“It’s like 2014, even then the Russians wanted more, not just part of the Donbass, but also Odessa and Kharkiv, they wanted to isolate Ukraine from the Black Sea and couldn’t.” Eight years later, they may be forced to stop again and to be content with a minimal goal, the capture of Mariupol in order to link Crimea to Donbass. Qualified sources in Kyiv are therefore commenting with Adnkronos on the change of strategy that Moscow’s military leaders have given their ground forces, a strategy that now sees the Donbass as the “main target” of the “special military operation” against Ukraine last February 24.
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“Russians need to take Mariupol, which continues to resist vigorously, in order to connect Crimea with Donbass, this is the least result explain the sources you could call the possible encirclement of Ukrainian forces a success in demilitarizing the country. All like 2014. And like then, they would also like to take Odessa, but “with the forces they have now, they cannot do it: it could take 56 months to consistently increase the presence of Russian forces,” the sources underline , not all of whom are convinced of the change in strategy.
On the one hand, what was said two days ago by the Moscow General Staff “seems to be an admission of weakness, because in fact the Russians are struggling, they have great difficulties, especially at the logistical level, they have problems with motivating the troops”. At the same time, sources say, “they will leave no stone unturned” to try to build on their achievements as much as possible. And on May 9 the date that has been put forward as a possible deadline for a Russian withdrawal to allow Vladimir Putin to save face and “celebrate victory in Ukraine at the parade in Moscow in Kyiv “they hope, but they have no illusions.” .
In this phase, in which they feel “bolder”, the Ukrainians are less and less willing to cede parts of their territory to the Russians and want to negotiate from a stronger position: when it comes to the question of neutrality, they continue to send signals of openness , they have stiffened in recognizing Crimea and Donbass, while continuing not to trust Moscow on the issue of security guarantees, given what happened to the 1994 Budapest memorandum by which Kyiv agreed to send its nuclear warheads, in Exchange for guarantees from Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, and later also from China and France, for its security, independence and territorial integrity. Guarantees that have obviously proved to be insufficient.