FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT
TEL AVIV – Jihad or Hudna: total holy war or political compromise? Since its founding in December 1987, in the early stages of the first Intifada (the major Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), Hamas's fundamentalist leaders have oscillated between demands for more extremist militancy and the possibility of negotiating an agreement with the State of Israel. With its military involvement, which included suicide bombers, massacres of civilians, religious sermons against the Jews, and the glorification of the liberation of the entire land of Palestine “sanctified by the will of Allah,” Hamas distanced itself from its “competitors,” the secular nationalists Palestinian Liberation Organization that mixes Islam and militancy in pure Muslim Brotherhood style.
But as the possibility of a “hudna” emerged from its leading cadres, which in fundamentalist vocabulary stands for “ceasefire”, more solid than the ceasefire and therefore less strong than full political recognition of the opponent, it also became clear that this was elaboration a consideration of the possibility of a coexistence formula between the Palestinian state and Israel. The momentum increased shortly after Hamas's election victory in Gaza in 2006.
On April 21, 2008, in Damascus, the movement's then-main leader, Khaled Mashaal, publicly offered former American President Jimmy Carter a “10-year hudna,” suggesting that he could have prepared something more stable. But a stalemate ensued, and in the following years even offers of secret negotiations from a staunch advocate of dialogue like Labor's Yossi Beilin failed.
Recent statements by some senior Hamas political leaders in Qatar must be read in light of these thirty years of historical precedent. Two days ago, it was 72-year-old Moussa Abu Marzouk, vice president of the political office, who even went beyond the openings of the past by speaking not of Hudna, but of full recognition of the existence of the State of Israel in return for complete withdrawal this last from the territories occupied in the 1967 war.
A withdrawal that therefore affects not only the Gaza Strip and the entire West Bank, but also all of East Jerusalem. Immediately afterwards, Ismail Haniyeh, his chief in the political office, reiterated that the idea of ruling Gaza without regard to Hamas remained a “mere illusion” and that the war could definitely end tomorrow if Israel opened up to negotiations would. These are statements that must be seen in the context of the rapid developments on the ground following the horrific Hamas massacre on October 7th.
First, the political soul of the Islamic movement seeks to capitalize on political and strategic successes. Hamas managed to push the Palestinian issue to the center of the Middle East just when it seemed that the “Abraham Accords” between Israel and the Gulf monarchies could normalize relations with the Arab world without worsening the situation in the occupied territories take into account. Recent polls also appear to demonstrate the Islamic movement's continued popularity among Gaza's population and its growth in the West Bank to the detriment of the Palestinian Authority, led by Mahmoud Abbas.
Finally, one should not underestimate the internal conflict between the military soul of the movement, which Yahya Sinwar directs with an iron fist in the tunnels of Gaza, and the politicians in double-breasted suits in the big hotels of Qatar. We do not know how much the two sides really communicate with each other, but disagreements and divisions have arisen in the recent past: among others, there are those who claim that Haniyeh did not even know about the preparations for the October 7 attack and Today he is forced to deal with the consequences.
It should also be added that in Israel today no one takes into account the offers of dialogue coming from the jihadists in Doha. The Jerusalem Post's front page headlines about the lack of credibility of Hamas' “charlatans.” Abu Marzouk is accused of playing a “false moderate role-playing game” aimed at muddying the situation to buy time and gain international credibility.
It is not surprising that this is the case. Israeli public opinion remains united in its decision to eliminate Hamas at all costs, and jihadist leaders are fighting for survival.