The 76th Guards Air Assault Division in training.
Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense
Ukrainian troops last week appeared to cross the outermost anti-tank trench in the first line of fortifications of the vaunted Surovikin Line, which stretches across Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.
It is possible that the Ukrainians were part of a small reconnaissance unit. It is also possible that they retreated after coming under fire from Russian troops who fired anti-personnel grenades.
But the Ukrainian survey, if it is one, northwest of occupied Werbowe in southern Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Oblast on Wednesday is further evidence that Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive in the south is intensifying, three months after the first Ukrainian attacks along two main axes in Zaporizhia and adjacent Donetsk Oblast.
The Ukrainians have liberated two key towns in recent weeks: Robotyne, a mile west of Verbove, and Urozhaine, a Russian base in the Mokri Yaly river valley, 60 miles east.
Russian commanders are scared. They were so frightened that a week ago they moved the 76th Guards Air Assault Division – their last major operational reserve – from eastern Ukraine to the south. Elements of the powerful 76th GAAD arrived in Tokmak, 12 miles south of Robotyne, and immediately began shelling Ukrainian forces in Robotyne.
But how? The 76th GAAD took place in eastern Ukraine for good reason. What has changed to convince the Kremlin that it can safely relocate the division, which consists of three front-line regiments each with a few thousand paratroopers and T-90 and T-72 tanks?
Tom Cooper, author and expert on the Russian military, has a theory. According to Cooper, the 76th GAAD is free to move its troops from the east to the south as the Kremlin has recently become more confident about the durability of its positions in and around Bakhmut.
We recall that at the same time as the Ukrainian brigades launched their counteroffensive in the south, a small Ukrainian force also attacked in the east. Led by two aggressive Army assault brigades, the 3rd and 5th, Kiev’s eastern forces crossed the Donbass Canal, a key defensive position for the Russians, and advanced several miles along Bakhmut’s flanks.
The eastern attacks served an important purpose for the southern attacks. “The ZSU offensive in the Bakhmut region in recent months has held two Russian VDV divisions together,” Cooper wrote, using the native abbreviations for Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU) and Russian Airborne Forces (VDV).
With the 96th and 108th Guards Airborne Divisions stationed, only the 76th GAAD could act as a “fire brigade” in the east, moving quickly to close gaps in the Russian lines.
But then, a few weeks ago, the Ukrainian attack around Bakhmut slowed – seemingly significantly. Data from NASA’s fire detection satellites shows that the hot spots around Bakhmut peak around August 9 and then die down, a possible indication that fighting in the area has eased significantly.
Afterwards, the 96th and 108th Guards Airborne Divisions apparently had freedom to move their own regiments without endangering Bakhmut. This made the 76th GAAD unnecessary as an operational reserve in the east – and the division was able to reinforce Russian defenses in the south.
“The Keystone Cops in Moscow were free to begin moving a third VDV detachment to southern Zaporizhia,” Cooper aptly put it.
Ukraine’s eastern offensive indirectly supported its southern offensive – by holding on to Russian reserves. The commanders in Kiev obviously understood this from the start. But that begs the question: Why did they appear to slow down the eastern offensive?
It is possible that the assault brigades that led the attack took a break to rest, rearm and recoup losses after months of hard fighting. It is also possible that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will not have enough of their own reserves, even temporarily, to replace the front-line assault brigades.
The shifting balance of power along the 600-mile frontline of Russia’s 19-month major war against Ukraine underscores the intensity of the fighting. On both sides it’s always just a few exhausted brigades or regiments giving up momentum to an eager enemy.
At the moment, Ukraine’s armed forces have the momentum in the south. But if you believe Cooper, Russian forces in the east may have enough momentum to create divisions between regions without destabilizing entire sectors.
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