US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan made a startling announcement earlier this month: Russia is receiving hundreds of drones from Iran and will begin training with them within weeks.
A major US adversary selling one swarm of drones to another sounds like something out of a Tom Clancy novel – but will the move give Russia the advantage it needs to fundamentally change the course of its war in Ukraine?
For all the theatrics, buying a drone could have as much to do with desperation as with collusion. As terrified as the Pentagon and US officials are that countries like Russia, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, and others are working together, the nature of this deal seems much more in the realm of Iranian opportunism and Russian desperation than the beginning of some big ones Iran-Russia engagement.
Russia’s domestic drone program is lackluster, its industry is struggling to replace lost equipment, and Israel, Russia’s traditional drone partner, is distancing itself from both sides in the conflict. Given that US-oriented drone makers like Turkey are unlikely to sell drones to Russia, only Iran’s domestic drone industry, interest in proliferation, and lack of concerns about political backlash to pull off the move.
The transfer of hundreds of drones is worrying, but the type of drones being sent is very important.
Iran makes dozens of different types of drones, from tiny kamikaze drones to the large attack platforms that most people think of when they think of drone warfare. A 2019 US intelligence survey of the Iranian military found that drones “are Iran’s most rapidly advancing air capability” and their drones can perform reconnaissance, surveillance and reconnaissance, launch munitions, or crash into a target and detonate. Most recently, they have demonstrated the ability to launch drones from surface ships, which extends their range.
Iranian Army Chief Maj. Gen. Abdolrahim Mousavi and Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri visit an underground facility with drones at an undisclosed location in Iran May 28, 2022.
Iranian Army/WANA/R
Sullivan’s announcement provided some clues as to what types of drones Iran might provide. US officials claim Iran presented the Shahed-191 and Shahed-129 to a Russian delegation in June. Unlike Iran’s simple kamikaze drones, which run towards their target and explode, the 191 and 129 are capable of long-range reconnaissance (ISR) and firing ammunition, the latter resembling the infamous US MQ-1 Predator drone.
While a worst-case scenario for Ukraine would be Iran transferring its top-performing drones en masse to Russia, it is more likely that Tehran would want to service its latest systems and send more expendable platforms instead.
In particular, the US announcement mentioned that some of the drones were weaponized, such as Iranian supplies to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Houthis have made extensive use of Iranian-supplied drones to strike military targets in Yemen, attempt to assassinate leaders at public events and attack Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities. According to the United Nations, the main systems used by the Houthis are the Ababil and Samad families, both of which have ISR capabilities and kamikaze variants, but are not as capable as the Shahed-191 and 129, conducting ISR missions and Can fire ammo and return it for reuse. If Iran is already mass-manufacturing these cheaper systems to supply to the Houthis, it would not be difficult or risky for Tehran to sell many to Moscow while providing smaller numbers of 191s and 129s.
The big question is whether the Iranian drones are an indicator that Russia is itself short of drones. Artillery is key to Russia’s advance, and drones with long-range attack capabilities would allow Russia to locate targets and correct artillery fire in real time. According to some estimates, Russia has lost dozens of its own ISR drones, such as the Orlan-10. At the same time, Iranian drones are no less impervious to Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems, raising the question of how long they would outlast the orlans once deployed.
A drone is launched during a large-scale drone combat exercise by the Islamic Republic of Iran Army January 4, 2021 in Semnan, Iran.
Iranian Army/WANA/R
It’s also possible that the drones will complement Russia’s long-range attack options to make their larger weapons more effective. The Houthis often claim that they use their drones in conjunction with missiles, presumably to complicate Saudi Arabia’s air defenses. Russia’s own kamikaze drone appears to be in short supply and doesn’t have the range to strike targets deep in Ukraine. Kamikaze drones could prove a problem for besieged Ukraine’s air defenses, especially when crossing the front lines.
Overall, Ukraine is rightly concerned that Russia can now procure more drones from abroad, but there’s a limit to the tactical damage they can do and strategically it probably won’t make much of a difference.
But if Iran starts transferring more sophisticated UAVs, helps smuggle components Russia lacks, or perhaps negotiates sales of other long-range weapons like missiles — all bets could be off the table.