Syria, the Wagner troops were closely monitored, with a plan to gradually integrate their projects into the security services and the Ministry of Defense.
A portrait of the head of the Wagner group Ievgeny Prigozhin and flags of the mercenary group are placed at a monument honoring Prigozhin in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia. Photo: Anastasia Makarycheva / Portal
During this first phase of Wagner’s retreat, Prigozhin’s involvement was deemed necessary. Your contribution ensured smooth access to key people, facilitated staff appraisal and assisted in decisionmaking. But when the fighters withdrew from Russia, virtually disarmed and busy training the Belarusian armed forces, things changed. It became a living testament to the state’s fragility and a painful reminder of how Putin dealt with the giant he helped create. From the Kremlin’s point of view, his existence no longer made sense.
Regardless of the true cause of Prigozhin’s supposed death, Russian audiences will surely view the death as an act of punishment and revenge. Few people will doubt Putin’s involvement a perception that fits well with the image of a strong president. Some analysts argue there are potential downsides. First, Putin showed weakness by not respecting the security guarantees he allegedly gave to Prigozhin. Second, there could be a backlash from patriotic circles outraged by the apparent execution of a person they viewed as a war hero. Third, the Wagner soldiers, certainly appalled by the assassination, could organize another uprising.
These concerns seem exaggerated. After all, there were no public and explicit guarantees for Prigozhin’s safety, only guarantees which were fulfilled that he would travel safely to Belarus and that the criminal charges against him would be dropped. In addition, Prigozhin’s popularity plummeted after the uprising, as many former supporters denounced his behavior. As for the Wagner group, a widely circulated video allegedly showing their commanders vowing revenge has been debunked, and official channels have called for moderation.
While Prigozhin’s death doesn’t fully restore Putin’s position as a key leader — a wrecked business jet is hardly a convincing symbol of strength — it may offer some comfort to radicals who fear the president is becoming hesitant or unable to form his own circle manage. For Russian elites, the incident is a clear warning: challenging the regime, no matter what successes it achieves, will inevitably lead to its downfall. / TRANSLATION BY RENATO PRELORENTZOU
* Stanovaya, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, writes on Russia’s domestic and foreign policies.