Circumstances demand that we act decisively and immediately”, announced Russian President Vladimir Putin exactly one year ago, on the morning of February 24, 2022. Therefore, he ordered “a special military operation to be carried out”. international law The “Wiener Zeitung” spoke with the German political scientist Stephan Bierling, an expert in international relations, about how much this attack has changed Europe’s self-image and what effects it has on the world order.
“Wiener Zeitung”: Before February 24, 2022, hardly anyone, especially in Germany and Austria, could have imagined that Russia would actually attack Ukraine. Where does this lack of imagination come from?
Stephan Bierling: It was based on a naive idea of how the Russian system works and how Putin works. Many signs were ignored, such as the wars in Chechnya or Putin’s attack on Georgia. And you must continue to emphasize that the war in Ukraine did not start in 2022, but in 2014.
So with the annexation of Crimea. . .
. . . and also with the war of Russian troops against Ukraine in Donbass, which claimed the lives of about 8,000 Ukrainians by 2022 – a figure that never reached Germany and was never reflected.
Instead, attempts were made to contain Russia through economic relations, particularly through gas deals, which Germany and Austria in particular continued to make under Putin. Did the concept of “change through trade” fail with the war in Ukraine?
Stephan Bierling is Professor of International Politics and Transatlantic Relations at the University of Regensburg. He has published numerous writings and books on international relations, German and US foreign policy. He also teaches in the US, South Africa, Israel and Australia.
I don’t think it was particularly justified because it was based on the assumption that a mid-sized power like Germany could fundamentally change big and superpowers like Russia or China – that principle still applies to some extent today. This was an illusory idea, which was also politically desired. Because that way you could gloss over your brutal economic interests by presenting them as an idealistic foreign policy.
In response to the Russian attack, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of a turning point. He was referring to the rearmament of the Bundeswehr, but can’t it also be said that there has been a turning point in the entire European security architecture?
“Zeitwende” is a typical German term. Because others in Europe – like the Balts, the Poles or the British – understood long before that the Russians and Putin cannot be appeased. Germany, perhaps along with Austria, lagged behind in understanding that fundamental things had changed. The tipping point was a big announcement, but it ultimately remained a PR stunt. What we’ve seen since then is a slow-motion reversal of German politics. It all started with these 5,000 helmets that we wanted to deliver to Ukraine – and then Germany had to be asked to deliver as they were proactively organizing support for Ukraine in Europe. Last year, a navel-gazing policy was adopted. Austria can pay for it as a small country of no importance in terms of foreign policy – but not Germany as the most populous and financially strongest nation on the European continent and an important partner of NATO.
Has this crisis once again demonstrated the decisive role played by the US in security policy?
Absolutely. The United States provides 75 percent of Ukraine’s support in weapons, humanitarian aid and financial payments. In addition to providing support for Ukraine and military protection for Europe, the United States also offers something Europe is utterly incapable of: providing leadership and political unity. Had the Europeans been left alone in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Kiev would today be in Putin’s hands, and he would have established a regime of his grace there. Ultimately, it is only thanks to America’s perseverance and the persuasiveness of an extraordinarily intelligent president like Joe Biden that the West is united.
Was Putin’s war of aggression also a campaign against the West from the start?
Destruction in Sieverodonetsk in Donbass. “The war started in 2014.”
– © AFP / Fadel Senna
Yes. In his speeches over the past 15 years, it has become increasingly clear that he is developing a phobia about Russia being a victim and being exploited. This is being publicized in the public eye by media loyal to the state. His statement that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century is famous. With such an attitude, you don’t want to work through anything about your own past. Rather, ill-fated imperial traditions from Soviet and tsarist times are being revived.
Now there is another player, China, which maintains its strategic partnership with Russia. What role does it play in the conflict?
China is acting brutally invested in its interests to promote its rise in world politics. And the war in Ukraine, which CP chief Xi Jinping gave the go-ahead in a meeting with Putin at the Beijing Olympics, has been a boon for China: It distracts the US from East Asia, where Biden has his focus and wanted to encircle China. However, the equation did not work out for Xi: he thought that the war in Ukraine would bring a quick victory for Russia, putting China on the winning side and perhaps setting the stage for a future takeover of Taiwan. At the same time, however, Xi is not uninterested in the fact that Putin is weakening. Because Russia is increasingly being forced to side with China, and not on an equal footing, but as a junior partner, if not a supplicant.
But didn’t the war in Ukraine show, especially in relation to Taiwan, that conquering a foreign country is not so easy?
Xi with Putin: “Xi is not uninterested in the fact that Putin is weakening.”
– © AFP / Sputnik / Sergei Bobyloyv
That could very well be the case. Above all, he sent signals that strengthened defenses in East Asia. Taiwan ordered new weapons, Japan dramatically increased its defense spending, and the Philippines moved much closer to the US again.
In the Global South, on the other hand, there is a lot of understanding for Russia’s position, so India, South Africa and Brazil don’t want to break with Moscow. Why is conflict seen differently there than in the West?
If the unifying democratic principle were applied, these nominal democracies would have to side with the West. But these countries don’t want to take sides until it’s clear who the winner is in this conflict – because they’re being courted, they can get the most out of all sides.
In such a dynamic environment, is it appropriate to talk about the new Cold War?
The Cold War is not the appropriate analogy because at that time the conflict between two superpowers encompassed the whole world and almost all states were on the side of one of the two sides. Today we have a different world: Above all, we have a big player, the USA, and a second, not so big one, which is China. Then we have many smaller players, which would include Europeans, Russia or India. Therefore, the current system is much more multipolar. That’s why the possibilities of forming coalitions and forming alliances are much more complicated than in the Cold War.
But hasn’t a new autocratic international emerged that makes uprisings more difficult? If you look at the protests in Myanmar against the military junta or in Iran against those in power, then the regimes there can count on receiving arms from Moscow and diplomatic support from China.
And yes. The Western liberal order is a threat to all despots. Because it is based on human rights, democracy, elections, the rule of law and individual freedoms. No wonder Putin depends primarily on China, Iran and North Korea for support with arms and other goods. This is perfectly understandable in the logic of this axis of autocracies.
Back in Ukraine, do you think the war will end this year?
No, because it will only end when Putin is no longer in power or when Russian troops suffer such defeats that they have to agree to a compromise peace. As long as Russia maintains the upper hand, calls for general mobilization and terrorizes the Ukrainian population, this war will have to go on.