Contrary to the statement of the Sûreté du Québec (SQ) in July 2020, not everything that could be done to find Martin Carpentier and his daughters alive has been done. The deputy coroner thus confirms the revelations of the Enquête program of March 2022, which led to the opening of the public inquiry of which he was chairman. We got our hands on his report, which is due to be published on Tuesday.
On July 11, 2020, after a three-day search, the lifeless bodies of sisters Norah and Romy were found in the forest, about 2.5 km from the scene of the accident. Her father’s specimen was found hanging from a tree a few days later, about four kilometers away.
After hearing numerous witnesses, analyzing more than 700 documents and reading more than 250 pages of memoirs, forensic pathologist Luc Malouin delivers a report that is not favorable to the SQ’s leaders.
The police hierarchy needs to seriously question its emergency intervention model and take note of the problems encountered in this case in order to avoid such a situation in the future.
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Coroner Luc Malouin addresses the media, on the first day of the public inquest into the Carpentiers’ deaths at the Quebec courthouse.
Photo: The Canadian Press / Jacques Boissinot
The urgency of the situation
A crashed car left on the highway in Saint-Apollinaire with ice still frozen; a cell phone and a wallet inside. The residents, a father and his two daughters aged six and eleven, cannot be found. It is July 8, 2020, 9:20 p.m.
“To me we clearly and indisputably meet the definition of an enforced disappearance contained in the Guide to Police Practices,” writes Coroner Malouin.
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Martin Carpentier’s vehicle was found damaged on Highway 20 near Saint-Apollinaire.
Photo: Surete du Québec
He concluded that the situation should have been treated as a worst-case scenario as quickly as possible. That was not the case.
Especially since before midnight, on the evening of the accident, the then partner of the children’s mother and a work colleague of Martin Carpentier had expressed their concerns to the police about the father’s mental state.
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Mr. Carpentier’s damaged vehicle.
Photo: Collision Investigation, Sûreté du Québec
Statements, denounces the coroner, whose existence the officials responsible for the file only learned about at the time of his investigation. A situation that he describes as incredible, although it raised doubts about the psychological aspect of Mr. Carpentier and confirmed that his behavior was completely unusual.
It’s an incomprehensible situation, he argues.
I have to point out that somewhere in the police hierarchy someone has forgotten the Police Practice Guides.
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Martin Carpentier is described by his relatives as a present, loving and devoted father to his two daughters since their birth.
Photo: Lemieux family
The coroner also notes, in the light of the public inquiry, that during this operation in July 2020, we in the hierarchical authorities of the SQ repeatedly forgot the idea of the urgency of the situation.
From the beginning of the night after the statements were taken […] All resources should have been made available to carry out the investigation, we read in the Malouin coroner’s report. This did not happen until around 5am the next morning, causing significant delays to further operations.
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The former deputy director general of the Sûreté du Québec, Marcel Savard, was very critical of the management of this operation as part of our report at Enquête.
Photo: Radio-Canada
Too little too late
As Enquête revealed in the broadcast on March 10, 2022, the coroner found that not only had we delayed too long before starting research on site, but it had also not been carried out according to the rules of technology.
Police officers specializing in ground searches were called in at around 5am the day after the accident. The first searches could only begin around 10 a.m. Almost 12 hours after the accident. And there aren’t enough of them.
More than a third of the day was lost due to poor planning and unethical research.
The coroner mentions in his report that the ground search carried out by competent and trained personnel can be summed up in four words: too little, too late.
At approximately 3 p.m. on July 9, the SQ issued an Amber Alert to locate Martin Carpentier and his daughters. On this subject, coroner Luc Malouin doubts whether the warning was useful in this case. Of the 350 pieces of information police received following the alert, none was helpful in advancing the case. In fact, this only led to extensive verification work by the police, which, however, did not lead to any concrete results.
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The AMBER alert to search for Norah and Romy Carpentier attracted numerous journalists to Saint-Apollinaire for several days.
Photo: Facebook Search and Rescue Quebec Metro (RSQM)
The footprint error
It wasn’t until the afternoon, the first day of the search, that a crucial clue was discovered on the ground: a sandal print that exactly matched Norah’s and was found in the car after the accident.
