Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, we have followed the concerns of world leaders about a nuclear threat. Last week, the warning came from both the CIA’s William Burns and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky himself. Asked about the matter by a TV station, Zelensky admitted he was troubled by the matter. He said that in his view “all countries should be affected”. Burns had claimed days earlier that the Russian government could use lowpowered nuclear weapons in case of desperation.
Burns was referring to what experts call “tactical weapons”. In contrast to the socalled “strategic” weapons, they have a shorter range and lower explosive power. You also have different delivery options. They lack intercontinental range and have a less extensive destructive capability. Nevertheless, these are weapons, the use of which would not only mean significant damage to Ukraine, but also the beginning of a new phase in the conflict.
Nuclear weapons are not only about the size of a country’s arsenal, but above all about the willingness to use them and the criteria to which they adhere. Not only does Russia have the world’s largest stockpile of warheads (estimated at between 5,000 and 6,000), but it directs its deployment based on a vague and imprecise doctrine. The country’s official documents speak of employment only in the face of an “existential threat”. In this sense, they leave room for different narratives and interpretations of what risks would affect the state’s survival.
It is no coincidence that for a number of years, Western, particularly North American, leaders have been describing Russian criteria for the use of nuclear weapons with the phrase “scaling to deescalate”. This is the perception that the Putin government would be willing to use part of its tactical arsenal to launch oneoff nuclear strikes in order to force the opponents’ eventual withdrawal and consequently force the other side to negotiate more favorably for the Russians.
If confirmed, such a move would not only pose an increased risk to Ukrainian civilians, but also two other things to keep in mind: 1) the harbinger of an unprecedented escalation of the conflict as NATO would be pressured to respond appropriately; and 2) the death knell that would cap the already widespread crisis of multilateral institutions.
Nuclear weapons are considered the last frontier of world politics. Since at least 1945, international codes have attempted to limit the use of these types of resources as much as possible. The real expectation of countries that own these weapons is that they keep them because they imagine they will not be challenged to use them. That is the logic of deterrence. Nuclear weapons are not only a material, but above all a symbolic answer to the security dilemma that exists in the anarchic world. When they are no longer seen in that way as “another resource at our disposal”, they not only offer unprecedented harm to those who suffer possible attacks, but also denote grave violence against all forms of action, thought and feeling within the international system. They are therefore the highest expression of human barbarism.