In the run-up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, most Western analysts viewed Moscow as a major power and Kiev as a minor one. Although Russia had shrunk compared to its Soviet heyday, it still had a large conventional military and a vast nuclear arsenal, which secured it a place among the top tier of world powers. In January 2022, as Russian troops massed on Ukraine’s borders, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mark Milley warned that Moscow was poised to deal a “terrible” blow to Ukraine. Michael Kofman, director of the Russia studies program at the Center for Naval Analysis, argued that Russia had “the power to challenge or violently upend Europe’s security architecture” and “the conventional military might to deter the United States.”
This view of Russian power was widespread in the United States and Western Europe, leading many analysts to argue that the United States and NATO should either stay out of a conflict between Russia and Ukraine or strictly limit military aid to Kiev. For example, realist scholars John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Stephen Walt all labeled Russia a great power and argued that Moscow’s need to dominate Ukraine should be indulged. Posen went even further, implying that Russia has the military might to achieve the desired outcome. As he put it just days before the Russian invasion began, “Ukrainian units would no doubt fight valiantly, but given the country’s geography, the open topography of much of its countryside, and the general numerical superiority enjoyed by Russia, this is unlikely.” that Ukraine can successfully defend itself.”
But once When Russian President Vladimir Putin unleashed his war machine, this narrative of Russian power quickly unraveled. The Ukrainian army, rumored to be outgunned and with little chance of conventional resistance, fought back with shrewdness and ferocity. And Ukrainian civilians, believed by many experts to be at odds over the issue of the country’s ties with Russia, rallied to defend their homeland. Meanwhile, Putin’s military faltered. Its weaponry and doctrine proved lackluster at best, and its soldiers performed far less well than expected, due in part to corruption and poor training. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps more than a million, Russian military-age men fled the country to avoid conscription. And just last week, Wagner paramilitary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin briefly seized control of the southern city of Rostov-on-Don, threatening to plunge the country into civil war by sending his mercenary fighters within 120 miles of Moscow.
This startling revelation of Russian weakness challenges not only Moscow’s status as a great power but also the very concept of a great power. Even realists, who use the term frequently, have never provided a clear and convincing definition of what makes a power great. Rather, they tend to use the term to describe everything from genuine superpowers like the United States and China, which command the full spectrum of economic, technological, and military might, to above-average military powers like Russia, which command the full spectrum Nuclear weapons possess a spectrum of economic, technological, and military power, but little else that could be considered indicators of great power. Such inaccuracy not only distorts analysis of state power and its use in war, but can also make countries appear more militarily threatening than they actually are. For these reasons, analysts should stop asking what makes a country a great power and start asking what makes it a “power of attorney.” This would have helped avoid overestimating Russia’s power before February 2022 – and will help avoid overestimating the threat posed by China in the future.
POTEMKIN POWER
The moniker “Great Power” was never particularly useful. On the eve of World War I, Europe was believed to be dominated by its great powers: Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom. But the war showed that there were really only two dominant powers in Europe: Germany and the United Kingdom. The power differences between these countries on the one hand and Austria-Hungary and Italy on the other were so great that the latter two quickly became dependent on other countries and both were in dire need of credit and eventually troops from their more powerful allies to keep fighting.
When the United States entered the war in 1917, it created an entirely new class of power that was fundamentally impervious to outside threats. Washington remained the world’s only superpower throughout World War II, when it could fight in any sphere (air, land, and sea) and in any theater of war and provide massive aid to its allies. No other power could even come close to matching these abilities.
Russia can by no means be regarded as an economic or technological superpower.
From this perspective, Russia is not a great power today and was no longer part of one years before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Claims to the contrary were based on a misjudgment of Moscow’s military strength, based on the most obvious characteristics of power: weapons and alleged capabilities, troop numbers, performance in military maneuvers, and declared doctrine. By taking these actions, Russia appeared to be a heavily armed nuclear and conventional power, able and willing to impose its will not only on its neighborhood but on countries around the world. But behind that ominous picture of the Kremlin lurked a much shabbier picture of the underlying social, political, economic and technological elements of power, all of which suggested Russia was far from great.
