by Federico Rampini
With his offensive, the Russian leader is “distracting” the US, China’s great rival, drawing America’s attention and resources to Europe and forcing NATO to deal primarily with the ongoing conflict
What are the messages of the last phone call between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, with which the two heads of state conclude the year 2022? The relationship between the two anti-Western superpowers remains strong, and their “strategic cooperation” will take a step forward during Xi’s next visit to Moscow. However, the Chinese version is the first to define the war in Ukraine as an “international crisis,” a negative term Xi had avoided in the past. To assume a divergence or even a conflict from here is the step too far. China is paying a price for the conflict instigated by Putin, and the most likely consequence is that… it will increase the price of its support for Russia.
In the call officialing Putin’s invitation to Moscow, the Russian leader said that “in the face of rising geopolitical tensions, the importance of the strategic partnership between our two nations as a factor of stability is being strengthened.” Putin has expressed his desire to increase military cooperation with Beijing. He added that he expects to receive Xi at the Kremlin this spring. This trip, he said, “will demonstrate to the whole world the strength of Russian-Chinese relations on crucial issues and will become the most important political event of the year.”
The Chinese leader, in translating his response, used more negative terms to describe the international situation: he defined it as “difficult and far from easy.” But he, in turn, said he was ready to “intensify strategic cooperation with Russia.”
Putin’s position is clear: Beijing’s support has become indispensable for him after the West’s economic sanctions. Without the profitable trade and financial ties with the People’s Republic, the Russian army would not have the resources to deal with a protracted conflict. The role of the Asian superpower is also essential on the diplomatic front. China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has always prevented Russia from being condemned there; Furthermore, the influence that Beijing wields over emerging economies is invaluable in keeping Putin from isolation. The existence of a Sino-Russian axis carries considerable weight vis-à-vis the Third World, from the Persian Gulf to Africa to Latin America. What the Russian president expects from the spring bilateral summit is that Xi also crosses the final “red line,” i.e., agrees to openly provide assistance, including military assistance, to continue the aggression against Ukraine. Putin gets a lot from his strongest partner, and he has a lot to ask for. What does it offer in return? Not a little, in truth: with its offensive in Ukraine, it is “distracting” China’s major rival, drawing America’s attention and resources to Europe, and forcing NATO to deal primarily with the ongoing conflict.
Xi’s position is more complex than Putin’s. China has an economy ten times richer than Russia’s and much more tied to Western markets. 2022 could end with China’s GDP growing just over 4%, a result that seems miraculous in the current circumstances: that is, given the war damage, high energy costs and the only recently lifted Covid restrictions. This growth would not have been possible without Chinese exports to the West. The reason Xi has so far avoided supplying arms to Moscow – at least openly (there is North Korea as a channel to do this covertly) – is that he does not want to get caught in the crosshairs of US and European sanctions. The People’s Republic has an interest in making the most of its relations with the West, which have enabled it to achieve remarkable economic prosperity over the past thirty years. The balancing act Xi wants to continue is precisely this: hasten our decline, but without cutting ties with us (as Putin did instead).
China’s behavior during the more than ten months of the Ukraine conflict always followed this script. The language of his diplomacy continues to defend the principle of sovereignty; but care was taken not to condemn the invasion of a sovereign state like Ukraine. Chinese propaganda speaks of peace, but never misses an opportunity to confirm Putin’s narrative: whatever ultimately happens would be NATO’s fault. The only distancing of any significance occurred on two occasions: this summer at the Samarkand summit between Putin and Xi, when the Russian leader was asked to acknowledge there were Chinese “concerns” about the war. Then in the fall on the occasion of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, when Xi reiterated his condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons. From these two signals, some in the West have drawn overly optimistic conclusions, even hypothesizing China’s role as a peace broker.
But “worries” about the war haven’t stopped China from increasing its imports from Russia by 50%, offsetting much of the impact of Western sanctions. The Moscow-Beijing economic axis is further strengthened: for example, with the slow and gradual development of the Chinese-centric payment system, which seeks to position itself as an alternative to the American-centric Swift. In the long run it is clear that this will make Russia a Chinese colony and is therefore a good investment for Xi. There are areas of tension – even rivalries, in Africa and even more so in Central Asia – between the two anti-Western superpowers, but these are subordinate to the convergences. As for nuclear power, it is far from certain that Putin’s use of tactical nuclear weapons – however unwelcome Xi might be – would actually break the partnership. The understanding between the two has also acquired a personal dimension, which is very important.
Friendship carries real weight in the psyche of the two autocrats, both dedicated to spreading the “cult of personality” in their respective countries. Most importantly, the war that Putin unleashed comes at great cost and risk for Xi, but is accelerating the course of history toward the much-desired happy ending: the end of the American-built international order. The most likely scenario, therefore, is that China is always determined to help Russia without making too many compromises with the West. The overwhelming superiority of the Chinese economy over Russia’s will lead to ever-increasing bargaining power; for example in negotiations on energy prices, especially since the price caps for gas and oil introduced by the US-EU can mean significant savings even for an energy-intensive economy like Beijing’s.
Will Xi’s spring visit to Moscow really be “the political event of the year” as Putin hopes? Only if Xi got out of his ambiguity about military aid. For the time being, there is nothing to indicate that he wants to take such a momentous step. And with spring still a long way off, the balance of fighting in Ukraine over the next three months will also matter.
January 1, 2023 (change January 1, 2023 | 07:17)
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