They call them “rebels”, but they have occupied the capital Sanaa for almost ten years, they rule 70% of the country and control the Yemeni army: allies of Iran – such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Syrian regime of Assad and the Iraqi one Shiite militias threatening shipping from the Bab el Mandeb Strait to Suez are the new “perfect enemy” of the US and the West. And all of this without ever having spoken or negotiated with us or taken their wishes into account. We did not want a widespread war in the Middle East, but we are contributing to another conflict without trying to avoid it.
We also apply a loser's logic to the Houthis, since after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Iran is not only no longer isolated, but can also count on the support of Russia and China, the members of the Security Council and the alliances in the southern balances change.
THE HOUTHI They are dragging the United States – and perhaps us too – into a new Middle East conflict that affects not only the Red Sea but also the mainland, where the United States defends a single sovereignty, Israel's, which is already clear with the attack on In Iraq, chaos began in 2003.
American deterrence is an illusion of stabilization; in fact, it has exactly the opposite effect. Why did the Houthis intervene in the Red Sea? The “rebels” say they want to attack ships heading to Israel and have also launched attacks on the Israeli port of Eilat, just as they attacked Saudi oil facilities in September 2019.
The lack of American response to protect the Wahhabi kingdom was one of the main reasons for the disagreements between Washington and Riyadh, which suffered a major defeat in the open war against the Houthis that began in 2015. A failure given that Riyadh had been heavily bombed and, along with the Emirates, had hired tens of thousands of mercenaries.
If today, on the one hand, the Houthis intend to attack ships heading to Israeli ports, on the other hand, the real reason may be that they want to keep Saudi Arabia and the international community at bay in order to demonstrate their military influence and gain political recognition in the future International, which has never arrived before.
But who are they? I think I was one of the first to get to know her better in December 2009. The war against the regime of President Saleh – who was himself killed by the Houthis while trying to escape in 2017 – was already underway and the Saudis were paying Yemeni soldiers and also supporting them with air power. Here they are as they appeared to me at the time. There were about thirty of them stationed on the road to Sada, their historic fortress.
In Harf Surfian, against a backdrop of mountains of black, spiky rocks that mark the prelude to the Saudi border, they showed how they retreated into the last pockets of resistance and were hunted by soldiers and tribes loyal to the president. A spokesman said they would retake the city “very soon”, while “other guerrilla groups – he said – have been sent to the Jawf district to attack the Saudis on the border.”
WEAKENED and tired, the Houthis of Harf Surfian, however, bore no obvious signs of battle, as if they had still emerged unscathed from these sanctuaries of dark rock, craters and thousand-year-old fortifications and where they used the “hit and run” tactics. They only had a few weapons, AK 47s with colored shoulder straps and military bags over their shoulders. But no heavy ordnance, just a few RPG grenade launchers resting in the backs of Toyota pickups. Almost all wore checkered keffiyehs that framed hard, tested faces, including experienced fighters but also boys aged 14 to 15 or perhaps younger.
The Houthis were already waging a kind of proxy war for Tehran as well as a war of liberation. Yet – this is what made me cross Yemen – no one was interested in the Houthi issue, another major underestimation of current conflicts. The Houthis are part of the Zaidi minority and have also been maneuvered to counter the rise of Saudi-backed Wahhabi preachers.
Then, having gained some power to make demands, they rebelled and found supporters in the more traditional regions of the north, where they still cannot digest the 1962 revolution that overthrew the thousand-year-old Imamate. The Houthi family clan feels that it is their heir in a sense and claims to be directly descended from Mohammed as Seyyed (the religious men with the black turbans).
The local Houthi conflict therefore has a religious, cultural, geopolitical and territorial dimension. But what was an isolated situation has developed into an international crisis that is linked to regional problems. The insurgency that emerged in the early 1990s remains one of the key elements of the Yemeni situation. The insurgents represented the main enemy of government forces backed by Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.
Tribal creatures in nature and regionally, the Houthi movement has long justified its rebellion with a desire to end the marginalization of northwest Yemen. In addition, there is the defense of the religious minority that they represent, Zaydism, a movement that Islamologists have some doubts that it belongs to Shiism. It was also a violent push, often indiscriminately against civilians, and against the devastating coalition led by Riyadh, the Houthis defied the implacable logic of retaliation by not shying away from using child soldiers and resorting to terror against any dissenting voice .
How could this conflict develop? In the Israel-Hamas conflict, the Houthis aim to reduce Israel's military pressure on Gaza and, in the meantime, keep Saudi Arabia in particular under control, putting Riyadh in a difficult position just as it was negotiating a ceasefire.
By rapprochement with Iran under Chinese mediation (arming the Pasdaran and training the Houthis), the Saudis hoped for a compromise. But now the logic of weapons is prevailing and with the Anglo-American attack, the Saudis, like many other states in the region, fear a major and unrestrained war.