The Moldovan region of Transnistria's request for protection from Russia is reminiscent of the developments that led to the war against Ukraine. But other “frozen conflicts” show that Putin adopts a different approach.
“Russia is a peace-loving country, surrounded by ceasefires.” – This is how the satirical story “Darth Putin” in X describes the fact that conflict areas are lined up along Russia's borders like a string of pearls.
Conflicts in regions that broke away from the then-emerging nation-states during the collapse of the Soviet Union and that led to ceasefires after brief military conflicts are referred to as “frozen”.
Plan for Transnistria?
However, things have remained relatively calm over the years only in the case of the Transnistria region, which separated from Moldova. Russia fought a war in Georgia in 2008 over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nagorno-Karabakh, which was inhabited by Armenians, is now back under Azerbaijani control.
Russia used instability to de facto hold respective states hostage and limit their sovereignty. With “peacekeepers”, Russia guaranteed a military presence against the will of the affected states.
It seemed like a model when Russia first fomented conflict over the self-determination of the Russian-speaking population in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, then used the military to trigger military unrest and finally annexed the areas. The fear is that Russia will use this approach to launch new attacks.
But just as the respective conflicts have developed differently over the past few decades, the Russian leadership is using them in different ways. This allows conclusions to be drawn about the calculations of costs and benefits of the leadership circle around ruler Vladimir Putin.
Political influence in Moldova
It is becoming clear that Russia is not currently planning any military action to take control of the Transnistria region, which has separated from the Republic of Moldova – at least not while Ukraine can still maintain a position against the Russian armed forces of its side of the border by air, sea and land.
On the contrary, Russian political influence is to be expected, as there will be presidential elections in Moldova in the autumn. Pro-European President Maia Sandu will then likely be challenged by a pro-Russian politician like former President Igor Dodon. On election day, people will also vote on whether Moldova should join the EU. The republic has been conducting accession negotiations since February 7.
Request for protection also from Gagauzia
This includes the fact that the head of government of the autonomous region of Moldova, Gagauzia, a friend of the Kremlin, has now asked for protection and more support from Russia. However, the formulation chosen by Eugenia Gutul is as vague as the request for protection of the separatist region of Transnistria, presented on March 4th.
In both cases there is no question of military intervention. MP Oazu Nantoi, from Sandu's party, told the Portal news agency: “The Gagauz and the Transnistrians have one objective: to further destabilize the situation in Moldova.” Putin left the response to his Foreign Ministry. He himself did not mention Transnistria in his address to the nation on March 4.
In the case of Transnistria, companies have had to pay customs duties to the Moldovan state since the beginning of the year if they trade with the EU. This is a significant cost for the breakaway region. This is probably the background to the request for protection from Moscow. Contrary to what many expected, this time Transnistria did not ask to become a member of the Russian Federation as it had done in March 2014 and in 2006. Both times the Russian leadership did not respond.
Option to annex South Ossetia
The situation is comparable to that in the South Ossetia region, which separated from Georgia. After the war in 2008, Russia recognized them as independent and placed them under its military control. In 2022, then-leader Anatoly Bibilov announced a referendum on South Ossetia's admission to the Russian Federation during the election campaign.
He probably expected recognition from Moscow for the South Ossetians who participated in the war in Ukraine. He even defended the high number of victims among his own people. But the Kremlin let Bibilov come to nothing. South Ossetia ended up canceling the referendum.
It was also not the first attempt to annex South Ossetia to Russia. But Putin is satisfied with the military presence there – 50 kilometers from the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. It keeps the option of annexation open, creating lasting uncertainty in the region while avoiding further international ostracism. In 2022, the Ministry of Economic Affairs in Moscow even called for South Ossetia and the other region that separated from Georgia, Abkhazia, to become less financially dependent on Russia.
Scary acquisition in Abkhazia
Putin's power circle found its own solution for Abkhazia, located east of the Black Sea. Because its population persistently resists being taken over by Russia beyond the existing military occupation. However, the Kremlin is taking advantage of its enormous financial dependence and investing in strategically important locations, such as the abandoned airport, in part through businesspeople.
Russia increased these activities after the war against Ukraine. A port that has not yet been expanded offers the possibility of transporting sanctioned goods from Turkey, via Abkhazia, to Russia. Additionally, warships will be able to anchor there if the Russian Black Sea Fleet comes under greater pressure near occupied Crimea.
Loss of reputation in Nagorno-Karabakh
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflict region in Azerbaijan inhabited by Armenians, Putin's power circle was prepared to pay a price – namely to resolve the conflict in its current form. When Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev waged a war to retake Nagorno-Karabakh with Turkish support in 2020, Putin only imposed a ceasefire when the Armenians were left with just one remaining territory.
One of the terms of the ceasefire was that Russian “peacekeepers” would be stationed to protect the Armenians. The Nagorno-Karabakh leadership focused on “Russification” with the introduction of Russian as an official language. Furthermore, many Armenians accepted Russian passports in the hope of protection. Armenia itself was no longer able or willing to risk Azerbaijani attacks on its own territory and, therefore, its own existence in Nagorno-Karabakh.
But the Armenians were seriously disappointed with Russia. In 2023, Aliyev began the gradual conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian “peacekeepers” allowed this to happen until the complete capture and exodus of the Armenians in September 2023. However, this meant that they lost the mandate for their presence on Azerbaijani soil. According to media reports, some military equipment and 2,000 soldiers have already been withdrawn.
Furthermore, Russia lost its status as the protecting power of Armenia. The country remains economically and militarily dependent on Russia. But the Yerevan government is doing everything it can to reduce this dependence. Other states in the region are closely following these developments with regard to their own relations with Russia.
Putin is clearly willing to pay this price because he sees Azerbaijan as a more important strategic partner in the region and wants to avoid an open confrontation with Turkey. Russia is also concerned about stability in the region, from which a conflagration could still develop. This could, in turn, endanger the infrastructure Russia needs as an alternative route to Europe.
For Putin, Ukraine has notable historical, political and strategic importance compared to other neighboring regions. As long as Putin keeps his options open, those affected will remain “hostages”.