read the article to understand why the creation of a pan-European defense is so difficult

Europe must “become a more independent, more sovereign power.” Faced with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Emmanuel Macron called for a revival of “European defense” during a speech delivered on Wednesday, March 2. The French president is far from the only one pushing for a true European Defense Union. It must be said that the unity and speed of reaction of the “twenty-seven” in Moscow revived hopes that things would move forward. Within a few days, unprecedented decisions were made: sanctions against the Russian economy, accepting refugees, and sending weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.

If observers see this as a historic turning point for the EU, questions remain: what are Brussels’ defense prerogatives? Why are discussions around this topic so difficult? How significant are the decisions taken in response to the war in Ukraine? Franceinfo gives you some answers.

Why did this topic come back to the fore?

“By upsetting the balance of the world,” the Russian invasion of Ukraine has reset the European defense dossier, Federico Santopinto, researcher at the Peace and Security Research and Information Group (Grip) explains to franceinfo. “Europeans were acutely aware that war had returned to the continent.” This led to the unanimous adoption of several plans for sanctions against Russia, while the bloc hesitated for some time about the extent of measures to be taken against the regime of Vladimir Putin.

On Sunday, February 27, two remarkable events took place. First, the announcement of the EU’s decision to purchase and supply Ukraine with weapons and ammunition worth 450 million euros. The measure, a first ever, is “remarkable,” according to Adaya Stoetman, a researcher and specialist in the field at the Institute of International Affairs in Clingendaal, the Netherlands.

“This shows that the EU is willing and able to act on defense issues rather than talk. This has been lacking in recent years.”

Adaya Stoetman, Research Fellow, Clingendahl Institute for International Affairs

on Franceinfo

Another noteworthy statement is the statement by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that his government is going to allow arms supplies to Ukraine and increase the defense budget to 2% of GDP. “This is truly a cultural revolution,” sums up Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, lecturer in political science at the University of Grenoble-Alpes. “Before that, Germany had a tradition associated with its history: diplomacy and refused to interfere outside its borders.” Thus, this 180-degree turn opens the way for a change in European doctrine on this issue.

What are the EU’s defense prerogatives?

European defense is organized around two main principles: unanimous decision-making and national primacy. “Defence remains a sovereign competence exercised by states,” recalls Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, contacted by Franceinfo. “We don’t have a European army, but 27 national armies,” adds Ronja Kempin, a researcher at the German think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, in an interview with franceinfo.

Thus, the prerogatives of the EU concern mainly cooperation between member states. However, within the framework of the common security and defense policy, several instruments have been created, including: the Political and Security Committee, which deals with crisis management in Brussels, the Military Committee, in which each member state is represented by a military delegate or an EU military headquarters. The latter “does not have an intergovernmental character, but represents the interests of Europeans,” notes Delphine Deschaux-Dutard. “He is mainly involved in monitoring, strategy and planning, and also coordinates joint military operations.”

The EU also has several financial instruments: the European Defense Fund, intended to support military research, and the European Peace Fund, which is used, among other things, to finance the supply of equipment to third countries. It was this provision that was used for Ukraine, allowing the purchase of arms worth 450 million euros. Finally, permanent structured cooperation, an innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, makes it possible to “concretely deepen cooperation on defense issues,” Adaya Stoetman elaborates. A sign of the “success” of the initiative, 25 out of 27 Member States have joined the latter.

So the EU cannot intervene militarily?

The Union does not have its own army, but it may decide to send missions under the European flag, consisting of the troops of the member states. In total, Twenty-Seven launched “nearly 30 missions, including ten civilian operations and six military missions that are still ongoing,” Adaya Stoetman elaborates. For example, the EU is training Malian troops as part of a mission launched in 2013. Interventions are “always around conflicts”, without participation, adds Ronja Kempin.

Is the idea of ​​a defensive Europe new?

The desire to build a common defense policy dates back to the 1950s. “The first attempt was made with the European Defense Community with the idea of ​​creating a European army,” says Delphine Deschaux-Dutard. France rejected the treaty.” It wasn’t until the 1990s that the idea resurfaced, thanks to the Balkan crisis.

“The war in Bosnia became a trigger for France and Germany, because we realized that without the Americans it was impossible to act.”

Delphine Deschaux-Doutard, lecturer in political science at the University of Grenoble-Alpes

on Franceinfo

The issue of closer integration seemed to move forward in 1998 when the United Kingdom adopted the principle of an autonomous European defense capability. But hopes are quickly shattered, emphasizes Delphine Deschaux-Dutard. “Basically, the problem is always the same, we cannot agree on the concept of autonomy: the British wanted NATO to agree to the creation of these forces, and the French wanted to leave NATO.

Why is it so difficult for Europeans to agree on this?

First, because there are 27 different armies in the EU and, therefore, the same number of “military and strategic cultures”, emphasizes Delphine Deschaux-Dutard. “Not all states have the same traditions. Faced with terrorism, France has no problem sending soldiers from the Sentinel to patrol the streets. This is unthinkable in Germany.”

The issue is also financial, some capitals, like recently Berlin, are less inclined to invest in defense. Another controversial point: the definition of the threats facing the EU. “The Baltic countries or Poland, for example, will look to the East much more than France or Spain, and therefore their priorities will diverge,” says Dutch researcher Adaya Stoetman.

Does European defense risk weakening NATO?

Some member states see France’s proposal for strategic EU autonomy as a way to go beyond the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This alliance, founded in 1949, is designed to protect its 30 members from external threats. For some countries, especially in Eastern Europe, membership in this organization is crucial to ensuring their protection from Russia.

“The Baltic states and Poland fear that a common defense policy will undermine NATO,” Adaya Stoetman explains to franceinfo. The vision rejected by Federico Santopinto: “I don’t think European defense is incompatible with NATO. This is a policy that fits into a broader integration process that complements the missions of the “alliance”.

Will the war in Ukraine give a boost to the European defense project?

This opinion is shared by many experts. “I think this is a decisive moment,” says Ronja Kempin enthusiastically. “All Member States have understood that the war has returned to Europe, that the means we have are not enough to deal with the Russian threat.”

“This shock of Russian aggression is mobilizing never-before-seen efforts.”

Ronja Kempin, researcher at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

on Franceinfo

However, Delphine Deschaux-Dutard remains cautious. “What’s amazing about European defense is that it works with crises, but every time we return to the limitations that were before.” Will the “end of European youth” soon come, as Ronja Kempin says? Apart from the shock of the war in Ukraine, the EU should soon give birth to its own strategic compass. This tool should, for the first time, allow him to name the threats he faces. “A big step forward” and concrete, according to Adaya Stoetman.

I was too lazy to read everything, can I briefly?

The question of the EU’s common defense policy came to the fore again after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Thursday, February 24. The speed and cohesion of the European reaction to Moscow, and in particular the decision to supply weapons to Kiev, leads many experts to believe that we are witnessing the birth of a real common policy of the “twenty-seven”.

Although the EU does not have its own army, it has created several tools and organizations that allow it to promote operational and financial cooperation between member states on defense matters. It can also send missions to third countries, usually support missions made up of troops from member states.

But the idea of ​​a common defense policy, which first appeared in 1954, is hardly moving forward. In particular, the inability of the “twenty-seven” to agree on the boundaries of such a project, as well as differences in military culture between each country. Several states, especially in the east of the continent, also fear that the EU will turn its back on NATO, which is considered decisive for their defense.

Brussels’ decision to buy and send weapons to Ukraine, a first in its history, and Germany’s announcement of an increase in its defense budget nevertheless represent a historic turning point for the 27. And he could announce a new stage of European integration.