CNN –
Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russian forces has not yet gained the momentum that some overly optimistic observers had expected. So far it feels like the prelude to a larger act.
Offensive operations have so far met with modest success in southern regions like Zaporizhia, as the multi-layered Russian defenses proved difficult to breach. The area is considered Ukraine’s prime target as it would mean breaching Russia’s land bridge between annexed Crimea and east Donetsk.
But there are also signs that Ukraine’s armed forces are widening their bets, trying to stem Russian gains around Bakhmut and exploiting what they see as vulnerabilities elsewhere in the east.
Instead of an overwhelming show of force that concentrates newly formed brigades in one direction, the Ukrainians appear to be trying to pull Russian units in different directions, identifying which might be weak or exploiting lines separating different battalions.
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On Thursday, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, Mykhailo Podolyak, said the first goal was to wipe out as many Russian conscript units as possible and to “increase psychological pressure on the Russian army.”
“At the same time,” he said, “Ukrainian units are testing to find out which areas are the weakest.”
These included new offensive operations centered around Bakhmut, designed to force the Russians to send more units to defend a city that was taking more than six months to destroy and occupy. On Friday, the commander of Ukraine’s land forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said the Russians “continue to move some of the most combat-ready units towards Bakhmut.”
Perhaps more surprisingly, there are signs that the Ukrainians are in the front lines near the city of Donetsk, a long frozen line of contact, and farther south around the equally static but highly kinetic Vuhledar Front.
The Ukrainians have the luxury of picking areas to attack; The Russians must attempt to defend nearly 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) of tortuous front lines, some units of which have already been destroyed and patched up.
Still, it’s a daunting task: especially in the south, Ukrainian forces have to launch a frontal attack against deeply prepared defense positions, and most importantly, they lack air superiority. The Russians had months to strengthen their defenses here; There was never a chance that the Ukrainians would make such rapid progress as they did last autumn in Kharkiv.
Yan Dobronosov/Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images
Destruction in the city of Bakhmut after hostilities on June 1, 2023.
The Institute for the Study of War also warns that it is far too early for takeaways.
“Ukraine has not yet deployed the bulk of its counter-offensive forces and Russia’s defenses are not uniformly strong across all sectors of the front,” it said this week.
Matthew Schmidt, associate professor of national security at the University of New Haven, agrees that there are more questions than answers at this early stage.
“Are the Russians reacting strategically? Are they moving troops and supplies as if they see the current focus of fighting as the main push?” he says.
“Apparently only about a quarter of the entire Ukrainian armed forces are deployed, what is the rest doing? Are the Russians confused as to where they are deployed?”
Ukrainians will hope that the Russian military command, under Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, who now commands troops in Ukraine directly, will make some false statements.
As Mick Ryan, a former General in the Australian Defense Forces, notes, “There’s an old adage: ‘If your enemy makes mistakes, don’t stand in his way.'” Gerasimov has for some time demonstrated an ability to make strategic mistakes to commit”, not least with the ill-conceived first attack in February 2022.
Valentyna Polishchuk/Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images
Ukrainian soldiers lie by the side of the road during training for an operation near Bakhmut June 1.
So far, the Russian approach to defending its lines in the south appears to have worked relatively well, with the Ukrainians losing mine-clearing armor and other armor trying to break through, falling victim to artillery and air raids. Available open-source videos indicate that the high use of anti-tank ammunition is affecting Ukrainian front-line units.
“A first [Russian] “One echelon of forces repels or slows down attacking forces before a second echelon of forces counterattacks an enemy breakthrough,” says the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
One Ukrainian officer recognized the challenge and wrote: “While obstacles can be effectively avoided with demining vehicles, bulldozers, mine plows and other technical devices, this becomes a challenge with the presence of drones that provide real-time data to the enemy, artillery and aviation.”
It’s worth noting that in a hotly contested area, Russian units – belonging to the 58th Combined Arms Army – are among the most effective in the military.
