The organization, the “hold” in the face of aggression, the counterattack. They are the three phases of a conflict that is mainly being fought out between plains, rivers and forests and at the center of which is one protagonist: General Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of the land forces of Ukraine. Not the only one, but certainly relevant.
Born in 1965 in the Russian city of Novinki, the officer attended military school in Moscow and then in 2014 took part in the first phase of the war in Donbass. A critical moment for Ukrainians, with an old-fashioned army riddled with corruption, outdated mentality, lack of funds. Syrskyi grew up in the establishment, was in direct contact with NATO and eventually assumed the current position in 2019. Along with the first, General Valeri Zaluzhnyi, keen to initiate reform of the apparatus, a forward mission in the country was under pressure. A change that was also made with the help of the Western Allies, who were indispensable suppliers for the composition of the brigades.
Close cooperation with NATO espionage and the most sensitive component, the “special operations”. Known aspects that are also shared with the media – such as training programs – that need to be combined with the more confidential aspects. This cooperation became fundamental when the threat from the Kremlin from the battalions stationed on the borders became concrete. At the time, the Zelenskyi government was skeptical about Washington’s warnings of the invasion, didn’t believe them, or perhaps pretended not to believe them. According to the reconstructions, Syrskyj himself had expressed doubts, but this did not prevent him from reacting immediately and, together with the others, denying the US forecast of a defeat of Ukraine “in a few weeks”.
The general took care of the capital’s defenses and created at least two security circuits, which he then divided into sectors and entrusted to carefully selected subordinates. The “Day After” stories claim that the commander gave the officers a great deal of autonomy, allowing them to act without having to wait for a green light from the hierarchy. In other words, as they had been used to doing for decades by consulting Soviet-style manuals. He scattered the few fighters and reserves to save them from the first wave of attacks, he brought all the guns, even outdated “iron” and those used for training.
Greater flexibility than the “Soviet” Goliath, which was slowly advancing towards Kiev. The tactic worked, Putin’s columns had to give up due to noticeable losses and logistical problems. The neo-tsar has changed his aims, focusing on the south and east, torpedoing generals deemed unfit and giving way to Wagner’s mercenary convicts: a constant instability in the chain of command, the opposite of the Ukrainian camp. It was easy for Zelenskyi to recognize the merits of the General Staff, Oleksandr Syrskyi was awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine.
The officer scored new points when he took advantage of the surprise and inefficiency of the occupiers and coordinated the attack in the eastern areas, in the Karkhiv area. A breakthrough with overpowered enemy. One version says that it was Syrskyj who suggested the moves despite the dissenting opinion of his colleagues, other observers seem to be more cautious. The operation cannot depend on a single man, especially when multiple units are involved and inventories are not large. Oftentimes, Ukrainian artillerymen had to ration shots, choose between different priorities, and be mowed down by devastating enemy fire at the cost of enormous soldier casualties.
In any case, the decisive factor is the result and the resistance has achieved it, it will then be the scholars who determine the specific weight of the individuals. The head of the secret service, Kyrylo Budanov, whose blows enabled Kiev to dare to take far-reaching actions, falls into this category. Now they have to think about an even more difficult phase, namely that of the possible offensive on free territories. Compared to winter 2022, Syrskyj has more resources, more ammunition, more experience, but has to contend with inflated expectations and the Russian army, described negatively by critics but still entrenched in a good part of Ukraine.