Bill Roggio is a senior fellow at Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and editor of the Long War Journal of the FDD. From 1991 to 1997, Rogio served as a signalman and infantryman in the US Army and New Jersey National Guard
Desirable thinking has the upper hand in the battle to shape Western perceptions of war Ukraine.
Sympathy for Kyiv’s superior and superior defenders has exaggerated Russia’s failures, misunderstood Russia’s strategy, and even baseless claims by amateur psychoanalysts that Putin has lost his mind.
A more sober analysis suggests that Russia may have sought a knockout strike, but has always had well-prepared plans for follow-up attacks if its initial moves prove insufficient.
The world has underestimated Putin before, and these mistakes have led in part to this tragedy in Ukraine.
We must have clear eyes now that the war is on.
Yet even Pentagon professionals allow sympathy to obscure their judgment.
Just two days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, US Defense Department reporters were quick to say that the failure to take Kyiv in the early days of the war was a serious failure.
Defense Ministry informants have hinted that Russia’s offensive has lagged far behind or even failed because the capital has not fallen.
But US leaders had to learn to hold back after their disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Once again, American and Western officials are trapped for failing to understand the enemy and his goals.
A look at the Russian military offensive shows that there was a plan for a full-scale invasion that Russia is now carrying out.
Putin is believed to have believed that the Ukrainian government would collapse after Russian troops crossed the border and pushed into Kyiv, and that the operation failed because the Ukrainian government remained in place.
Putin certainly hoped for a quick victory, but he clearly did not rely on his initial volley as the only plan for success.
Rather, the Russian army was ready to take the country by force if the rapid beheading failed.
This kind of plan should be familiar to Americans who remember the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In the early hours of the war, the US Air Force launched a campaign of “shock and awe” in an attempt to assassinate Saddam Hussein and other key leaders and overthrow the government. Saddam survived, but the US military was fully prepared for a ground attack.
A look at the Russian military offensive shows that there was a plan for a full-scale invasion that Russia is now carrying out.
Conventional, mechanized warfare is an enterprise that takes time and resources, and the operation of this scope does not take days.
The Russian offensive is being conducted on four separate fronts. On the fifth front, in eastern Ukraine, which Putin declared independent last week, Russian forces are tying up Ukrainian troops needed elsewhere.
Most Russian forces are advancing south of Belarus to Kyiv.
Russian front forces, including air, mobile and reconnaissance forces, have been engaged with Ukrainian troops outside Kyiv since the start of the war.
A huge column of Russian troops, valued at more than 40 miles, is just 20 miles north of Kyiv and is likely to gather to surround the capital.
If Russian forces succeed in capturing Kyiv and pushing south to join forces with the Crimean Front, thus dividing Ukraine in two, it would be a serious blow to Zelensky’s government.
What matters more than a few setbacks is that Russian forces have pushed 70 miles into disputed terrain in less than a week and are on the outskirts of the capital.
A huge column of Russian troops, valued at more than 40 miles, is just 20 miles north of Kyiv and is likely to gather to surround the capital.
This is not a sign of a disorganized, poorly assembled and unsuccessful offensive.
Pressure south from Belarus to Kyiv was backed by another Russian column fired from the east near Kursk.
If this column manages to connect with Russian troops near Kyiv, it will encircle Ukrainian forces in most of Chernihiv and Sumy provinces, depriving the Ukrainian military of much-needed troops and military supplies needed elsewhere, and cut the government in two. northern provinces.
To the east, Russian forces launched a broad offensive targeting Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, which is now under siege.
In the south, Russian forces, backed by landing attacks from the Black and Azov Seas, poured into Ukraine from Crimea.
On this front, Russian forces branched off along two main axes, one to the northwest along the South Buch River and the other to the northeast along the coast and inland to the Donbass region, which Russia annexed shortly before the invasion.
If Russian columns from any southern front manage to connect with forces further north, they will cut off many Ukrainian troops from reinforcements – one of the two columns has already advanced about 160 miles.
Russian generals often choose to bypass cities that have strong opposition and isolate them in order to cope later.
There have been reports that Russian forces have escalated attacks on civilians, especially in Kharkiv.
Currently, artillery and missile attacks there are limited, perhaps to send a message to citizens as a warning of what may come.
Putin seems to want to keep Ukraine intact, but he will not hesitate to increase the level of brutality if necessary.
The systematic nature of the Russian attack runs counter to speculation that Putin has lost control of his senses.
No one knows for sure, but Putin’s actions seem like a cold and calculating opponent.
Rejecting his decision to invade Ukraine as a form of madness is actually an excuse to ignore Putin’s likely motivations and future actions.
Putin’s strategic progress toward Ukraine began more than a decade ago when he invaded and Balkanized Georgia, recognizing the Kremlin’s puppet regimes in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Believing that Russia’s attack is going badly may make us feel better, but it contradicts the facts.
In 2014, Putin occupied and annexed the strategic Ukrainian region of Crimea, which served as a launching pad for the current invasion.
Putin paid a small price for both actions.
The United States and Europe have imposed limited sanctions, but have continued to commit to it on Iran’s nuclear deal and other important issues.
Today, Putin calculated that the conquest of Ukraine by force is in his and Russia’s interest.
He no doubt expected the West to impose the diplomatic and economic sanctions that US and European leaders had threatened in advance.
Putin may have misjudged Ukraine’s resistance and the intensity of Western opposition, but that doesn’t mean he’s crazy or hasn’t considered options and has chosen to invade independently.
It remains to be seen whether Putin’s plan will succeed or fail, but what is clear is that there was a plan in place to invade Ukraine, and that plan has been running since day one.
Ukrainian troops are fighting a valiant battle, facing long chances and difficult conditions. Russia has most, if not all, advantages.
It may and has attacked Ukraine from three different directions. The Russian military has a definite advantage in terms of manpower, as well as superiority in air, navy and armor.
There are huge resources to take advantage of. While Ukraine has the support of much of the international arms-providing community, Ukraine is fighting alone.
Believing that Russia’s attack is going badly may make us feel better, but it contradicts the facts.
We cannot help Ukraine if we cannot be honest about its difficulties.