After a poor performance so far, the Russian Air Force could be a game-changer in the coming weeks, says Matthew Schmidt, an associate professor at the University of New Haven. “That will depend on their effective use of glide bombs. Are their rotary aircraft able to operate safely? In other words, is your air force back in the game because it has learned how to counter Ukrainian air defenses?”
Alexander Ermochenko/Portal
A Russian soldier stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant in Russian-controlled Ukraine June 15.
A senior Ukrainian officer admitted to CNN on Friday that Russian airstrikes and artillery were making advances difficult.
“Your aviation operates in waves, as was the case in Vietnam and Afghanistan. They work continuously, all day long, either by helicopter or by plane, and they work all day,” a deputy battalion commander of the Separate Territorial Defense Brigade told a CNN team near Zaporizhia.
He also stressed the lack of aircraft in Ukraine.
“There is a complete lack of aviation support,” he said.
The Ukrainian units in the region had to adapt, often breaking up into smaller groups that were less easy to spot.
Olga Maltseva/AFP/Getty Images
Russian soldiers stand guard June 15 near the Russian-controlled Zaporizhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine.
Schmidt says Ukrainians need to learn fast. “Are troops learning the tricks they need to successfully break through Russian lines so they can teach and lead the next wave of offensives? This learning effect is crucial for the success of the main thrust of the counter-offensive.”
The Ukrainian commander told CNN: “We are advancing and displacing the enemy from their positions, not as fast as we would like, but we are making progress.” In places, the enemy is already panicking and shedding reserves [in] Here.”
If true and widely repeated, Russian forces may be pulled in too many directions to maintain a coherent defense.
To be sure, the Russians have learned some hard lessons in the nearly 18 months of conflict. Russian military bloggers, who frequently criticize the military’s performance, praise the use of electronic warfare capabilities that have disrupted communications and targeting in Ukraine, as precision-guided munitions require GPS coordinates.
The Institute for the Study of War said this week it was “unclear whether Russia’s continued successful EW tactics are due to superior capabilities or improved use of these systems by Russia,” but there is some evidence that they may have led to a have become a priority for Ukrainians.
But much of what matters in the coming weeks will depend on events far from the front lines. Attacks by Ukraine on rear positions – command centers, ammunition and fuel depots – will affect Russian capabilities, as well as the decisions and survival of middle and senior officers on both sides.
Mick Ryan, who also writes the blog Futura Doctrina and follows the conflict in detail, says: “If they can limit fuel and ammunition availability for Russian combat troops, the Ukrainians will limit Russian responses to their tactical or operational attacks and the mobility of theirs.” Limit troops.” Russian reserves.”
We will also not be able to follow the development of the counter-offensive in real time. There will be snippets of information, geolocatable videos often several days old, but secrecy will be a top priority for both sides. Additionally, as one Ukrainian officer puts it: “Operational success is not just about capturing positions, but also about maintaining momentum and advancing after enemy defenses have been breached.”
Where this dynamic develops will be the story of Ukraine’s initiative to take control. How far it progresses may well alter the course of the conflict and affect how it ends.
Foreign policy veterans Richard Haas and Charles Kupchan point out that “when Ukraine’s anticipated offensive is over, Kyiv too may warm to the idea of a negotiated settlement, having done its best on the battlefield and with increasing restrictions on both its own manpower as well as its own forces.” Aid from abroad.”
“Even if the West increases its military aid, Ukraine will be far from defeating Russian forces,” they say.
Others say Ukraine has no choice but to deal a crushing blow to the Kremlin that will ultimately involve retaking Crimea (or at least turning it into purgatory for the Russians).
While some observers consider this a dangerous fantasy, others argue that only such humiliation could deter the Kremlin from a new bout of aggression.
Conclusion: Few would argue that this is the final battle.
Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minister, said that if the offensive succeeds in driving Russian troops out of Ukrainian soil, “it will be the last.” If not, there will be more. If our arms supplies are cut off, Ukraine will simply move on to a lower-intensity war.”