Consider the issue of troop morale. Analysts assumed that the Russian armed forces were both well-trained and well-led, capable of competently conducting military operations. Although Russia’s armed forces had not performed particularly well in the 1990s and first decade of this millennium, and in Georgia in 2008, analysts minimized such concerns and instead focused on Russia’s more formidable armament.
Although the military analysis of Russia was skewed, the overall picture of the country was even more flawed. By any standard, Russia could not have been considered an economic or technological superpower. In 2021, Russia’s GDP was smaller than Canada’s, Russia was not a player in high technology, and it was becoming increasingly corrupt and dictatorial. Its economy was based on resource extraction rather than manufacturing. And it was a demographic mess, with declining birth rates and an average male life expectancy of just 66 years. US Senator John McCain’s 2014 comment that Russia was “a gas station masquerading as a country” was perhaps a little too demeaning – but only a little.
THE WHOLE CLUB
More useful than the concept of great power is that of full power, which takes into account the various factors that create military power, and not just its external manifestation in arms. Few countries have ever achieved all the foundations on which to build and sustain superior military power. Most of what were described as great powers were actually mid-level Potemkin states, whose militaries served as a front for otherwise weak power bases. That was true of Benito Mussolini’s Italy and it’s true of Putin’s Russia.
In the past 150 years, there have only been a handful of full-spectrum performers. One, obviously, is the United States, which became the world’s largest economy sometime in the 1890s and had few security concerns compared to most countries. The UK was undoubtedly a full-spectrum power from the late 19th century until 1943, when it had to subordinate its preferred grand strategy to serve US interests. Previously, the UK was able to field and deploy advanced and well-prepared armed forces almost anywhere in the world and sustain a wartime economy that few other states could match. Other countries that likely fit the full spectrum were Germany from around 1900 to 1942, the Soviet Union from 1949 to the 1970s, and China from around 2010 to the present. All three could compete in any strategic area and produce high quality military equipment. They did not always have a truly global reach, but they exerted great influence over much of the world.
What made them powerful, however, was not just their military might, but also the economic and technological prowess that enabled their armed forces. Military power is based in large part on the ability to craft the best and most advanced military hardware, from small arms to highly complex aircraft and naval vessels. This capability cannot be faked and must be able to scale quickly when needed. A military is only strong when it can be equipped – and then equipped again. Because of this, the Soviet Union was in some ways the weakest member of this club and ceased to be a full power sometime in the late 1970s.
Few countries have laid all the foundations on which to build superior military power.
Not all economic powers become powers of attorney. Take Germany and Japan, for example, neither of which have emerged as major military powers. That is because political and social factors play just as important a role as economic and technological ones. Politics and society shape the emergence and use of power far more than many realistic scholars acknowledge. Countries compete for global influence in different ways, and these differences are often limited to who leads, what type of system they run, and whether their societies support or hinder the exercise of power.
Different managers can perceive power relations differently. They often take actions that are consistent with their respective worldview, rather than those that reflect the actual balance of power or some abstract, objective national interest. Going to war, for example, is almost always a choice that doesn’t have to be made. Sometimes leaders are more aggressive than necessary given the threats they face. Often their personal prejudices shape their perception of national interests and lead them to make decisions that are not in the interests of the people they govern.
Politics and political systems also play a role in whether countries evolve into empowerment. All leaders, from the dictator to the consensual democrat, operate in systems in which they want to retain power. This imperative can either push them into action or hold them back. For example, after France fell to the Nazis in May 1940, US President Franklin Roosevelt believed that the United States had to go to war to destroy Germany’s power. But he wasn’t convinced the American public shared that belief — and he was right. So for a year and a half he did everything he could to get the United States to go to war, but he always shied away from declaring war. In the end, it was Japan’s unexpected attack on Pearl Harbor that got Roosevelt out of his dilemma and the United States into the war.
