Moscow is ready to stop merchant ships heading to Ukraine and control them in the Black Sea. The news published by the Tass agency shows how central the sea front remains and once again underscores the parallels of what is happening in the Persian Gulf with the Iranian actions against oil tankers.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin explained at a briefing that the cargo inspections are aimed at searching for war equipment, a consequence of the naval blockade in connection with the grain dispute: “We have to be sure that there is nothing dangerous on board.”
The development is not unexpected, a possible use of helicopters to drop commands on a ship or a lookout to board was actually foreseeable. Flexible, tiered resolution versus a real attack. And that allows for a lot of opportunities to choose which “vessel” to block and maybe unblock it after a couple of hours. The scenario reproduces the showdown between the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman.
Pasdaran, but also the Iranian Navy, stop tankers under various pretexts: smuggling, violation of national waters, irregularities. There was no shortage of “motivation” and in one recent instance they opened fire to stop a unit laden with crude oil. Washington has just responded by increasing naval and air forces in the region.
The points of contact are obvious. Moscow does not need to learn anything, but it can update its strategy by mimicking Tehran: it has bought and successfully deployed large quantities of Iranian kamikaze drones, a replica of its Shia Middle Eastern ally’s attacks against Saudi, Emirati and Israeli targets. The focus is on oil sites, infrastructure and, of course, ships.
In a sort of mirror game, Ukraine has opted for the “Israeli model” that is often applied to Iran. Five points.
1) Surprise factor, with special forces and covert activities.
2) Intelligence War.
3) Targeted Kills.
4) “Spectacular” bets behind the lines.
5) Communication battle, alternate denials, partial admissions, innuendos and even warnings to the enemy.
The leaders of the military espionage in Kiev initially hid behind silence, later they complained about some of the steps because there are now too many “acts” and at some stages they served to support the “cause” of the resistance. When there were acts of violence in Russia at first, observers also assumed a Russian provocation.
Today they have to consider the – high – possibility of Ukrainian involvement. This double track will continue. This is shown by Moscow’s initiatives on the Black Sea, Zelenskyy’s statements about the need to neutralize the Kerch bridge, the constant search of Ukrainians for suitable means of launching missions not limited to the battlefield on land.