The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held every five years, opens today at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. 2,300 delegates from across China attend and all the leaders who will lead the party for the next five years are selected, including the absolute leaders.
Most importantly, the Congress opens today that will re-elect Xi Jinping as Party Secretary-General, President of the People’s Republic and Chief of the Armed Forces for an unprecedented third term, in violation of the rules and regulations that had guaranteed the stability of Chinese politics for the past forty years: Xi will be the longest-serving leader since Mao Zedong.
The substantive confirmation of Xi Jinping as the leader of the country and party is taken for granted, but there could be variations in the form and definition of his offices: there has been talk of possible constitutional reforms, which can only be done during the National Congress, which could be limited or more extensive . At the age of 69, the Chinese president appears to have completed his work of centralizing power, transforming the bureaucratic structures and processes of the party and state over the ten years of his presidency.
Especially after a reform passed in 2018 that removed the two-term limit for the presidency, Xi Jinping has the potential to rule for life. One of the reasons of greatest interest of this congress, historically limited to ratifying and making public decisions previously made by party leaders, is precisely to verify whether Xi Jinping intends to name a possible heir among the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the small executive body through which the Party governs China.
Previous leaders had done so, promoting a new-generation official to the inner circle, destined to take the post of general secretary at the next congress in five years’ time. Xi had already broken with this habit in 2017 when, contrary to expectations, he did not present anyone who could replace him: a clear sign of his will to remain in power. He could repeat the same election today: Many observers point out that you do not seem to want to set deadlines for your leadership.
The centralization of power
Xi Jinping’s political transformation of China began immediately after his first election in 2013, with the launch of a major anti-corruption campaign that led to the ousting of some 1.5 million party officials across the country, including seven ministers and members of the Politburo (the 25-member Politburo) and twelve senior generals.
The resulting public trials and exemplary sentences (two high-ranking officials were given suspended death sentences) served to define Xi as a “strongman” in Chinese public opinion and eliminate potential political opponents.
Its political management evolved increasingly from the top down, with the party’s bureaucratic organs charged almost exclusively with ratifying decisions made from above. Although the Chinese leadership has always had a rigid hierarchical structure, before Xi Jinping, the party’s president and secretary had acted as primus inter pares and shared in most decisions. With Xi, these power-sharing processes have been greatly curtailed, if not eliminated.
Another important moment was the 2017 National Congress, not only because of the (implicit) failure to nominate an heir, but also because the Communist Party voted to promulgate its philosophy entitled “Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for “take up” a new era. Previously, only party founder Mao Zedong and economic reform leader Deng Xiaoping were among the major ideologues of the doctrine.
The following year, 2018, was the year of the abolition of the dual term limit: it had been introduced by the will of Deng Xiaoping in 1982, as a measure aimed at removing the temptations of autocracy and the centralization of power a leader instead of at the party. The limitation was intended to avoid the excessive concentration of power of the Mao era and later problems in the subsequent phase. Jang Zeming (president between 1993 and 2003) and Hu Jintao (2003-2013) had conformed, remaining in office for a decade and appointing a designated successor for the second term, who in Hu Jintao’s case was apparently Xi Jinping.
The mandate boundary reform was instead approved on March 1, 2018 during the annual session of China’s parliament, the National People’s Congress: 2,964 votes in favour, two against, three abstentions.
In recent years, Xi Jinping has not only eliminated and pursued the dissensions in the country, but also the debate within the party. This led to Xi himself being weakened, according to Wu Guoguang, a former party member now a researcher at Stanford University in California, who is quoted by Portal: “Today’s leader fears that any self-correction regarding past decisions by opponents could be used to attack him”. This would be one of the explanations for the persistence in pursuing the “zero-COVID” strategy that is holding back the Chinese economy, or for the rigidity of foreign policy decisions.
The Congress, which starts today, will also show how much Xi Jinping wants to revamp the group of officials closest to him who make up the Politburo: An unwritten but respected rule requires that members not be confirmed when they reach the retirement age of 68 reach. There are currently eleven in this state, including chief diplomat Yang Jiechi, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and one of the deputy premier Liu He, who is considered the most respected adviser on economic issues.