Different managers can perceive power relations differently.
The role societies play in when and how military power is used is complex. Some societies support military expansion more than others. Some societies convey ideas more efficiently and creatively, and develop or adopt technological advances—both of which are critical to the creation of military power—while others have different priorities. And some societies seem to favor military action far beyond the capabilities of their governments.
Community engagement is not easy to measure, but it obviously makes a big difference in the war in Ukraine. Although Russian leaders like to talk about national sacrifices, they have not called on elites in Moscow or St. Petersburg to join the war. In contrast, Ukraine has mobilized a far larger segment of society. Such social differences play no part in the calculations of the realists, whose writings before the outbreak of war seemed to deny Ukrainians any agency in determining their country’s future. Fortunately, the Ukrainians thought differently.
While community engagement is an elusive quality, it is more commonly found in flexible and pluralistic political systems that are most successful in maintaining—if not attaining—full power. Such systems create military power that is more adaptable and less susceptible to a dictator’s whims. Partly because they need social support to sustain wars, they also create armed forces designed to limit their own casualties, relying more on machines than on personnel to do so. For these reasons, the United Kingdom and United States have had the longest tenures as powers of attorney.
In contrast, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union failed to adapt to the changed circumstances and their strength waned. Germany was doomed by its dictatorial system, which allowed Adolf Hitler to start a global war that was beyond the country’s resources. The result was such a complete defeat that even after Germany had regained its economic strength, neither its political leaders nor its people wanted to restore its military might. For its part, the Soviet Union was weakened by economic weakness, due in part to an inflexible political system that had lost the support of much of the public.
fool me once
Misunderstandings about state power have had dire consequences in recent years and could have even more disastrous consequences in the future. The tendency of Western policymakers to drastically overestimate Russia’s power no doubt influenced their decisions to severely limit military support to Ukraine prior to February 2022. Many argued that the West should not arm Ukraine, as Western weapons would make little difference in a war – and would even make a difference. It’s made worse by giving Ukraine the wrong idea of what it could achieve.
This mindset helped limit aid to Ukraine as the war progressed, leading to increased casualties on both sides and prolonging the conflict. On February 24, 2022, Ukraine was almost fully armed with old Soviet and Russian heavy weapons and aircraft. The only Western weapons that existed were lighter handheld systems. This made it significantly inferior to the more modern systems of Russia. Had Ukraine possessed anything remotely like the arsenal it possesses today – with a range of modern NATO-standard weapons – the Russian military would already have been thoroughly defeated.
Western analysts and policymakers must not make the same mistakes when assessing China’s power. Undoubtedly a force to be reckoned with, China has the ability to create and replicate powerful modern weapons and armed forces that far exceed Russian capabilities. However, China would not fare well against a coalition of the United States, Japan and Taiwan, possibly backed by South Korea and Australia (with tacit or even open support from India and the EU). Such a coalition would have a manufacturing capacity now almost twice that of China, and its armed forces have real experience in conducting complex warfare operations. This would also include societies that want to fight for their freedom – which would make a Chinese military defeat even more likely.
But if China’s power is not to be overstated, neither should the West’s prospects in a future war in the Indo-Pacific be overstated. Such a conflict would be catastrophic for all sides. China would almost certainly suffer massive losses in military hardware when it tried to attack Taiwan. An amphibious assault is the most difficult and complex operation a military can undertake, and China has never attempted such an attempt before, so such an attempt could easily result in a fiasco. Still, a US-led coalition would suffer heavy casualties in such a war.
A proper understanding of power would achieve two important goals: it would make China appear less of a threat to the West, and it would destroy the illusion that power could be used decisively in war. The United States has no reason to be aggressive towards China. She leads a coalition that is in a superior position and that China would take enormous (and almost certainly self-destructive) risks to challenge. Perpetuating the status quo with a non-confrontational approach is far better. For this reason, the concept of a power of attorney is not only useful for understanding the behavior of states in the international arena; It can protect against analytical errors that led to the current disaster in Ukraine.
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