The visit at Taiwan House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the Chinese military response have highlighted the seriousness of the relationship between them United States and China, reached its historic low. Beijing has raised the escalation level for the straits by a new status quo of military operations represented by both rocket fire and aircraft strikes in Taipei’s Adiz (Air Defense Identification Zone), crossing the “center line” multiple times by passing through the straits. A totally fictitious demarcation for China, but which had previously been relatively respected by the Plaaf (PLA Air Force) in such actions involving Adiz airspace south and north of Formosa.
In some US circles, therefore, a war with China for Taiwan, it has gone from a distant scenario to a frighteningly plausible one. Finally, the US defense has prepared for a war confrontation with its main global rival: all US armed forces have launched new weapons procurement programs and are converting their forces to face a conventional adversary after decades of dealing with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism . Across the Atlantic, however, there are those who believe that not enough is being done and that the United States, despite the commitments it has made in recent years, does not appear to be adequately preparing for such a conflict. The Biden administration laments that it is not following the rhetoric in defense of the island’s independence with the correct approach to military support in the region, and it is believed that it would make more sense for Washington to act as if the United States were could be on the brink of war with a rival nuclear-armed superpower. For the former US Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colbythe changes made so far I’m not up to it the urgency and magnitude of the threat posed by China.
What is certain is that the People’s Republic is in the midst of a process of military empowerment that includes expanding its nuclear forces, building an ocean-going navy, and rapid advances in disruptive military technologies (artificial intelligence, hypersonic systems, and quantum technology) that are in some respects exceed the level of the United States, most recently for example in the hypersonic sector, which sees important advances that will soon close the gap. “acute” and equal to that of the invasion of Ukraine in the months leading up to the current conflict. Defense Department officials also pointed out that a done deal Chinese in Taiwan is a real and urgent danger and at the same time there are serious doubts that the United States can actually win a war against China for Taiwan. We are likely at the beginning of a much more aggressive dynamic in China, mistakenly triggered by Pelosi’s trip. Right now, the Chinese may not be ready for an open conflict over Taiwan, and we think that’s why they don’t want it, but theA military option was always on the table, as President Xi Jinping himself has said more than once, who is heading for a third extraordinary term. The problem of an invasion is related to his own confidentiality: the concentration of troops would have been visible for a long time, but the Chinese are solving this problem by increasing their constant military presence along the coast and, above all, by constant penetrating missions in Taiwan’s Adiz to accustom the island’s defenses and allied observers to order to preserve the element of surprise if an attack is decided. In this deteriorating scenario, the Biden administration has strongly and repeatedly signaled that the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense, further reinforcing the perception that American credibility in Asia is tied to Taiwan’s fate.
These demands are not limited to the political level. On the military side, the Pentagon has not only identified China as the main adversary of its national defense strategy, but has also formally designated Taiwan as the centerpiece of a “pace-setting scenario,” underscoring its commitment to China’s ability to successfully counter any attack. According to some, however, the Biden administration’s actions to increase conventional deterrent capacity in the region, which could effectively counter the Chinese invasion of Taiwan, do not appear to square with its rhetoric: you would spend little in defense compared to what China is doing in percentage terms, and in general even allies of the very important United States, like Japan, are not spending enough. The risk for countries in the region is that unless they adequately reinforce their armed forces, they will be forced to come to terms with China under the threat of its military might. The question is not unique to Taiwan: if China is willing to attack the island and shoulder the resulting international sanctions, why should it confine itself to this front? It is likely that the first shot of the new conflict will actually be fired South China Sea, where Beijing has militarized the islands it illegally occupies in the Spratly Archipelago and, most importantly, is initiating a process of nationalizing this disputed body of water. Here, too, China has proved once again that it is using the tactic of fait accompli, and in so doing has started its gauntlet run against the international regulatory system. This is a global challenge, including Russia, between revisionist and conservative powers: On the one hand there are indeed those who want to rewrite the rules of the international forum according to their own principles, on the other hand there are those who defend the status quo. The continuous Fonop (Freedom of Navigation Operations) missions conducted by the United States in the seas bordering China (and conducted in the Black Sea prior to the conflict) are precisely related to defending the principle of freedom of navigation on the explains seas (and in the skies). ). It is an epochal confrontation between those who want to nationalize certain spaces (including India) and those who fight to keep them open and free. That conflict in Ukraine it is also (but not only) explained in this sense: Russia started the invasion to demonstrate the fallacy of the current international system and above all the willingness to act as a new regulator according to its own principles, which are also shared by China . The war in Ukraine represents a previous important, carefully evaluated by Beijing, which is monitoring the reactions of the international community to the Russian invasion in terms of options to be pursued for the return of Taiwan to the motherland, but also for the next activities in the South China Sea. there US answerTherefore, it can only be uncompromising, both on issues of international prestige (an ineffective response would be interpreted by its Indo-Pacific allies as a sign of weakness) and in continuing to defend its interests as a world power. However, the US military instrument is unlikely to be up to a confrontation tout court with China, since the conflict would be fought not far from the Asian continent, which gives Beijing the advantage of being able to mobilize all its forces in a short time. The United States should concentrate on its bases in Overseas (Japan and South Korea) and those in the Pacific (Guam, Hawaii) leftunknown given by the attitude of other partners such as the Philippines or Vietnam, which could easily fail to take a stand and deny access to US forces, fearing that Washington is not fully committed to their defense given the previous visa in Afghanistan . Therefore, the Pentagon would have to rely almost entirely on itself force projection ability, which is currently being renovated. If there is a perception in the United States that a future conflict with China cannot be won because of the state of its armed forces, there have been those in Beijing for some time who have had the perception that it can be fought and won instead over the signals sent out by Washington, read as weakness, for confidence in both the technological and numerical advances of the People’s Liberation Army. All of these factors together are potentially catastrophic because they paint a scenario.Now or never“.
However, we don’t know if China will attack Taiwan this decade, but it is reasonable to assume that Beijing is far more likely to strike if it concludes that it would be successful, and significant factors suggest it will be this decade than that could judge the most promising. The United States and its allies are nearing, or may be near, a window of vulnerability to Taiwan and the South China Sea, and changes in defense strategy will not materialize in the short term: decisions made now will take years, if not. Decades to bear fruit. Consequently, the United States is in a must Expression of a conventional deterrent effect take swift and decisive action now if they are to avert open conflict, not only to address the immediate threat but also to hope to be ready in the next decade.