“These misfits saw the giant at the heart of the economy, and they saw it by doing something the rest of the suckers never thought to do: they looked.”
The above quote is from the 2015 film titled The Big Short. The film tells the parallel stories of a number of finance professionals in the mid to late 2000s who made big bucks by predicting that the American real estate market would collapse. Most people assumed the housing market was strong, while the main players in the story did their research and found that those assumptions were wrong.
While not nearly as significant, I’m pondering how the quote applies to the way NFL teams evaluate draft picks in trades. Virtually the entire league operates on the same chart, which assigns a numerical value to each selection. When a trade is closed, people turn to the chart to see if their general manager got good value.
Rarely, however, do you see someone testing whether the chart accurately reflects the true value of each choice.
That’s what came to mind after the Jets’ pursuit of Tyreek Hill. The Jets reportedly offered Kansas City the 35th, 38th, and 69th picks of this year’s draft. Together, these picks add up to 1,315 points. (Kansas City would have sent the Jets a late third-round pick in the deal for Hill, reducing the overall point cost of the trade.)
Some have questioned why the Jets didn’t offer the 10th pick. This selection alone is worth 1,300.
I noticed that the Jets’ pair of second-round picks and their third-round pick total about equal 10 based on the chart. Only 15 points separate them, which according to the table corresponds to a late pick in the sixth round.
The Jets will certainly be tied with other wide receivers in the trade market by the time of the NFL draft in four weeks. That amazed me.
If the Jets put together a package to land someone like DK Metcalf or AJ Brown, would giving up the 10th pick really be the same as giving up 35, 38 and 69?
I decided to collect data on the last 25 NFL drafts, specifically the players who were drafted 10th, 35th, 38th, and 69th overall.
I compared the total number of seasons these players were a main starter for their team, along with Pro Bowls and AP First Team All Pro selections. I also looked at how many of the 25 players had at least one Pro Bowl selection in their careers. Then I did the same with the AP All Pro First Team. (This was because an exceptional player could potentially skew the number of Pro Bowls and All Pros in a way that would make the data unrepresentative, like Tom Brady at pick 199.)
Here are the totals.
Of course, picks 35, 38, and 69 would be part of one pack, so combining them makes sense.
This data paints a pretty clear picture that the two second round picks and the third round together are a better package.
I bet you’re surprised. If one was much more valuable, you might have bet it would be 10th overall.
There are a few things to consider. Obviously you need to allocate three roster slots for 35, 38 and 69, as opposed to a single slot for 10. But is that really a big deal? Even if you miss one or two of these picks, they would take the 54th and 55th player squad spots on the list. You probably wouldn’t eliminate productive players from your team.
You may be wondering about salaries. The 10th overall winner will receive a 4-year contract worth $23.5 million, according to Over the Cap. The three picks on day two total around $25.5 million over four years. So in terms of money, there isn’t much of a difference.
Of course, you need to consider the strengths and weaknesses of a draft class along with your team’s goals. That said, in a neutral situation, it seems clear that you’re going to get significantly more production with the 35th, 38th, and 69th picks than with the 10th pick alone.
This suggests that the Jets would prudently try to give 10 as their first pick if the two options are deemed equal by the other team. The diagram seems wrong. The values of these packages are not the same.
This should also serve as a sort of reminder to the fan base to dampen expectations if the Jets don’t make a deal. There’s a tendency for the team to make a lot of impact this year with two top ten picks. Two top ten picks should equate to two stars, right?
This investigation tells a different story. Fewer than one in three players who have picked 10 overall over the past two and a half decades have even made it onto a single Pro Bowl team. I have a feeling this is one of the reasons the value of picks is so misperceived. In general, NFL fans regard the top ten picks as must-have stars. In fact, in the early stages of the draft, you have to know what you’re doing to hit. A seven in twenty-five chance of landing a Pro Bowler is no laughing matter, but it does show a disconnect between that perception and reality. Trading down from the top ten is probably less costly than you think.
In the same way, giving up pick 10 is probably better than giving up 35, 38, and 69.