Many observers in the West seem to assume that the Polish opposition’s victory in last weekend’s parliamentary election – the country’s return to liberal democracy after eight years of rule by the increasingly illiberal Law and Justice party (PiS) – is a return to liberal Democracy will mean the pre-populist era before the PiS came to power. In their view, a new government under Civic Platform leader Donald Tusk will quickly reverse eight years of right-wing politics, align Warsaw with its Western partners and return Poland to the happy fold of the European family.
Many observers in the West seem to assume that the Polish opposition’s victory in last weekend’s parliamentary election – the country’s return to liberal democracy after eight years of rule by the increasingly illiberal Law and Justice party (PiS) – is a return to liberal Democracy will mean the pre-populist era before the PiS came to power. In their view, a new government under Civic Platform leader Donald Tusk will quickly reverse eight years of right-wing politics, align Warsaw with its Western partners and return Poland to the happy fold of the European family.
There are at least five reasons why these expectations are exaggerated, naive, or simply wrong.
1. Reversing the policies of the last eight years will be a long, arduous and incomplete process. The Law and Justice party has systematically deconstructed the liberal democratic state over the past eight years, and repairing the damage could take just as long.
On the one hand, the PiS has spread its people throughout the Polish state, in the media and other institutions. Even though Tusk is prime minister, the Polish constitution gives President Andrzej Duda, a former PiS member, veto power that he could use to obstruct the new government’s legislation. Likewise, PiS has packed the Polish Constitutional Court with judges who agree with its agenda, and they could also blow up reforms. Finally, the populists have distributed significant funds to various PiS-affiliated organizations, which will now try to discredit the new government and help the populists regain power. If Tusk, who has served as prime minister twice, takes the helm of government, he will need all his experience to overcome this daunting challenge.
2. There is no return to Poland’s role in Europe before 2015. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has irrevocably shaken Poles’ trust in the German and French leadership. On the one hand, a government led by Tusk, a former president of the European Council, will put an end to Warsaw’s vicious anti-German and anti-European propaganda. But great skepticism towards European foreign and energy policy – especially Germany’s – will remain.
The skepticism is justified. Germany’s mistakes in its Russia policy paved the way to war. Berlin’s cultivation of proximity to Moscow, including the policy of increasing energy dependence on Russia, was one of the reasons why Russian President Vladimir Putin was confident that the West would be divided and not come to Ukraine’s aid. At the same time, convinced that they were morally and strategically right, the Germans often lectured and denigrated the Poles and anyone else who dared to warn of the growing threat.
No belated German turnaround can make these essential facts disappear. It is impossible to imagine a scenario in which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe return to the old European status quo, in which Germany and France treated them as junior partners. Poland has learned its lesson.
3. Poland will continue to target Russia as an existential security threat. Russian officials have openly stated their intention to restore Moscow’s Cold War-era empire, just as Putin long ago announced his plans for Ukraine. As much as Tusk has stressed that Poland should restore close ties with Brussels, fear of a possible war with Russia and the renewed loss of Polish statehood to Moscow will be a fundamental driver of the policies of any government in Warsaw.
These currently include the continuation of arms deliveries to Ukraine, regional security leadership and sustainable growth of the Polish military. The significant increases in defense spending under the PiS will be maintained. Poland is already on track to spend up to 4 percent of GDP on the military, significantly more than most European countries. There is a broad consensus on these issues in Poland, and any EU attempts to soften policy towards Russia will face strong resistance from Warsaw. In doing so, Poland will increasingly align itself with a large bloc of EU and NATO members stretching from the Nordic region to the Black Sea.
4. Poland will remain more transatlantic in its perspective than its European partners. Unless Washington’s commitment to European security changes dramatically, Poland will continue to rely on the United States and NATO. While Warsaw will favor greater security coordination with other EU member states, any attempt to decouple EU defense from NATO will be vigorously opposed, potentially leading to disagreements with France and any other Western European countries pursuing this goal. In a new situation of existential threat, countries close to Russia will rely on Washington, not Paris or Berlin.
5. Polish politics will become increasingly populist. The PiS is already the party with the highest share of votes at 35 percent. It therefore remains an important part of the Polish political landscape.
But there is a more fundamental reason why Poland will continue to be a country where nationalist populism plays a greater role than in the countries of Western Europe. As elsewhere, populists base their rhetoric on fear of losing their sovereignty. In Poland and other countries in Eastern and Central Europe, this fear is not just a rhetorical topic of conversation, but a deep national trauma. In the 20th century, most of these countries were invaded by foreign powers on several occasions; some, such as Poland and the Baltic States, were completely wiped off the map in their not-so-recent history.
It goes without saying that the war in Ukraine has enormously increased these collective existential fears, which in turn is creating new political divisions. Polish populists not only point to Moscow, but have also directed fears about national sovereignty to Brussels and Berlin. This won’t go away.
Nevertheless, anyone who believes in a democratic Poland and sees the country as an important part of the EU has reason to be happy. Last weekend, more Poles voted to overthrow the populist PiS than voted to abolish communism in 1989. Voter turnout was also higher, reflecting not only Poles’ deep concern about the direction of their country, but also the vibrancy of Polish democracy as well after eight years, PiS shows attempts to stifle it. In the most brutal and unfair election campaign since the fall of communism, pluralism won. Poland has shown the world that an entrenched illiberal regime can be defeated. Hopefully this will be an example for other European countries like Hungary to follow.