Just before the first anniversary of Russia’s major offensive in his country, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled to Brussels on 9 February. There, senior representatives of the European Union warmly welcomed him and once again affirmed that Ukraine belongs to Europe. It was not by chance, however, that Zelenskyy first traveled to Washington and London. While the EU is providing Ukraine with the same general support as the US, the Americans are providing far more weapons – and weapons are what Ukraine needs most right now.
The EU is not a military actor. Instead, it prides itself on conflict prevention, which is all about creating economic and legal structures conducive to peace. Furthermore, it can boast impressive successes when it comes to post-war reconstruction – for example in the Balkans. Despite this, the EU was unable to stop the Russian invasion, and a defeated Ukraine would not be “rebuilt” by the EU, but by Russia. So it’s no wonder that Zelenskyy is urging the EU to act faster and bolder.
This war is more than a conflict that takes place on EU borders and leaves its mark on Europeans’ electricity and gas bills: Russia’s attack is a response to Ukraine’s ever-closer rapprochement with Europe. Let’s not forget what prompted the first Russian invasion in 2014, when pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled the mass protests he provoked by a last-minute refusal at Moscow’s request to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. .
The EU is inevitably involved in this war and cannot hide behind the great protector USA. Heidi Mauer and her colleagues see Europe as having a “collective responsibility to act” in the face of Russian aggression. But is the EU up to this responsibility? Wolfgang Streeck is not the only European intellectual to answer this question in the negative: “As soon as Realpolitik reared its ugly head, the EU was transformed in an instant into a NATO aid organization tasked, among other things, with writing sanctions and imposing sanctions. it was the least the EU could do in response to an illegal and brutal invasion, but sanctions alone will not steer the course of events on the EU’s eastern border.
Without the US, Europe would be an even more militarily toothless tiger.
The problem is that this war, like the wars in the former Yugoslavia, raises existential questions that pragmatic – or should we say short-sighted – European politicians prefer to avoid. Where are Europe’s borders? Is the US a sui generis power in Europe? Can a civil power like the EU exist in an uncivilized political environment? Should Europe’s economic interests prevail over legal and moral norms? Who will lead Europe when the wars start? Until the EU has convincing answers to these fundamental questions, it will be paralyzed when the first bombs fall.
EU borders have always been fluid. The six founding members of the European Communities have been joined over time by 22 states after adopting a comprehensive set of European laws and regulations. (One such state has already left.) Although Ukraine is far from fulfilling the legal requirements, the president of the EU Commission announced on Twitter: “Ukrainians are ready to die for the European perspective. We want them to live the European dream with us.”
This dream is not the same as EU membership, but millions of Ukrainian refugees within the EU’s borders are, in a way, equivalent to a tacit enlargement of the Union. If the EU participates in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, the country will also become part of the EU, although initially only de facto and not de jure. Is the EU willing to recognize the facts on the ground and welcome Ukraine into its ranks for purely strategic reasons?
The war in Ukraine confirms that the US is (virtually) at the table when the EU makes decisions. Not everyone likes that, but without the US, Europe would be an even more militarily toothless tiger and even more divided politically. That America is committed to Europe cannot be taken for granted. If Donald Trump becomes president for a second time, he and Xi Jinping, China’s president for life, could create a situation that will force the US to change its strategic priorities. This would be the case, for example, if Xi decided to invade Taiwan. Then the EU would no longer have a leading power that would be willing and able to defend the old continent.
Since Brexit, the chances of a European army that can be taken seriously are even worse.
The war once again made it clear that Germany was not up to this leadership task. The country is internally divided and has to defend itself against one or another external hostility. Furthermore, there are many “sovereignists” at the table when the EU takes decisions, which will not allow powers to be transferred to Brussels as far as possible.
In the early months of the war, however, Mario Draghi – the former president of the European Central Bank and later Italian prime minister – showed that it was perfectly possible to lead the seemingly undisciplined club of Europeans through informal leadership. Leadership is not just a matter of personal charisma, but is also, if not largely, about one’s ability to formulate a common political point of view that reflects the values of Europe. How to bridge the gap between Europeans who see Ukrainians as heroes in maintaining Europe’s security and those who see Ukrainians as nothing more than fanatical nationalists challenging Russia’s legitimate security interests?
It would be equally difficult to reconcile economic interests with legal and moral points of view. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU failed to reduce its trade with Moscow, and policies aimed at reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas supplies were implemented only half-heartedly until 2022. EU still spends more money on imports from Russia than on aid to Ukraine. I disagree with those who blame Germany’s trade relations with Russia for the current dilemma. But “business as usual” with people who commit crimes that violate international law is not just immoral, it is suicide by installments.
Does the war in Ukraine give impetus to the creation of a European army? After the Yugoslav succession wars, the EU decided to create a rapid reaction group with 60,000 troops, but this decision has not yet been followed up with action. Since Brexit, the chances of a European army that can be taken seriously are even worse. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, several member states – mainly Germany and Poland – decided to increase their armament budgets, but it is highly questionable whether they will reach the level of capability of British military power in the near future.
The EU will never be a classic military actor.
However, the EU could do much more to promote joint arms procurement or even joint arms production. For example, it could expand the mandate of the European Defense Agency and increase its budget. It could also provide significantly more money for the European Peace Mechanism, which pays for weapons sent by member states to Ukraine and can support future military peacekeeping operations.
Anyone who bemoans American hegemony in Europe must have credible alternatives ready to stave off military threats. Without a concrete security policy commitment, the EU will not be taken seriously by Russia, America, Iran, Syria or Turkey.
The EU will never be a classic military actor, but Europe’s security is not just a matter of the strength of a possible European army. It is also a question of security infrastructure, which also includes areas such as intelligence, logistics, communications and energy – areas where Europe can unite even more politically. Above all, however, security requires a clear compass and a culture of leadership aligned with Europe’s common will.
“This is Europe’s time,” announced the then President of the EC Council and Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos when he and two other EC foreign ministers flew to Yugoslavia in 1991, shortly after the start of war. Unfortunately, Europe did not live up to these grand ambitions at the time and did not follow through with corresponding acts. The course of history is shaped by drastic events such as wars. And it is perfectly legitimate to speak again of “Time for Europe”. But the horrors of Sarajevo and Mariupol, Srebrenica and Bucha teach us that reassuring words are not enough. Bold and swift decisions are needed, followed by concrete actions – otherwise the EU will falter.
This is a joint publication by Social Europe and IPG Journal.
Translated from English by Andreas Bredenfeld