Latin America is experiencing a new political cycle. The shift to the left of the first decade of the 2000s is a thing of the past and right-wing extremist electoral forces are gaining ground in many countries in the region. The recent triumph of Javier Milei in Argentina is a clear example of this new trend, which also includes the four years of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency in Brazil (2019-2022) and the current government of…
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Latin America is experiencing a new political cycle. The shift to the left of the first decade of the 2000s is a thing of the past and right-wing extremist electoral forces are gaining ground in many countries in the region. Javier Milei’s recent triumph in Argentina is a clear example of this new trend, which also includes the four years of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency in Brazil (2019-2022) and the current government of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. There are also cases of far-right forces that have not captured the executive branch but have managed to gain a place on the electoral stage: Cabildo Abierto in Uruguay, the Republican Party in Chile and Renovación Popular in Peru.
Proof of the similarity between these various far-right forces across Latin America is the fact that their leaders maintain a relationship of mutual love. Jair Bolsonaro was the first confirmed international guest at Javier Milei’s inauguration and Rafael López Aliaga recently awarded José Antonio Kast with the Lima Medal. At the ideological level, however, the Latin American far right has different emphases: some are vigorous advocates of the free market, others articulate a particular hostility towards the left, and quite a few develop a populist discourse to attack “the corrupt elite” and defend the “pure people.” “. So what is the common denominator of these formations? A study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) of the Social Democratic Party of Germany reveals two of the most common similarities: on the one hand, the defense of a “tough” policy to combat crime, which is usually not only associated with demands for an increase in statutory penalties and one Facilitating citizens’ access to weapons, but also the militarization of the police. On the other hand, adopting extremely conservative positions on sexual issues, which include issues such as abortion, equal marriage and LGTBQ+ rights.
As we observe the rise of the far right in the region, it is reasonable to assume that the Latin American electorate is becoming more conservative. In other words, what would explain the support of the far right is that voters today are more right-leaning than they used to be. However, the available empirical evidence shows that this thesis is not plausible. Below I present three graphics that support this skepticism; Each of them is based on aggregated data for all of Latin America (from Chile to Mexico) from the Americas Barometer.
consent to marriage
egalitarian
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
consent to marriage
egalitarian
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
Consent to equal marriage
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
The first graphic shows the average of pro-marriage equality across Latin America, with this measure showing a gradual increase over time.
For abortion for health reasons
Mother is in danger
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
For abortion for health reasons
Mother is in danger
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
For an abortion if the mother’s health is at risk
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
The second graph represents the region-wide average of those who justify abortion when the mother’s health is at risk, and as in the previous figure, we see that support for this position is increasing.
Ideological positioning
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
Ideological positioning
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
Ideological positioning
Source: Barometer of the Americas (Lapop)
Finally, in the third graphic you can see the self-positioning of the electorate on a scale from left to right for the years 2004, 2010 and 2018. Here it can be seen that there are no significant changes that suggest that increases. The number of people who describe themselves as right-wing; In fact, there is a slight increase in those who define themselves as left-wing.
Given this empirical evidence, one might think we are faced with a paradox: even though there appears to be no sign that the Latin American electorate is turning to the right, we are seeing far-right forces increasing their electoral influence. How is it explained? Although we need research to be able to provide empirically and theoretically sound answers to this question, it seems important first to develop a line of argument. Much of the success of the Latin American far right is due to a punishment of incumbents: just as we cannot understand Milei’s triumph without taking into account the dramatic economic situation in Argentina, we cannot understand the rise of Bolsonaro without taking into account the scandals of corruption, that shook Brazil (Operation Lava Jato). Seen in this light, many supporters of the extreme right do this not because they fully agree with their ideas, but primarily because they want to express their rejection of those in power.
The problem is that the institutions of (liberal) democracy suffer when the right-wing extremists conquer the executive branch. Hungary under the mandate of Viktor Orbán is a paradigmatic example of this situation. Brazil and the United States are safe for now because neither Bolsonaro nor Trump managed to get re-elected, but both cases reveal a deeper problem: the virtual disappearance of the conventional right.
Unfortunately, there is every reason to believe that something similar could be happening across Latin America. Just as it took Mauricio Macri 24 hours to support Milei, the conventional right in Chile needed the same time to support José Antonio Kast, the far-right candidate, in the second round of the 2021 election. In summary, the risk is that the reason for the rise of the extreme right lies not only in its attack on the institutions of liberal democracy, but above all in the phagocytization of the conventional right. Comparative evidence shows that the democratic system cannot exist without the latter. This is bad news for Latin America, where it has taken a long time to consolidate conventional right-wing political forces willing to respect the rules of the democratic game. History will ultimately tell us whether they have resisted the onslaught of the far right, but for now everything points to them not resisting.
Cristóbal Rovira cold water He is a professor of political science at Catholic University