This discovery quickly leads the police to another lead, around 800 meters further, that of the youngest, Romy.
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The discovery of the first footprint corresponds to the print of Norah’s sandal found in the car.
Photo: Confidential
Despite these important clues pointing to the trio moving south, the search had to be called off for the night at around 8:20 p.m. due to a lack of personnel. Norah, Romy and their father Martin Carpentier had been missing for almost 24 hours as we were in the middle of a heat wave.
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Martin Carpentier disappeared with his daughters on the evening of July 8, 2020 after an accident on Highway 20 in Saint-Apollinaire. He walked with them through a trailer before killing them and taking his own life.
Photo: Radio-Canada
The search did not resume until the next morning, July 10, around 9 a.m. The trio has been missing for about 36 hours.
Here too, we in the hierarchical authorities of the SQ have forgotten the idea of the urgency of the situation, the coroner states again in his report. Children are probably somewhere in the forest without food and water. It is urgent to find them.
The SQ is resuming searches in a residential area several kilometers from the last footprint found the previous day because citizens say they heard screaming, contradicting best practices in land searches.
This second day of research was also characterized by a lack of planning and qualified personnel.
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On July 10, the SQ moved the entire search to the area of Rue Veilleux in Saint-Apollinaire.
Photo: Radio-Canada / Marc Andre Turgeon
On the third day of the operation, July 11, the search began for the first time with a sufficient number of specialized police officers and qualified volunteers. Based on the latest clues found on site, they will resume around 7:00 a.m.
The two girls were found dead around dinnertime, about fifty yards apart. The bodies are located very close to the last footprints and just over 2 kilometers from the scene of the accident.
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On July 11, 2020, after discovering the girls’ lifeless bodies, the police continued the search in Saint-Apollinaire to find the father, Martin Carpentier.
Photo: Radio-Canada / Marie-Pier Bouchard
The search then becomes a manhunt for her father, Martin Carpentier. Nine days later, on July 20, he was found dead about four kilometers from his daughters.
Could the girls have been found alive if troops had been deployed quickly and in sufficient numbers?
Some witnesses have claimed this. Experience teaches me to be more careful. The chances of finding her safely would certainly have been greater, but it is uncertain whether this could have been the case to the extent that a hunted man like Mr. Carpentier could have triggered his act, the coroner writes.
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Martin Carpentier’s body was found hanging from a tree behind a residence in Saint-Apollinaire on July 20, 2020.
Photo: The Canadian Press / Jacques Boissinot
Coroner Luc Malouin writes in his report: “The condition of the girls’ bodies at the time of their discovery, with all the possible nuances and reservations of experts in the field, corresponds to a death that occurred approximately 36 hours ago.”
This means that Martin Carpentier would have intervened just over 24 hours after the accident.
Luc Malouin devotes eight pages of his report to the analysis that led him to this conclusion to determine the time of death of the two sisters, Norah and Romy.
The accident, a turning point
The coroner says he is satisfied that the accident was not a voluntary act on Mr Carpentier’s part, but rather a loss of control of his motor vehicle.
This accident, which endangered the lives of his daughters, was the moment he changed. He, a good father, how could he endanger his daughters’ lives with such an accident? Wasn’t it enough that he lost custody of his daughters, the center of his life, his only reason for living?
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Wheel tracks were visible on the median of Highway 20.
Photo: Collision Investigation, Sûreté du Québec
Luc Malouin believes the accident was the turning point that caused Mr Carpentier to panic and irrationally fear losing his daughters.
Given the testimonies collected and the expertise of psychiatrist Alain Lesage, the forensic pathologist is convinced that it was panic that drove Martin Carpentier to flee with his daughters. And it was only in the next few hours, when he began to realize the untenable situation he had put himself in, that the idea of killing his daughters before ending his life occurred to him later.
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The vehicle crashed onto the roadway of Highway 20.
Photo: Collision Investigation, Sûreté du Québec
The psychiatrist explained that at the time of the accident we were dealing with a man who was certainly suffering from an exacerbation of his anxiety-depressive disorder. […] However, did not in any way represent the psychopathology of psychotic depression, which could be suggested by the violent acts he committed between the accident and his suicide.
Organizational pride?
The SQ could have asked partners to staff their research teams with qualified staff, but did not do so.
The coroner points out that she even rejected the Quebec City Police Service’s (SPVQ) offer to put its special teams at her disposal, confirming another revelation from the show Enquête.
On the other side of the river there was a group of qualified and experienced police officers who were to carry out the ground search on the morning of July 9th. But no one asked or accepted the SPVQ’s offer to provide these qualified personnel because this was not common practice.
How come the police hierarchy never thought to ask for this help? Did we have organizational pride?
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The headquarters of the Sûreté du Québec in Montreal.
Photo: Radio-Canada / Ivanoh Demers
The SQ also delayed the convening of the Quebec Association of Search and Rescue Volunteers (AQBRS) and wildlife protection officers.
In his report, Luc Malouin emphasizes the importance of AQBRS volunteers. You will receive training accredited by the Ministry of Public Security (MSP), which must be renewed annually. In addition, each member must take part in around ten training courses every year.
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Martin Simard, a volunteer, helps police comb the wooded area in Saint-Apollinaire in search of Martin Carpentier.
Photo: The Canadian Press / Jacques Boissinot
For some reason the SQ decided to go it alone. The strategic decisions of those responsible certainly affected the smooth conduct of the research, as we cannot rule out that a quick mobilization could have changed the course of events.
Catastrophe predicted
It must be said that on July 8, 2020, the Sûreté du Québec was not ready for a large-scale operation like that of Saint-Apollinaire.
In the middle of the summer and in the middle of the restructuring of the emergency department, it was deprived of its best forces.
The coroner stresses that the SQ’s decision in 2019 to close the permanent emergency units consisting of police officers specializing in ground searches had a damaging impact.
I must note that in July 2020 this unit was unable to respond to the urgency that existed in this case.
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A logo of the Sûreté du Québec. (archive photo)
Photo: Radio-Canada / Ivanoh Demers
Before this closure announcement, there were 150 police officers trained for ground searches, after which there were only 45. The new policy in the event of an enforced disappearance: Call police officers from highway stations who have received basic training.
The coroner was surprised to learn that the SQ had not put in place a plan to deal with unforeseen events. Given this information, it is not surprising that the SQ was short-staffed on July 9 and 10, 2020. Four events occurred simultaneously.
The lack of trained staff is obvious. Furthermore, basic training in terrestrial research is not a long-term solution, he concludes.
Luc Malouin believes that the new model of the SQ can work on the express condition that its members, both those in emergency response and highway stations, are trained regularly and not just once or twice a year, he writes. The future will show us the feasibility of the new structure.
And he adds: If the AQBRS requires its members to complete ten search training courses a year, I don’t understand why we should ask police officers less.
Coroner Luc Malouin therefore issues a series of recommendations aimed exclusively at the Sûreté du Québec.
Amend the Management Policy “Runaways, Disappearances, Kidnappings” ENQ, CRIM.-36 to provide for the presence of two investigators at each disappearance of a child under 13 years of age;
Remind all officials, investigators and police officers of the importance of always viewing the disappearance of a child under 13 as a worst-case scenario and acting accordingly;
Equip vehicles and police officers with the technology necessary to share information collected during a police operation;
Train emergency services police officers, both Pool 1 and Pool 2 police officers, in accordance with national search and rescue standards and ensure skills and experience are maintained in accordance with national standard CSA Z1620-15.
Establish simple and effective partnership and cooperation protocols with other police forces, wildlife officers and Quebec Association of Search and Rescue Volunteers (AQBRS) volunteers and disseminate these protocols to all officers.
If children under 13 go missing, issue a media alert quickly after the disappearance;
Establish a unified command post from the beginning of a ground search operation.
Assign a ground research technician to this command post to act as a liaison between researchers and investigators.
Provide comprehensive feedback at the end of each day.
Better write all operational documents, both for survey work and land research.
Hire two land search technicians as additional personnel are added after initial searches.